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ABSTRACT

Movements and Political Parties in the 21st Century:
Exploring the Role of ICTs, Human Development, and Political-Activism Culture in East Asia and
Latin America
By Wilneida Negrón

The dynamics between social movements and political parties are shifting in the 21st
century. Due to the emergence of information communication technologies (ICTs), political
parties are facing increased pressure to use ICTs to co-exist, complement, and nurture social
movements and empowered civic communities (Nahon, 2015). However, this shift is not
ahistorical and technologically deterministic. Rather, the shifting relationship between social
movements and political parties is one that can be shaped by a variety of demographic and socioeconomic factors as well as preexisting cultures of resistance, activism, and electoral
campaigning. This research examines potential patterns and casual mechanisms which can help
explain how ICTs enable new political opportunities which can shift relations between
movements and political parties in emerging democracies. Specifically, the case studies reveal
that history matters and that contextual factors such as successive student movements and a
country’s human development, particularly education, can help us understand the changing
relationship between social movements and political parties.
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Chapter One
Political Parties, Social Movements, and Technology in
Networked Societies

The past years have exposed democracy’s structural flaws. Although more than half the
world’s people are living under democratic systems, freedom around the world has declined, and
authoritarian governments have become more repressive (Freedom House 2016). Across the
world, democratic representative institutions are experiencing varying symptoms of political
disaffection and cynicism as seen by low voter turnout in elections and weakening levels of party
loyalty and membership (Mair2007; Webb and White 2009). Consequently, the crisis in
democratic representation and governance has increased the scrutiny of political parties around
the world. Studies have found that legislative branches and political parties are the most salient
targets of public cynicism (Diamond 2014). Therefore, while low voter turnout and decreasing
levels of party membership have been observed in advanced Western democracies since the
1960s (Barnes et al. 1979; Lipset and Schneider 1983; Dalton 1988; Nye 1997; Pharr and
Putnam 2000), changes in citizens’ attachments to political parties continue to be a concerning
and continuing feature of established democracies and in new democracies (Dalton et al 2011).
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Within this context, the emergence of information communication technologies (ICTs)
are believed to be undermining democratic institutions, particularly political parties (Putnam
2000) while they are also empowering the masses. ICTs refer to a range of technologies
available to facilitate communication, community building, and information sharing. They
provide convenient, cheap, and innovative methods of communication such as the Internet,
social networks, email, and mobile/SMS technologies (Hafkin & Huyer 2006). Although ICTs’
influence over politics is constantly evolving and its future developments are not easy to predict
(Vaccari 2008; Bimber 1998, 1999; Budge 1996; Hacker and van Dijk 2000; Weare 2002), ICTs
possess several dynamic characteristics which differentiate them from previous
telecommunication advancements such as newspapers, radio, and television.

Most notably, a significant political outcome of the increased pace and
interconnectedness of ICTs has been their ability to facilitate the development of horizontal
political networks (Bimber and Jorba2012) and to provide opportunities for citizens to increase
and deepen political participation (Lusoli et al 2003; Jordan and Taylor 2004). Therefore,
although political participation via traditional channels such as political parties has waned,
political participation around the world has increased due to the diversification of political
participation enabled by ICTs (Ayres 1999; Bimber 2003; Dalton 2006; Micheletti and
McFarland 2011). Because of these features, ICTs have been found to have a “transformative
potential” which can restructure political power towards a populist direction (Weitzner 2007:
20) and change opportunity structures for political change and the range of possible outcomes
(Howard 2010, Pattie et al. 2003; Negroponte 1995: 229; Dahlberg 2001; Di Maggio 2001; Scott
and Street 2000; Gurak and Logie 2003; Boncheck 1995; Garrett 2006; Schudson 2004;
Rheingold 1993; Schwartz 1996).
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Yet, despite these virtues, scholars have warned against the technological determinism of
ICTs. First, scholars have argued that ICTs’ highly fragmented structure, increasing
commercialization, and inequalities in access and formation of groups (i.e. “digital divide,” see
Norris 2001), prevent them from facilitating dense networks that cross-cut various issues and
identities (Healy 1997; Sunstein 2007; Castells 1999; Norris 2003: 9; Bimber 1998; Corrado
2000; Davis 1999; Davis and Owen 1998; Hill and Hughes 1998; Kamarck and Nye 1999).
Therefore, ICTs have been found to not effectively and equitably provide additional spaces for
political deliberation and participation (Wellman et al 2001; Dahlberg 2001; Papacharissi 2002;
Wilhelm 2000; Feick 2007). This is also often referred to as the “democracy divide,” or people’s
differential usage of ICTs for political purposes, which creates an unequal distribution of power
and influence in political systems (Norris 2001). The emergence of democracy divides raises
critical questions for democracies around the world, as it suggests that there will be an
increasing number of politically marginalized citizens in the digital age.

Putnam (2000) also argues that ICTs will have a detrimental impact on engagement
because they are primarily used for entertainment. Rather, ICTs distract us from civic duties
(Putnam 2000) and make us less thoughtful, less connected (Turkle, 2011; Kavanaugh et al
2005; Van Laer and Van Aelst 2010; Diani 2000; Clark and Themudo 2004; Tilly 2004b).
Consequently, some studies have found that new ICT-enabled forms of political participation
have little substantive impact on real-life political goals (Bimber 2001; Scheufele and Nisbet
2002), contributing only to ‘slacktivism’. Slacktivism refers to political activities that only serve
to increase the feel–good factor of the participants (Morozov 2009). Therefore, citizens may be
lured away from more effective forms of participation whether within political parties or
through other more traditional activist repertoires (Putnam 2000). Finally, scholars argue that
ICTs tend to undermine social cohesion and instead contribute to a “society made up of the
juxtaposition of flows and tribes which cease to be a society and bears the seeds of a new,
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fundamental barbarianism” (Castells 1999: 60). Thus, ICTs, and the “networked individualism”
they produce, intensify this sense of dislocation. Likewise, the multiple channels and outlets
now available for “niche” audiences, fragments voter information and contributes to
“accelerated pluralism” (Bimber 1998; Kriesi 2008; Castells 2009) which makes it harder for the
public to agree on the salience of issues and for political parties to mediate among the differing
opinions (Bennett & Manheim 2006; Bimber 2005, Farrell & Webb 2000; Norris 2000; Prior
2007).

ICTs and People Power from Below

Central to this study is the changing relationship between new forms of activism and
social movements and political parties (Rohlinger 2015). Despite the contradictory claims about
the utility of ICTs in the political sphere, there is ample evidence that ICTs are helping to
increase activism and protest around the world (Carothers and Youngs 2015). The
consequences of this increased activism are twofold. First, the resurgence of “new” electronic,
digital or networked action repertoires, have been found to support the politicization of existing
struggles and issue areas as well as introduce new political players and social issues to
established advocacy spaces (Costanza-Chock 2003; Van Laer and Van Aelst 2010; Della Porta
and Diani 2006; McAdam et al 2001; Taylor & Van Dyke 2004). Second, these new techsupported repertoires of contention are also enabling new opportunity structures. Opportunity
structures are best understood as the contextual factors outside of a social movement which
impact and shape the success and sustainability of movements (McAdam, 1996). Per McAdam
(1996: 42), political opportunities typically are: (1) accessibility of the political system, (2) the
stability or fragmentation of alignments among elites, (3) the presence of elite allies, and (4) the
state’s capacity and propensity for repression. ICTs help to enable new opportunity structures
by helping to accelerate and geographically extend the diffusion of social movements, activism,
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and protest (Myers1994; Ayres1999; Vegh 2003). Therefore, news coverage of protest activity in
one location can increase issue salience across a much broader region, potentially motivating
future actions elsewhere. Finally, ICTs offer modes of communication and organizing that allow
activists to communicate directly with their audience and challenge top-down hierarchical forms
of communications (Scott and Street2000; Kidd2003; Rucht 2004) 1.This levels the playing field
for new emerging groups and political actors.

ICTs and Party Decline or Renewal?
Since ICTs offer new means for citizens to engage in politics and social life, scholars have
tried to understand how citizens and political parties use these technologies. This branch of
research has raised empirical and theoretical questions about how ICTs may promote or
undermine people-party linkages (Stockton 2001; Norris 2003) as well as whether they decrease
citizens’ reliance on elected officials or party organizations (Corrado and Firestone 1999; Budge
1996; Whitley 2010; Gibson and Ward2000; Oates et al. 2006; Lusoli 2005). Two seminal
studies -- Political Parties and Democratic Linkages (Dalton et al 2013) and Political Parties
and the Internet: Net Gain?(Gibson et al 2003)-- provide a comprehensive assessment of how
political parties are adapting to the emergence of ICTs. Both studies find that overall, political
parties will not be undermined by ICTs because political parties are adapting to changes brought
on by ICTs and incorporating these technologies into their practice (Dalton et al 2011; Gibson et
al 2003). Specifically, ICTs have been found to help political parties in several ways.

The Internet potentially allows activists to increasingly circumvent government-imposed barriers to organization
and mobilization. This ability is illustrated in recent failed attempts by authoritarian regimes to censor or block access
to the Internet. Increasing reliance on ICTs in contentious activity also poses a risk for social movements because it
creates new opportunities for demobilization efforts. In many cases, elites and their allies own and/or control the
infrastructure on which new ICTs depend. If a use becomes too threatening, challengers may be denied access to
resources, or a system’s architecture may be modified to prevent undesirable uses.
1
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First, ICTs have been found to provide new avenues of communication which allow
parties to bypass traditional media and communicate directly with the public (Kamarck 1999;
Norris 2003: 26; Römmele 2003, 9–11). This can result in new forms of interactivity and
deliberation that would contribute to more direct forms of democracy (Grossman 1995; Budge
1996). Second, they bring several benefits for minor parties, such as the ability to accurately
portray what a party stands for, recruit new members, engage in fund raising, provide timely
information, and mobilize grassroots activists in a timely and cost-effective manner.
Consequently, ICTs have been found to “equalize” the electoral playing field by reducing the cost
of campaigning as well as reducing regulatory and financial barriers (Gibson & Ward 1998;
Rheingold 2000). This can increase the ability for fringe and minor opposition parties to get
their message out and mobilize supporters like major parties (Margolis & Resnick 2000;
Margolis et al. 2003: 57–8; Barber 2001; Corrado and Firestone 1999; Hagen and Mayer 2000;
Norris 2001). Finally, the emergence of political party Web sites and various social media
accounts used by political parties are believed to have a direct impact in terms of engaging
voters on policy issues and encouraging people to go out and vote.

However, while political parties around the world appear to be adapting to these
technologies, questions have surfaced regarding their ability to transform and deepen peopleparty linkages, and hence, representation. Norris (2009) argues that, on a global basis, the
penetration of Internet usage is a greater predictor than democratization of whether political
parties of a nation will maintain a Web presence. Therefore, she argues that “the strongest and
most significant indicator of the presence of all parties online is technological diffusion,
measured by the proportion of the population online, followed by levels of socioeconomic
development” (9). At the same time, evidence shows that the interactivity often attributed to
ICTs does not always result in effective forms of deliberation and communication between
voters and political parties (Gibson et al 2003). Rather, party’s use of ICTs has become an

6

additional tool in their repertoire of politicking and marketing, thereby existing right alongside
more traditional forms of communication. Most notably, scholars have found that in mature
western democracies such as the US, UK, and Norway (Jackson and Lilleker 2009; Kalnes 2009;
Foot and Schneider 2006), political parties’ use of ICTs resembles more ill-defined attempts to
join a marketing bandwagon than a conscious and well-planned strategic effort to connect with
voters (Bimber and Davis 2003).

These findings have led to the conclusion that political parties are not necessarily using
ICTs to create an “informational democracy” (Castells 1996), facilitate a new civic arena (Stoker
2006; White 1997; Bimber 1999, 2001; Comfield 2000; Dahlgren 2000), or enhance or broaden
participation among disengaged groups (Tedesco 2007; Jackson and Lilleker 2009; Norris
2003). Rather, political parties are primarily using ICTs to improve the speed of organizational
communication (Bentivegna 2006: 336) and mostly communicate with current supporters or
what Bimber and Davis call “preaching to the converted" (2003: 54). Consequently, ICTs have
also been found to increase the costs of campaigning and the day-to-day party operations for
political parties, because they do not replace existing traditional communication methods. So,
parties now must allocate funding for additional technology-savvy staff or consultants which can
be a large expense (Norris 2004; Bimber and Davis 2003). Thus, politicians now face pressure
to modernize, as they increasingly must maintain official blogs and social media accounts.

The political use of ICTs’ by political parties is often explained by the demographic
hypothesis. This hypothesis states that the use of ICTs’ for political purposes depends on the
demographic profile of the individuals using them as well as the overall demographic profile of
the country (Della Porta 2006). Specifically, studies have found that citizen resources and
motivation, socioeconomic development, the character of civil society (Norris 2002); the digital
divide, the media system, and the institutional setting (Anduiza et al 2012: 8) are some of the
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key individual and country factors which shape the democratic utility of ICTs. Studies have also
found that the existence of low broadband Internet, prevailing political apathy, and distrust of
political parties are factors which could discourage political parties from using these
technologies to transform party-citizen linkages (Loulis 2003; Schmitter 2003).

Finally, as noted earlier, the ability of social movements to leverage ICTs has been
changing the dynamics between movements and political parties. Internet-savvy movements
can help fill in gaps in party structures. Thus, ICTs are crucial to the proliferation of nontraditional third-party actors (Farrell and Schmitt-Beck, 2008), including new issue-centered or
identity-based movements (Castells, 2010) and new movement parties (NMPs) (Gunther and
Diamond 2001; Schmitter 2001). Therefore, many argue that ICTs have the potential to alter
the cultural context in which politics happens, thereby altering politics itself (Howard 2003).
Scholars argue that if traditional political institutions are perceived as unresponsive,
nonhierarchical communication and organizing channels such as these will continue to increase
in popularity (Little 2008; Bang 2005). Take the case of the newly-created “Podemos” (We Can)
party in Spain, which originated from an electoral program that brought together the main
demands made by the various social movements that arose during the wave of opposition to
austerity policies (Chadwick and Strommer-Galley2016; Casero-Ripollés et al 2016). Supported
through various crowdfunding campaigns, the Podemos party has the most followers on social
networks, compared with the two main parties2. Likewise, in Italy we have seen the rise of the
Five Star Movement (M5S), a hybrid fusion of political party, celebrity culture, populism, online
mobilization, and street protest (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2015; Natale and Ballatore 2014).

In the December 20, 2015, National Elections in Spain, the Podemos Party received 20.65% of the vote and won 69
out of 350 seats in the parliament. As a result, many have concluded that they have officially ended the two-party
system in Spain.
2
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These parties-as-movements efforts in Spain and Italy, show the growing potential for
new more grassroots-driven party forms which may rely on peer-to-peer models of organizing
and fundraising. They highlight the ways that parties are being renewed from the outside in, as
digitally enabled citizens breathe new life into an old form by partly remaking it in their own
participatory image (Chadwick and Strommer-Galley 2016). Therefore, the party
organizational form is highly uncertain in the 21st century and it will be critical to continue
studying the changing relationship between social movements and political parties (Coleman
2017; Chadwick and Strommer-Galley 2016).

Finally, there is a need to explore the changing nature of electoral politics in nonWestern contexts. In less established democratic countries ICTs have often been found to be
dynamic and “liberating technologies” (Diamond 2010). From Turkey, Malaysia, Philippines,
Thailand, and Indonesia’s recent 2014 Presidential elections, empirical evidence shows how
ICTs can maximize voter volatility during elections (Howard 2010: 3). Likewise, in South Korea,
Philippines, and Indonesia, mobile phones were also successfully used for mobilization, leading
to the rise of what some call "networked politics" (Castells 1997; Webster 2001; Juris 2004).
Consequently, some of the case studies that follow show how ICTs can help promote important
power shifts in societies (Tan 2010; March 2006) which can have electoral impact. These cases
also highlight how ICTs role and impact in societies are often shaped by a variety of factors such
as existing cultures of activism, resistance, institutional context, levels of technological
development, and existing political practices and orientations (Jorba et al 2012: 241).

People Power and the Transformation of Political Parties in the
Digital Age: Research Design
This study explores the shifting relationships between political parties and social
movements in emerging democracies. Specifically, it seeks to understand how intermediary
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factors such as demographic, socio-economic, and cultural factors (e.g. resistance, activism, and
electoral campaign culture) interact with ICTs to shape relations between social movements and
political parties in the 21st century. To do this, I incorporate four sets of scholarly literature that
rarely interact with each other - literatures on social movements, digital media, technology, and
democracy (Porta 2011). For example, the need to incorporate the growing literature on the role
of digital media into democratization studies is becoming relevant. Scholars have begun
introducing new theories on how political communication now works and how politics is
increasingly defined by organizations, groups, and individuals who are best able to blend older
and newer media logics, in what has been coined a hybrid system (Chadwick 2016). Therefore,
the study of how digital media is created and consumed by activists and how this changes
activism and political parties will be a growing area of research (Coleman 2017; Chadwick and
Strommer-Galley 2016).
This study uses a “nested analysis”, combining a large-N quantitative analyses of 80
countries with small-N studies to identify broad trends related to level of Internet usage and
socio-economic factors which could impede or promote it. This is followed by four case studies
or small-N comparisons that will help me identify how contextual factors such as party politics
and history of mobilizations can help explain how ICTs are being used to shape politics and
democracies in these countries today. The case studies will also allow me to highlight the more
subtle, contingent, and unpredictable ways that ICTs are bringing new negotiated relationships
between political parties, civil society, and citizens. To lay the groundwork for exploring the role
of ICTs, digital media, and social movements in shaping political parties, I begin the study with
a quantitative analysis in Chapter 2. This chapter seeks to identify which country-level and
demographic factors can best explain differences between the countries in how ICTs and digital
media may be created and utilized by movements.
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The two main case studies that follow in chapters 3 and 4, Taiwan and Chile, highlight
the ways that social movements are utilizing ICTs to create new political opportunity structures
which may shift relations between social movements and political parties in countries with high
levels of human development, ICT usage and education, and strong movement legacies.
Findings from surveys with student activists and political parties in Taiwan and Chile illustrate
the divergent views that exist among activists and mainstream political parties. As noted earlier,
political parties in Taiwan and Chile maybe renewed from the outside in, due to established
parties’ reluctance to use ICTs to enable more participatory engagement. Meanwhile, “nonestablishment” politicians that opt for less bureaucratic and dynamic forms of ICT-enabled
engagement are winning notable elections, such as with the election of Dr. Ko Wen-je to become
the new Mayor of Taipei and election of several Chilean student movement leaders such as
Camila Vallejoin the 2013 Congressional elections. Whether citizens will be able to breathe new
life into established political parties (Chadwick and Strommer-Galley 2016), remains to be seen
and makes studying the changing relationship between social movements and political parties’
essential for the 21st century (Coleman, 2017; Chadwick and Strommer-Galley 2016).

The comparative case studies of Indonesia and Peru in Chapter 5 allow me to test
whether the same patterns can be found in two countries with lower levels of human
development, education and ICT penetration, and weaker movement legacies, and to identify
other enabling or disenabling factors which may shape how ICTs abilities to create new political
opportunity structures. I find that in all the case studies, ICTs are facilitating at least one kind of
political opportunity, such as: (1) elevating domestic issues to the international arena, (2)
supporting the election of “third party” non-establishment candidates, (3) facilitating peer-topeer communications which strengthen alternative and common/shared views and perspectives
and challenge elite discourse, (4) creating new civic accountability and transparency
communities, and (5) diversifying and complementing organizing, mobilizing, and movement
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building strategies. Taiwan, with a high level of education and Internet usage, is the only one of
the four in which all five of these political opportunities are being created. However, since the
emergence of ICTs, Indonesia, a country with less wealth, human development, educational
outcomes, and Internet usage, has experienced at least four of the political opportunities
outlined above. This suggests the role of other preexisting factors such as culture of resistance,
activism, and electoral campaigns which can help us to understand why ICTs have been so
influential there and not in other countries such as Peru.

Finally, the four case studies draw upon results from a content analysis of 82 websites
and social media profiles for established parties in Chile, Taiwan, Indonesia, and Peru
performed by myself and the research assistants. The content analysis sought to understand: (a)
which parties are currently online ;(b) how they are using their websites and social media
profiles to engage with citizens; and (c) how active and vibrant are the online communities they
are supporting. The conclusion suggests that many major parties have been relatively
conservative in adapting to the Internet, but one of the most important impacts of ICTs may be
to empower challenger and insurgent parties lacking traditional resources.

Table 1: Case Study Countries: Key Contextual Factors

Countries

Chile

Taiwan

3
4

Structure
of
movement
&
mobilizati
ons
Universities,
NGO/Civil
society
partners
Universities,
NGO/Civil
society
partners

HDI

Literacy3

Tertiary
Education4

Internet Users %
of Population

High

97.3% High

High

66.5%

Very High

98.5% High

Very High

80%

UNESCO Institute for Statistics. September 2015.
World Development Indicators, UNESCO Institute for Statistics
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Indonesia

Peru

Universities,
NGO/Civil
society
partners
NGO/Civil
society
partners

Medium

93.9% High

Low

15.8%

Medium

94.5% High

Medium-low

39.2%

Ultimately, this dissertation shows that history matters for understanding both how
political parties incorporate technology into their practices and the relationship between new
social movements and political parties. Specifically, I find that this relationship is shaped by a
variety of demographic and socio-economic factors as well as preexisting cultures of resistance,
activism, and electoral campaigning. In Taiwan and Chile, we learn of the ways that traditional
political parties are adapting to changing demands and expectations brought on by ICTs (Dalton
et al 2013). However, preexisting cultures of resistance and activism and the socioeconomic
context in those countries may determine if political parties will be able to shift to become more
inclusive and participatory and learn to coexist, complement and nurture social movements and
empowered civic communities (Nahon 2015). Meanwhile, the secondary case studies of Peru
and Indonesia emphasize the way that socioeconomic context interacts with preexisting cultures
to create different outcomes in these more similar countries. In Indonesia, the preexisting
culture of resistance and activism among youth has contributed to a vibrant and active student
movements and activism enabled by ICTs that can overcome Indonesia’s socioeconomic
challenges. In Peru, however, despite being wealthier, more educated, and technologyconnected population, a preexisting culture of political apathy and lack of trust for political
institutions has led to a weakened ICT-enabled activism.
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Chapter Two
Contextualizing the Political Uses of ICTs
Around the World

This chapter explores socioeconomic and demographic factors which can shape Internet
usage in countries. This study argues that these factors alone cannot explain why and how
citizens and groups use and leverage technologies in different contexts. However, they can help
us isolate and identify other intermediary factors such as preexisting political culture, activism,
and resistance which may help to explain how political actors and citizens use and leverage
ICTs. To explore this, I grouped socioeconomic factors by two main categories: (a) country-level
and (b) demographic factors. I then developed a sample of 77 countries with populations
greater than 500,000 in 2004, plus Taiwan. Taiwan is included in the data set because it is one
of the four cases analyzed in subsequent chapters and because its government makes policy as a
national government would. This is the largest sample I could put together which would have
complete data for all the variables I am interested in. In addition, the analyses reported are
cross-sectional in that I compare countries at a single point in time, instead of over time (good
time series data are available only for some of the variables).
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Extensive comparative work has found that Internet use is contingent on institutional
arrangements, political circumstances, levels of socioeconomic development, and demographic
factors (Jorba and Bimber 2012; Rosenstone & Hansen 1993; Thomas, 1982; Verba & Nie 1972;
Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995). Figure 1outlines some plausible associations between
Internet usage and additional contextual factors. This figure is not meant to present a complete
picture, but rather an attempt to highlight additional key variables which can affect Internet use
and hence, ICT-enabled political participation. In the figure, country-level factors refer to those
specific structural aspects of a country such as geography, economy, and politics. Specifically, I
have chosen to focus on population density, income inequality, democracy/democracy
experience, human development, and political freedom.
Figure 1: Model Guiding Quantitative Analysis

Internet Usage

Wealth

ICT Infrastructure

Demographic
factors

Country-level
factors
Population density - PD
Income inequality - GINI
Democracy experience- Polity
Human Development - HDI
Political Freedom – Freedom

Education - EDU
Gender – FEM
Youth pop. – Youth
Literacy - Literacy
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Demographic factors are those factors which represent socioeconomic characteristics of citizens.
The four demographic factors I have chosen to focus on are education level, gender, age as
reflected by the percentage of youth population, and the literacy rates of citizens (Kum 2008;
Van Dijk 2005; Norris 2001; Castells 2001; Wilson 2006; DiMaggio et al 2007) are factors
found to influence Internet use. Finally, I expect these factors to not only function
independently, but also have interrelated effects. Thus, it is unlikely that they would exhibit the
same outcomes across nations.

The Diffusion of the Internet in International Context
Nearly half of the world’s people have Internet access. Forty-five percent of Internet
users are in Asia and 10.4% are in Latin American and Caribbean (Internet World Stats, 2012).
Together these regions account for over half of the Internet users in the world - and this number
is growing. For the past twenty years, Internet use around the world has been increasing
(Archibugi and Coco 2004, Leiner et al. 2009, Odlyzko 2001). Although there is no reliable data
on the size of the world’s online population, estimates suggest that the number of Internet users
in the world has increased from 40 million in 1995, to over 3 billion in 2014 (ITU, 2014) 5. This
means that the global penetration rate of the Internet has increased from less than 0.1% in 1991
to 42.3% in 20146. However, despite rapid worldwide diffusion of the Internet, a
disproportionate number of users are concentrated in more developed countries, especially in
North America, Australia, and Europe. Table 2 shows the disparities that exist among the
world’s regions (Chen and Wellman, 2003).

6Internet

Usage and World Population Statistics are for June 30, 2014.
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Table 2: World Internet Usage and Population Statistics
Regions

Internet Users

% of Population

North America

310,322,257

87.7%

Australia/Oceania

26,789,942

72.9%

Europe

582,441,059

70.5%

Latin America

320,312,562

52.3%

Middle East

111,809,510

48.3%

Asia

1,386,188,112

34.7%

Africa

297,885,898

26.5%

World Total

3,035,749,340

42.3%

Source: Internet Usage and World Population Statistics are for June 30, 2014. Demographic (Population) numbers
are based on data from the US Census Bureau and local census agencies. Internet usage information comes from data
published by Nielsen Online, by the International Telecommunications Union, by GfK, local ICT Regulators and other
reliable sources. Internet World Stats 2014.

Over the years, the diffusion of the Internet (and accompanying technologies) has
occurred regardless of significant within-country differences in socioeconomic, political,
cultural, social, and technological factors. The term “digital divide” is often used to describe the
gap that occurs when country demographic factors don’t align with the expansion of Internet
and technology use. Specifically, this term was introduced in the early 21st century (Dewan et
al., 2004; Norris, 2001; Sidorenko and Findlay, 2001; Castells 2001; Kirkman et al. 2002;
Mosaic Group 1998; Norris 2001; Rogers, 2001) to study and measure the gap and causes that
were emerging between individuals and countries that have the resources to access and use the
Internet with those that do not (Wilson, 2006; Milner, 2006). Therefore, even in countries with
high levels of Internet use, there could still be considerable inequities in access between and
within specific subpopulations, especially when looking at age or gender.
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Country-level Factors
Population density
The population density of a country can promote or impede Internet access for citizens.
Studies have shown that rural areas with low population density have less technology
infrastructure than more densely populated urban areas. Rural low-population areas are
generally characterized as having lower access to basic infrastructure such as electricity, clean
water, schools, medical clinics, roads, etc., – let alone infrastructure for Internet and other
information technologies (Bazar and Boalch, 1997). On the other hand, there are several
reasons why heavily populated urban areas are often associated with abundant communication
and information technology infrastructure. First, densely populated urban areas tend to enjoy
higher incomes, thereby making Internet access more affordable to more citizens (Xiaoming and
Kay, 2004; Kim, 2007; Horrigan et. al., 2005; United Nations Publications, 2003; Prieger,
2003; Moss, et al., 2000; Morrill, et al, 1988). Consequently, it is no surprise that when you
map out Internet usage by area, scholars have found that Internet has mainly diffused in urban
areas among the comparatively wealthy and educated (Rogers, 2000; Rogers, 1995; Lim, 2005;
Horrigan et. al., 2005; Birba and Diagne, 2012). Second, greater proximity to fiber lines reduces
the cost of the Internet while also increasing the quality of Internet connections. This means
that for approximately 70% of the world’s poor who reside in rural areas (McKinsely &
Company, 2014), Internet access will be very limited. This has led scholars to conclude that
when studying the global digital divide, existing telecommunication infrastructure between high
and low-density population areas is crucial to understand the variation in the spread of the
Internet (Kelly and Petrazzini, 1997). Finally, studies have found that key causes of the Arab
Spring were a combination of disaffected citizens and high rate of youth unemployment all
coexisting in densely packed urban settlements (Hussain and Howard, 2013). Therefore, based
on these studies I can formulate the following hypothesis:
H1: The greater the population density, the higher the Internet usage.
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Income inequality
Studies have shown how economic factors, especially income level (Kum, 2008), can
significantly impact Internet diffusion at the national levels (Distaso, et al., 2004; GarciaMurillo & Gabel, 2003; Kim, et al 2003; Ismail & Wu; 2003). As a result, it is often a strong
predictor for Internet use (Viswanath and Finnegan, 1996; Hargittai, 1999; Guillen and Suarez,
2001; Maitland and Bauer, 2001; Chinn and Fairlie, 2004; Norris, 2001:58-64; Chen et al,
2002). Additionally, studies looking at how income inequality (measured by the Gini
coefficient) influences the digital divide have determined that it is an important influencing
factor on Internet use (Fuchs, 2009). According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF,
2008) and OECD (2011), while income can help to predict Internet use, Internet use is also
increasing the wage gap between the very highly skilled and everyone else. Thus, technological
progress is often referred to as the single biggest factor driving income inequality in both
advanced and developing countries (IMF, 2008; OECD, 2011). Therefore, while some countries
experience a decline in their socioeconomic divide, the digital divide in other countries
continues to increase along the lines of income and education (Chen, 2004). Finally, lower
levels of inequality — as measured by Gini coefficient — have been found to be related to higher
levels of access (Web Index Report, 2014). I can expect:
H2: The lower the income inequality, the greater the Internet usage.
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Democratic experience

Even though the relationship between democratic governments and Internet use is
highly contested (Best and Wade, 2009), a study looking at 190 countries from 1991 to 2001,
Milner (2006) found that a country's regime type can influence citizens’ use of the Internet, even
when controlling for other economic, technological, political, and sociological factors. Other
studies have found that democracies have historically been the prevalent regime during the early
stages of the worldwide diffusion of the Internet (Guillen and Suarez, 2005; Norris 2001:58-64;
van Disk, 1999). Likewise, when controlling for economic development and income, democratic
political regimes have been shown to enable faster growth of the Internet than authoritarian or
totalitarian regimes (Guillen and Suarez, 2005; Borrow, 1973-1974; Norris 2001:60-61, 100-101;
Milner, 2006). While Internet use still does take place in more authoritarian countries, the
belief is that users in democracies still have much more autonomy over the information they can
access and over the various information technologies they can use than those in authoritarian
settings (Guillen and Suarez, 2005; Havick, 2000). In authoritarian states, there is usually
rampant state surveillance and restrictions are often put on Internet and other personal
freedoms. For example, in countries such as North Korea, Vietnam, China, and Cuba
governments directly control all the physical access to the Internet (Boas 2000; Drake, Kelathil
and Boas, 2000). For example, in China and Vietnam, democracy advocates or cyber-dissidents
have been arrested and received harsh sentences for their pro-democracy activities online
(Abbott 2001; Cooper 2000; Taubman, 1998). As a result, Norris (2001) argues that the greater
civil liberties of democracy are consistent with greater access to and use of the Internet and
democratic governments find it more difficult to censor free expression on the Internet than on
television. Therefore, we would expect Internet usage to thrive in these conditions. Therefore, I
can formulate the following hypothesis:
H3: The more democratic the regime, the higher the Internet usage.
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Human Development
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) periodically releases a Human
Development Report to measure human development levels. The key metric used in their
reports is the Human Development Index (HDI) which measures progress in health, education,
and income over the past 40 years (UNDP Human Development Report, 2010). This index is
then used to distinguish between developed and developing countries. Since the emergence of
the Internet and ICTs, policy and program priority has been placed on the relationship between
ICTs, globalization, and human development by the United Nations (Birdsall, 2005). For
example, the importance of ICTs to human development is a recurring theme in the annual
UNDP Human Development Reports (HDR). The 1999 HDR report, Globalization with a
Human Face, includes an entire chapter on "New Technologies and the Global Race for
Knowledge" (UNDP, 1999). At the same time, a 2003 report links technology and human
development as a means of providing access to global knowledge and helping to pull people out
of poverty (UNDP, 2003, pp. 157–160; Birdsall, 2005). Consequently, although the relationship
between ICTs and human development continues to be contested, the widespread benefits
credited to ICTs have led key national and international actors to see them as central to all facets
of development — including globalization, human development, human rights and democracy,
poverty and economic development, and culture (Birdsall, 2005).

Studies have also found an increasingly positive correlation between human
development level and Internet penetration rate (Pratama and Al-Shaikh, 2012; J.K., 2011). Not
surprisingly, this also means that developed countries often have a significantly higher Internet
penetration rate compared with the developing countries. This positive correlation results
suggests that an improvement in health, literacy and income levels can result in positive effects
on Internet usage. It is important to point out that Internet use appears to be growing at a faster
rate in developing countries than in developed countries (Pratama and Al-Shaikh, 2012). So,
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the next ten years will be telling whether developed countries will be able to catch up with
developed countries with regards to Internet usage. Therefore, I can make the following
hypothesis:
H4: The higher the level of human development, the greater the Internet
use.
Freedom
A country’s laws regarding freedom of speech can provide key insights regarding Internet
use among citizens. However, this relationship is complex and studies have produced mixed
results. First, as noted in the previous section on democracy/democratic experience, in
nondemocratic systems, which lack protection for personal freedoms, governments may survey
or censor online speech and prosecute the expression of opposing online opinions (Du, 1999;
Euromonitor International, 2003; Goonasekera, 2001; Wunnava and Leiter, 2009; Rotberg,
2008). The UNDP have also found that major factors limiting the Internet access are (1)
government opposition to the Internet and (2) lack of communication freedom (UNDP, 2003).
Therefore, we would not expect Internet use to thrive under these conditions.

Second, other studies have found that although there is an assumed link between
political freedom and the deployment and use of the Internet in a country, this relationship is
not always significant (Xiaoming and Kay, 2004). A study of 28 Asian countries failed to show a
significant relationship between political freedom and Internet development (Xiaoming and
Kay, 2004). Instead, these scholars have noted the existence of a big range in terms of political
freedom among those countries that have low Internet penetration. For example, countries like
India, Indonesia, Thailand (at the time of the study) and the Philippines may enjoy greater
political freedom in Asia; their Internet use is relatively low. Meanwhile, countries like
Singapore may score poorly in terms of political freedom but its Internet penetration is higher
than most other Asian countries in the study (Xiaoming and Kay, 2004).
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Finally, a disturbing trend has been emerging wherein Internet freedom around the
world has declined for the fourth year in a row, as more countries introduce aggressive online
censorship measures (Freedom House, 2016). Freedom on the Net 2016, the fifth-annual report
released by Freedom House, found that of the 65 countries assessed, 36 experienced a negative
trajectory in online freedom between May 2013 and May 2014 (Freedom House, 2016). This was
due to factors such as blocked social networks, aggressive online surveillance and cyberattacks,
and the intimidation and arrests of journalists and digital activists. Therefore, although one
could conclude that countries that are politically less free are more likely to have lower Internet
usage and penetration rates, this is a trend that could change in the coming years. Therefore, to
test if there is really a relationship between political freedom and Internet use, I hypothesize:
H5: Political freedom will not show a strong influence on Internet usage

Demographic Factors
Gender
As noted earlier, studies have found that the offline population around the world are
disproportionately rural, poor, illiterate, elderly, and female (Mendoza & Alvarez de Toledo,
1997; Atkin et. al, 1998; Lin, 1988; Liu & San, 2006; Dutta & Roy, 2004; Dholakia et al., 2003).
Therefore, gender is a common theme as studies have found that men are more likely than
women both to access and to use the Internet (Chen and Wellman, 2003). The gender digital
divide is often considered one of the most prominent instances of digital divide around the
world (Liff and Shepherd, 2004). Scholars have found two statistically significant gender gaps
that exist regarding the Internet: (1) in access and (2) in use (Bimber, 2000). The access-gap is
not the product of gender-specific factors, but is explained by socioeconomic and other
differences between men and women. The use-gap is the result of both socioeconomics and
some combination of underlying gender-specific phenomena (Bimber, 2000). Specifically, these
gender disparities are often due to male–female cultural differences; differences in
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specialization, preferences for jobs, and education and literacy; complex interactions among the
features of the Internet and gender; and external variables such as sociocultural and economic
factors (Dholakia et al, 2004; Li and Kirkup, 2007). Thus, I can hypothesize:
H6: Gender will have a strong influence on Internet use.

Age
When looking closer at the users within a country, it is no surprise that youth tend to be
the highest users of ICTs. In return, this has caused an increasingly dominant role of younger
generations in political actions, especially in the so-called third-wave democracies (Valenzuela
et al, 2012). Youth bulges are large young cohorts ages 15-25 related to either the total or the
adult population (Geinges, 2005; Urdal, 2004; Groshek and Ingrid, 2014). There are about 1.8
billion young people between the ages of 10 and 24 – the largest youth population ever (UNFPA,
2013). Many of them are concentrated in developing countries. While these young cohorts have
been historically associated with political crises and social disorder (Goldstone 2001), their
willingness to participate in political transformation stems from their need to compensate and
fix economic and or social inequalities (Hart et al, 204). So, youth bulges within countries can
herald monumental political transformations (Gienges, 2005; Urdal, 2006). This was the case
in Arab Spring were other factors such as large groups of young disaffected citizens in densely
packed urban settlements helped to explain social unrest and protest that emerged.

Young people are the most enthusiastic adopters and users of ICTs. Thus, they have
become especially technology-savvy in using the Internet and accompanying ICTs to mobilize,
collaborate, and formulate a political voice and identity where perhaps there was none. Mobile
phones have also connected youth from all around the world across vast geo-political barriers.
In 2013, the International Communication Union estimated that young people under the age of
25 accounted for 45% of total global Internet users (ITU, 2013). Although there are great
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disparities in Internet use among the global youth population (25 years and younger) (ITU,
2013; Measuring the Information Society, 2013), the total number of Internet users that are
below the age of 25 in developing countries is already three times as high as that in the
developed world (UN Youth Reports, 2013). Therefore, the level of a country’s socioeconomic
development is not always a barrier to Internet usage among youth.

Other reasons which help explain the high Internet usage among youth are related to
their ability to access it from different places and their level of comfort with technology in
general. For one, students (particularly in developing countries) can access the Internet via
their schools and universities or are more likely to visit local Internet cafes in their area. By
contrast, their parents are less likely to do these things. Second, youth are considered “digital
natives” in that they were born around the time the personal computer was introduced and
have therefore spent their lives connected with technology (Measuring the Information
Society, 2013). Out of a total of 145 million young Internet users in the developed countries,
86.3% are estimated to be digital natives (ITU, 2013); and this figure is expected to double
within the next five years. Therefore, I can expect that:
H7: Age will have a significant influence on Internet use.
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Education and Literacy
Finally, the education gap is among the most important explanatory factors regarding
Internet use and the range of activities performed on the Internet (OECD, 2014). Many scholars
have argued that since the use of new technologies requires some level of knowledge and
literacy, low levels of education and literacy hamper both accessibility and dissemination of
information technologies (Kiiski and Pohjola, 2002; Cassiolato and Baptisa, 1996; Gatignon and
Robertson, 1985, Cohen, 1963). This has also been proven empirically true with few exceptions
(Norris, 2001; Hargiattai, 1999). Moreover, people with higher levels of education are likely to
have had more exposure to computer technology (Hargittai, 2002). Therefore, scholars have
found that Internet usage rates are among the highest in people that have earned tertiary
education (Kiiski & Pohjola, 2002; Volken, 2002; Lee, et al., 2001).

However, while most

studies agree with the positive influence of the education and literacy on the adoption and
diffusion of the Internet, Hargittai (1999) and Kiiski and Pohjola (2002) found that education
has no significant influence on the diffusion of the Internet in the case of industrialized
countries (Kum, 2008). Nevertheless, I can formulate the following hypothesis regarding
Internet use and education and literacy:
H8: The higher the education level, the higher the Internet usage.
H9: The higher the literacy level, the higher the Internet usage.

26

Emergence of Mobile Phones
I want to end this section by discussing the emergence of mobile phones. All around the
world, mobile phones are increasingly bridging many of the digital divides discussed in this
section (rural/urban, developed/developing, gender, educational/literacy, etc.) as well as acting
as agents of social mobilization through improved communication (Aminuzzaman et al, 2003).
According to ITU estimates, by the end 2013 there will be 6.8 billion mobile-cellular
subscriptions – almost as many as there are people on the planet; and there will be an estimated
2.7 billion people using the Internet worldwide (ITU, 2013). As global mobile-cellular
penetration approaches 100% and market saturation is reached, growth rates have fallen to their
lowest levels in both developed and developing countries. Mobile-cellular penetration rates
stand at 96% globally; 128% in developed countries; and 89% in developing countries. 2.7 billion
people – almost 40% of the world’s population – are online (ITU, 2013). Therefore, mobile
technology and services continue to be the key driver of the information society as they are not
hampered by slow broadband speeds and lack of electricity, and they can be used by individuals
with low or no literacy.

There are several ways that mobile-enabled technologies are increasingly helping to
bridge the digital divide in developing countries by the use of: (1) SMS applications through
which people can send requests by text-messages to a specific phone number, and get the result
with a new text-message they receive (e.g. popular SMS platforms such as Ushandi, Text to
Change, or Rapid SMS), (2) voice applications through which people can call a specific phone
number which is connected to a voice platform and with either voice or keypad inputs, they can
have the information they are looking for, or (3) web applications where people have a Web
browser on their phone and a data-service plan which connect them to the Internet and allow
them to browse the Web (Boyera, 2012). Thus, these mobile phone-based technologies are
providing simple and powerful ways for citizens to obtain and share information, search the
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web, communicate, and mobilize. The ITU estimates the number of mobile phone subscriptions
worldwide, at the end of 2010, to be around 5.28 billion, equivalent to 76.2% of world
population and to more than one subscription for every adult worldwide (ITU, 2015). In many
developing countries, mobiles represent well over 90% of all available telephones (ITU, 2015).
Furthermore, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) estimates that 90% of world
population now lives in areas with coverage, though the figure for rural areas in Africa is only a
little over half of this. This means that most rural areas around the world now have mobile
phone coverage. Therefore, I can speculate that soon people will increasingly be able to access
the Internet regardless of location, sex, education level, etc. This is a factor that will need to be
observed in the coming years and which could greatly change the relationships between countrylevel and demographic factors, Internet use, and political participation and activism.

Data and Methods
I have compiled a cross-national dataset on economic, political, and sociological
determinants of Internet use. My dependent variable, Internet usage, is measured each year
between 2004 and 2013. Internet usage is measured as the percentage of Internet users in a
population is represented by the number of Internet users per 100 inhabitants, as provided by
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU 2004: A89-A90; 2014). In this case, “Internet
user” refers to any person who has access to the Internet no matter what the type of access
(private/shared), connection (wired/wireless) or location (household/school/office/café). I
have chosen to use the ITU data because this specialized agency within the United Nation is
considered the official compiler of international statistics on telecommunications. The ITU
dataset covers more than 200 countries and territories and over a longer period than any other
available dataset. Moreover, the ITU sets standards for both telecommunications services and
statistics, organizes meetings to harmonize data collection and reporting procedures. Therefore,
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ITU is the best available source of information on the Internet around the world (Abramson
2000:70; Minges 2000).

Independent Variables

My nine independent variables are: (1) population density, (2) income inequality, (3)
democracy experience, (4) human development, (5) freedom, (6) education, (7) gender, (8), age,
and (9) literacy. GNI and ICT development are my control variables. For population density, I
have chosen to focus on this statistic rather than urban/rural data available through the World
Bank Development Indicators database. The reason for this is due to national differences in the
characteristics that distinguish urban from rural areas. There is also no definitive definition for
urban vs rural populations that is applicable to all countries. Therefore, the distinction between
the two is often blurred and scholars often resort to measuring the degree of concentration of
population. For my population density data, I have relied on World Bank population data for
years 2010-2014. For certain countries such as Taiwan that are not always recognized by the
World Bank, I have obtained the population density data from the United Nations World
Prospects Report (2004 and 2010 revision).

As noted earlier, I am focusing on income inequality as measured by Gini coefficient. I
have obtained Gini coefficient information from the World Bank Development Indicators
database for years 2010-2014 — a widely-used statistical measure of income inequality in
countries. For countries or years not available at the World Bank, I have used OECD and
United Nations Gini coefficient data to supplement and fill in missing gaps in the data. To
measure democratic experience, I took the average polity scores for years 1960-2013 calculated
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from the Polity IV dataset7. Long term democratic experience is a country’s mean Polity
(democracy minus autocracy) score overall years from 1960 to 2013 for which data are available.
The Polity IV dataset is among the largest and most reliable large cross-national democracy
databases for several reasons. First, it captures democratic experience for a long-time frame
(data go back to 1800 or to a country’s date of independence, whichever is later). Second, its
transparency and detailed coding rules are available for anyone to review. Finally, they use
multiple coders and inter-coder reliability tests (Marshalls & Jagger, 2006) to eliminate biases.

To measure human development, I employ the United Nations Development Program’s
(UNDP) HDI data. The HDI is a composite index that has been developed by the United
Nations (UN) and has been monitored by the UN on an annual basis since 1990. However, for
the purposes of my study I have only focused on the years 2005-2013 as this is the period that
the fieldwork research focused on. To represent levels of freedom, I employ the Freedom House
scores for political rights and civil liberties for years 2005-2013. Freedom House measures
national political rights and civil liberties by tabulating ordinal sets of survey questions. The
resulting political rights and civil liberties scores range from 1 to 7, 1 being the highest score.

For education, I have chosen to gather data on gross tertiary school enrollment for the
years 2010-2014 from the World Bank and the UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Gross tertiary
school enrollment is the total enrollment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6), regardless of
age, expressed as a percentage of the total population of the five-year age group following on
from secondary school leaving (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2014). I have chosen to focus
on tertiary rather than secondary education because studies have found that people with higher
levels of education are likely to have had more exposure to computer technology in general,

7

Polity IV’s DataSets User’s Manual (2016): Annual scores are based on three criteria: (1) openness and
competiveness of chief executive; (2) constraints on the authority of the chief executive; and (3) level of
factionalism and personalism in political participationand competitiveness of participation.
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familiarity, and expertise and confidence which is an important first step in gaining access to the
Internet (Hargittai, 2002). Specifically, Internet usage rates are among the highest in people
that have earned tertiary education (Kiiski & Pohjola, 2002; Volken, 2002; Lee, et al., 2001). To
measure the literacy rate, I have collected data on percentage of adults (age 15 and older) who
can read or write. This analytic is available at the CIA World Factbook (2010) and the World
Bank Development Indicators database (2004) which has an indicator that is available for the
largest number of countries and years is literacy as a percentage of the adult population (World
Bank 2004). For literacy, I consider the percentage of adults (age 15 and older) who are literate.

For my independent variable of gender, I was unable to access micro data for all my
countries; therefore, I chose to use female population (% of total) from the World Bank and the
United Nations Population Division's World Population Prospects. This indicator captures the
percentage of the population that is female within a country or territory. My contention is that
due to the gender digital divide discussed earlier, countries with high percentage of female
population may experience lower Internet use. For this indicator, I have collected data for the
years 2010-2014. I experienced the same challenges getting reliable age information for my
sample; therefore, I had to settle for obtaining data on the percentage of youth population
within a country. The belief is that countries with a high youth population as defined by 25 or
younger years of age, may experience more Internet use than countries with low youth
population. I obtained this data from the United Nations Population Division, World
Population Prospects (2012 and 2013).

For my analysis, I wanted to control for two of the factors that are most traditionally
associated with Internet usage: wealth and ICT infrastructure. Therefore, by controlling for
them I can explore the role of other explanatory factors. For my control variable, wealth, I use
GNI per capita for the years 2010-2014 from the World Bank Development Indicators database
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(World Bank 2014). To measure ICT infrastructure, I use the ICT development index from for
the years 2011 and 2012 from the ITU (2014) as a measure of the development of the
telecommunications infrastructure within a country.

Findings
The research design involved three analytical steps. First, I conducted correlation
analysis using the Pearson correlation coefficient to test the relationship between Internet use
and the various factors that may affect it. During this step, I also created a baseline model with
my independent variables and used multiple regression to explore associations between them
across the 77 cases. Second, I developed and tested two models to determine whether countrylevel or demographic factors are more likely to explain Internet use, using GNI and ICT
development as control variables. Model 1 tests the country-level factors against my
independent variables and Model 2 tests the demographic explanatory variables, while
controlling for wealth and ICT infrastructure. Finally, I tested these models a second time with
a stratified sample of 76 countries broken up by generic regions, so that I could identify any
regional differences. SPSS was used for all the analyses.

Bivariate Correlation Findings

Bivariate analysis investigates the relationship between two paired data sets. Therefore,
it can be used to examine the strength of any correlation. Pearson correlation analysis was
performed between the independent variables: GNI: Gross National Income, ICT: ICT
Development Index, Polity: Democratic Experience, PD: Population Density, HDI: Human
Development Index, Literacy: Literacy Rate, Freedom: Freedom, EDU: Tertiary School
Enrolment, FEM: Gender Population Female, Youth: % Youth Population & GINI: Income
Inequality, and the Dependent Variable - IU: Internet Usage. Table 3 outlines the findings of
the correlation analysis.
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As discussed in the previous chapter, there is a strong positive and significant
relationship between GNI and IU (r = .894, p < .01). This shows that a higher GNI would result
in a higher IU. Similarly, the relationship between ICT and IU was also found to be strongly
positive and significant (r = .955, p < .01). Thus, a higher level of ICT would result in a higher
level of IU. Regarding the other explanatory factors, there was a weak positive but significant
relationship (r = .252, p < .05) between Democratic Experience and IU. This shows that with an
increase in Internet usage within a country, their democratic experience score also increases. As
a result, the variables have a high-high relationship. It also means that this particular analysis
may benefit from testing with a larger sample size. Furthermore, no significant relationship was
established between PD and IU (r = .146, P > .05). A very strong and significant relationship was
observed between HDI and IU (r = .892, p < .01), it is thus noted that an increase in the level of
HDI could result in an increased level of IU. A moderate and significant relationship was found
between literacy and IU (r = .553, P < .01). The relationship between Freedom and IU was
moderate negative and significant (r = -.677, p < .01). This inverse relationship between
Freedom and IU shows that a higher level of freedom results in a lower IU. EDU was found to be
moderately positive and significantly related to IU (r = .675, p < .01). An insignificant
relationship was found between FEM and IU (r = .173, p > .05). Percentage of youth population
was found to be negatively associated with IU, the results show a strong negative and
significantly negative relationship between youth population and IU (r = -.762, p < .01). Finally,
the relationship between GINI and IU was very weak and negative but insignificant (r = -.223, p
> .05).
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Table 3: Correlation Analysis
GNI

ICT

Polity PD

HDI

Literacy Freedom EDU

GNI

1

ICT

.882** 1

Polity

.231*

.259*

1

PD

.358**

.173

-.055

1

HDI

.843**

.954**

.284*

.148

1

Literacy

.514**

.662**

.226*

.037

.727** 1

-

-

-

.582**

.681**

.396**

Freedom
EDU

.532** .754** .248*

FEM

.082

.247*

-

-

.698**

.850**

GINI

-.183

-.284* .131

IU

.894** .955** .252*

Youth

.087

.707**

-.483**

FEM

.774** .556**

-.566**

1

.170

-.040

.242*

.365**

-.080

.270*

1

-.191

-.100

-.654**

.596**

-

-

.737**

.445**
.034

.845**

IU

1

-.009

-

Youth GINI

-.022

-.247* -.134

.096

-.213

.146

.892** .553**

-.677**

.675** .173

1
.323** 1
.762**

-.223

1

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Multivariate Regression Findings

Multivariate analysis looks at several variables to see if one or more of them are
predictive of a certain outcome. Multiple regression is the most common method used in
multivariate analysis to find correlations between data sets, but many others, such as logistic
regression and multivariate analysis of variance, are also used. For my analysis, I carried out
ordinary least squares multiple regressions and tested all the independent variables together to
predict the dependent variable. Table 4 outlines the findings. The dependent variable (IU) was
regressed on predicting variables of GNI, ICT, Polity, PD, HDI, Literacy, Freedom, EDU, FEM,
Youth, and GINI. The results show that the independent variables significantly predict IU, F (12,
63) = 89.606, p < 0.0001, which indicates that the eleven factors under study have a heavy
impact on IU. These results clearly direct the positive affect of the predictor variables. Moreover,
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the R = .945 depicts that the model explains 94.5% of the variance in IU. Finally, the
coefficients show the significant influence of each of the independent variable on the dependent
variable. The results show that only GNI, ICT, PD and Literacy had a significant influence on IU,
other predictor variable had no significant influence on IU. The results of hypotheses testing are
summarized in Table 5.
Table 4: Model Summary
R

R Square

F

Sig

.972a

.945

89.606

.000

Table 5: Coefficients and Hypothesis Testing
Hypotheses

Regression
Weights

B

SE

t

p-value

Hypotheses
Supported

H1

GNI→IU

-17.825

53.423

2.971

.004

Supported

H2

ICT→IU

.000

.000

7.664

.000

Supported

H3

Polity→IU

12.872

1.680

-.550

.584

Not Supported

H4

PD→IU

-.010

.067

-2.161

.034

Supported

H6

HDI→IU

-.003

.001

-.894

.375

Not Supported

H7

Literacy→IU

-22.967

25.693

-2.000

.050

Supported

H8

Freedom→IU

-28.076

14.040

-1.185

.240

Not Supported

H9

EDU→IU

-.853

.719

-.171

.865

Not Supported

H10

FEM→IU

-.010

.057

.356

.723

Not Supported

H11

Youth→IU

.340

.956

1.456

.150

Not Supported

H12

GINI→IU

.478

.328

.975

.333

Not Supported
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Model Testing

Hierarchical multiple regression, a variant of the basic multiple regression procedure is
often utilized to evaluate the two models. The regression method allows the researcher to specify
a fixed order of entry for variables to control for the effects of covariates or to test the effects of
certain predictors independent of the influence of others. Therefore, I used hierarchical multiple
regression in which the independent variables were entered into the model in blocks, to test the
hypotheses. I ran two models for each of the independent variables and used GNI and ICT
development as control variables. The first model was for the total sample and used five
country-level factors as the independent variables of interest. The second model used the same
total sample but only examined the demographic explanatory variables. Below are the findings
from each model testing.

Model 1
A two-stage hierarchical regression analysis was performed. ICT and GNI were entered
at stage one as control variables. At stage two Population Density (PD), Income Inequality
(GINI), Democracy (Polity), Human Development Index (HDI) and Freedom variables were
entered. The hierarchical multiple regression revealed that at stage one, ICT and GNI
contributed significantly to the regression model, F (2,73) = 448.460, p<.001) and accounted for
92.5% of the variation in Internet Usage (IU). In the next stage, the next set of variables were
entered into the analysis. At stage two, the variables explained 93.8% change in IU. The change
in R2 was .013, the R2 was also found to be significant, F (7, 68) = 147.132. At stage two PD and
HDI were found to be significant while GINI, Polity, and Freedom were found to be
insignificant. The findings can be found in Table 6.
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Table 6: Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Model 1
Variable
Step 1
ICT
GNI
Step 2

t

R
.962

R2
.925

R2

.969

.938

.013

Sig.
.000
.000
.001
.019

9.684
.000

11.018
3.415

GNI

.001

4.161

.000

ICT

12.035

7.875

.000

PD

-.003

-2.174

.033

GINI

.103

1.141

.258

Polity

-.075

-.466

.642

HDI

-54.877

-2.570

.012

Freedom

-.908

-1.282

.204

Model 2
A two-stage hierarchical regression analysis was performed. ICT and GNI were entered at stage
one as control variable. At stage two, the variables Education, Gender, Youth Population and
Literacy were entered. Table 7 outlines the results of this analysis. The hierarchical multiple
regression revealed that at Stage one, ICT and GNI contributed significantly to the regression
model, F (2,73) = 448.460, p<.001) and accounted for 92.5% of the variation in Internet Usage
(IU). In the next stage, the next set of variables were entered into the analysis. At stage two, the
variables explained 93.6% change in IU. The change in R 2 was .011, the R2 was also found to be
significant, F (6, 69) = 167.628. At stage two FEM and Youth were found to be insignificant
while Literacy and Edu were found to be significant.
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Table 7: Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Model 2
Variable
Step 1
ICT
GNI
Step 2

t

R
.962

R2
.925

.967

.936

R2

Sig.
.000
.000
.001
.025

9.684
.000

11.018
3.415

GNI

.000

17.129

.000

ICT

12.722

2.260

.027

Literacy

-31.280

9.102

.000

EDU

-.017

-2.426

.018

FEM

.259

-.314

.754

Youth

.515

.286

.776

.011

Therefore, Model 1 explains 93.8% variable in IU, while Model 2 explained 93.6% change
in IU which is marginally lower than Model 2. However, it is important to note that two out of
four variables in Model 2 were found to be insignificant while the greatest contribution can be
accounted to ICT in both the models.

Regional Stratified Sampling

The countries were grouped by generic regions as identified by the 2013 United Nations
Statistics Division.8 A total of 76 countries were selected for the analysis. Table 8 shows the
representation from each region. Hierarchical multiple regression was once again used to
evaluate the two models. This regression method allowed me to specify a fixed order of entry for
variables to control for the effects of covariates or to test the effects of certain predictors
independent of the influence of others.

8

Composition of macro geographical (continental) regions, geographical sub-regions, and selected economic and
other groupings, United Nations Statistics Division.
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Table 8: Regional Distribution

Africa

Frequency
9

Percent
11.8

Asia
Europe

19
28

25.0
36.8

Latin America and the
Caribbean

16

21.1

Northern America
Oceania

2
2

2.6
2.6

Total

76

100.0

Model 1
A two-stage hierarchical regression analysis was performed. ICT and GNI were entered
at stage one as the control variables. At stage two, Population Density (PD), Income Inequality
(GINI), Democracy (Polity), Human Development Index (HDI) and Freedom variables were
entered. Regression analysis was run separately for each region. The results reveal that in all the
models the predictor variables explain over 90% of the variance in IU. In all the regression
analysis, in Step 1, ICT was found significant while GNI was found in significant, however in
Step 2, only for Europe, ICT was found significant, while all variables were found insignificant.
It is important to note that North America and Oceania/Australia had to be left out of the
sampling due to the small sample size.
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Table 9: Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Model 1
Variable
Africa
Step 1

t

R

R2

.948

.899

R2

F

Sig.

26.652

.001

ICT

18.701

6.566

GNI
Step 2

-.003

-3.893

ICT

7.760

1.888

.061

GNI

.002

1.766

.119

Polity

-.060

-.145

.154

PD

-.008

-1.601

.517

HDI

-58.383

-1.090

.277

Freedom

.440

.262

.180

GINI
Asia
Step 1

-.153

-.487

.310

ICT

9.999

5.962

GNI
Step 2

.000

1.013

ICT

11.584

6.648

.086

GNI

.001

4.124

.105

Polity

-.131

-.725

.887

PD

-.003

-2.296

.138

HDI

-58.216

-2.353

.299

Freedom

-1.032

-1.302

.798

GINI
Europe
Step 1

.105

1.073

.636

ICT
GNI
Step 2

.001
.998

.950

.943
6.404

.000

.948

.098

.902

46.876

73.421

.008
.112

.000
.000

.961

14.903

.997

.924

.022

.890

19.033

101.095

.326
.000

.000
.000

.954

.910

.020

28.804

.352
.000

ICT

14.051

3.966

.001

GNI

.000

.599

.556

Polity

-.066

-.225

.824

PD

.011

.694

.496

HDI

-5.864

-.083

.935

Freedom

-2.422

-1.666

.111

-.212

-.832

.415

GINI
Latin America and the
Caribbean
Step 1

.951

ICT

8.055

6.306

GNI
Step 2

.001

1.887

ICT

7.150

61.311

.000
.000

.968
2.116

.904

.938

.034

17.220

.082
.000
.067
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GNI

.000

.997

.348

Polity

-.241

-.791

.452

PD

.015

.962

.364

HDI

33.289

.637

.542

Freedom

.001

.001

.999

GINI

.126

1.020

.338

Model 2
A two-stage hierarchical regression analysis was performed. ICT and GNI were entered
at stage one as control variable. At stage two, the variables education, gender, youth population
and literacy were entered. Regression analysis was run separately for each region. The results
reveal that in all the models the predictor variables explain almost 90% of the variance in IU. In
all the regression analysis, in Step 1, ICT was found significant while GNI was found
insignificant. For Africa, in Step 2, only ICT was found significant, all other variables were found
insignificant. For Asia, in Step 2, only ICT was found significant, all other variables were found
insignificant. For Europe, in Step 2, ICT and Youth were found to significantly influence IU, all
other variables were found insignificant. For Latin America and Caribbean, in Step 2, only ICT
was found significant, all other variables were found insignificant.
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Table 10: Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Model 2
Variable
Africa
Step 1

t

R

R2

.948

.899

R2

F

Sig.

26.652

.001

ICT

18.701

6.566

.001

GNI
Step 2

-.003

-3.893

ICT

16.178

6.621

.022

GNI

-.002

-3.532

.072

Literacy

-12.114

-.665

.574

EDU

-.020

-.234

.836

FEM

-.282

-.110

.923

Youth
Asia
Step 1

-.980

-1.049

.404

.998

.950

ICT

9.999

5.962

GNI
Step 2

.000

1.013

.997

.098

.902

18.796

73.421

.008
.051

.000
.000

.952

.907

.005

19.439

.326
.000

ICT

11.508

3.316

.006

GNI

.000

.627

.543

Literacy

-20.064

-.509

.620

EDU

-.023

-.128

.900

FEM

.134

.046

.964

.336

.484

.637

Youth
Europe
Step 1
ICT

.943
14.903

6.404

GNI
Step 2

.000

.948

ICT

17.163

GNI

005

101.095

.000
.000

.960

5.333E-

.890

.921

.031

41.060

.352
.000

6.828

.000

.236

.815

Literacy

57.676

.440

.664

EDU

-.068

-.693

.496

FEM

.798

.546

.591

1.556

2.404

.026

Youth
Latin America and the
Caribbean
Step 1

.951

.904

61.311

.000

ICT

8.055

6.306

.000

GNI
Step 2

.001

1.887

ICT

-.323

-.074

.942

GNI

.000

-.381

.712

.970
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.941

.037

24.116

.082
.000

Literacy

18.636

1.116

.293

EDU

.058

.787

.451

FEM

-.249

-.229

.824

Youth

-3.338

-1.800

.105

Validation
Several validation tests were run to determine the reliability of my data. First, normality
tests for the variables were conducted using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The results reveal
that almost all variables were normally distributed. Hence normality of variables was attained.
The results for normality test are tabulated below.
Table 11: Normality Test Results

Region

GNI

ICT

Polity

PD

HDI

Literacy

Kolmogorov-Smirnova
Statistic

df

Sig.

Africa

.289

9

.029

Asia

.181

19

.102

Europe

.108

28

.200*

Latin America and the Caribbean

.139

16

.200*

Africa

.212

9

.200*

Asia

.144

19

.200*

Europe

.082

28

.200*

Latin America and the Caribbean

.128

16

.200*

Africa

.216

9

.200*

Asia

.120

19

.200*

Europe

.177

28

.025

Latin America and the Caribbean

.167

16

.200*

Africa

.239

9

.145

Asia

.430

19

.000

Europe

.221

28

.001

Latin America and the Caribbean

.313

16

.000

Africa

.231

9

.183

Asia

.125

19

.200*

Europe

.154

28

.088

Latin America and the Caribbean

.125

16

.200*

Africa

.191

9

.200*

Asia

.344

19

.000
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Freedom

EDU

FEM

Youth

GINI

IU

Europe

.263

28

.000

Latin America and the Caribbean

.261

16

.005

Africa

.147

9

.200*

Asia

.162

19

.200*

Europe

.379

28

.000

Latin America and the Caribbean

.141

16

.200*

Africa

.323

9

.007

Asia

.151

19

.200*

Europe

.116

28

.200*

Latin America and the Caribbean

.231

16

.022

Africa

.195

9

.200*

Asia

.157

19

.200*

Europe

.222

28

.001

Latin America and the Caribbean

.139

16

.200*

Africa

.174

9

.200*

Asia

.154

19

.200*

Europe

.190

28

.011

Latin America and the Caribbean

.189

16

.130

Africa

.169

9

.200*

Asia

.223

19

.014

Europe

.119

28

.200*

Latin America and the Caribbean

.123

16

.200*

Africa

.136

9

.200*

Asia

.178

19

.115

Europe

.098

28

.200*

Latin America and the Caribbean

.103

16

.200*

Literacy is constant when Region = Northern America has been omitted.
Freedom is constant when Region = Northern America has been omitted.
Freedom is constant when Region = Oceania has been omitted.

Outliers analysis was also conducted to determine the existence of outliers in the data.
To achieve this, boxplots were analyzed for each of the variables in the study. GNI, ICT, Polity,
HDI, Freedom, EDU, Youth, GNI and IU did not show any significant outliers (refer to
Appendix A for boxplot charts). However, outliers were found in PD, Literacy, FEM. The reason
for this could be attributed to the disparity in statistics of these variables across different
continents. Finally, one way ANOV Analysis was conducted to evaluate if there are significant
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differences in the variables. No significant difference was found in population density across the
different regions, while all other variables had significant difference across the different regions.
This further strengthens the disparity in different variables across the different continents.
Table 12: ANOVA Results
Variables
GNI
ICT
Polity
DU
PD
HDI
Literacy
Freedom
EDU
FEM
Youth
GINI
IU

df
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

F
11.588
18.298
2.353
7.692
1.089
23.687
13.503
9.843
13.434
3.148
34.890
4.474
14.955

Sig.
.000
.000
.049
.000
.374
.000
.000
.000
.000
.013
.000
.001
.000

Discussion
In this chapter I examined various social, economic and political explanatory variables
which may promote or impede Internet use around the world. The analysis consisted of a threestep process: (1) correlation and regression analysis of the explanatory variables, (2)
development and testing of two models to measure the explanatory strength of country-level vs
demographic variables, and (3) model testing using a stratified regional sample. The
explanatory variables under investigation were: wealth/GNI, ICT development, democratic
experience, population density, human development, literacy, freedom, education, gender, age,
and income inequality. In the first phase, correlation and regression analysis wasperformed.
The results indicated significant relationship between all the variables. Regression analysis
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revealed significant influence of GNI, ICT development, population density, and literacy on
Internet users.

During step two, hierarchical regression analysis was performed and two different
models were tested using ICT and GNI as control variables. Model 1 revealed that this set of
country-level independent variables explained 93.8% variance in Internet use. In comparison to
model 1, model 2 explained 93.6% change in IU. Therefore, the variance explained by model 1
was slightly higher than model 2. It is important to note that three out of five variables in model
1 were significant while two out of four variables in Model 2 were found to be significant while
the greatest contribution can be accounted to ICT in both the models. Finally, in step three the
two models were tested with ICT and GNI as control variables and separate hierarchical
regression analysis was performed for each region. Findings show that only in Europe is ICT and
youth population still significant after introducing the other explanatory variables while all other
variables were found insignificant. After the additional explanatory variables were introduced
only ICT development was found significant for Asia and Latin America & Caribbean.

These findings reinforce that context matters when understanding if and how citizens
use the Internet. The findings also confirm some of the basic theoretical arguments in the social
sciences regarding Internet access and use. As the findings show, the Internet is a medium
whose growth and diffusion are not only driven by technological and economic constraints, but
also by demographic and sociological ones. Therefore, although several studies support the
assumption that a country's level of economic development is usually closely related to the level
of Internet penetration in that country (Hargittai, 1999; Bazar & Boalch, 1997; Kelly &
Petranzzini, 1997; Maherzi, 1997; Baliamounce-Lutz, 2002, 2003; Arnum & Conti, 1998; Elie,
1998; Maherzi, 1997), scholars and activists should not ignore the role of other contextual
explanatory powers. As I can conclude, there are a collection of possible structural and
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demographic factors that can help us to understand this, and not just one factor alone. The
multiple regressions confirmed that country wealth and the ICT infrastructure within a country
alone are not sufficient to understand Internet use. Rather, when I added additional
explanatory factors using the models, those additional factors along with wealth and ICT
infrastructure could explain to a slightly greater degree Internet usage. At the same time, the
results show that their relationship is still hard to interpret and decipher due to lack of
consistent data across countries. In the meantime, case studies can help us to decipher the
complex relationships that exist between an array of factors when trying to understand how
social and political actors’ ICTs use may be shaped by their context.

In my analyses, when controlling for ICT and wealth, the country-level model had a
slightly stronger predictive power than the demographic model, but it is a small difference. The
model testing also revealed that the variables that warrant more in-depth exploration were:
population density, human development, literacy, and education. The five variables that were
not found to be a significant factor in Internet use was income inequality, democracy experience,
political freedom, gender, and youth populations. Initially, political freedom may appear to be a
surprise. However, the non–significant relationship can be explained by the fact that many
authoritarian societies also see the advantages of the Internet. Regarding country differences,
the analysis failed to show whether there is a statistical relationship within the regional clusters
which demonstrate that location does matter when understanding Internet use. As we know,
location does matter regarding the quality and your ability to access the Internet, but perhaps
these differences are best explained by population density or urban/rural distinctions rather
than regional or country differences. Finally, the lack of significance of youth population
regarding Internet usage is surprising, but not deterring as far as the significance of this
variable. Although mobile phones are helping to close the digital divide among youth in
developed and developing countries, there are still a variety of factors which influence the level
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of Internet usage within a country and specifically within a subset of a population. Trying to
understand the contextual factors that shape this is a reason for this analysis.

Even so, the explanatory variables chosen for the research design could explain over 90%
of the variance in Internet use for all the regions. At the minimum, this helps to confirm that the
explanatory variables I chose to explore are fruitful and potentially insightful ones. There are
several conclusions I can draw from the regional testing. For one, Europe was the only region
which showed that the youth population may also explain variance in Internet use. Second, it is
notable that although literacy and Internet use appears to have a correlation, it did not come up
as a barrier to Internet users in non-English speaking regions. This can probably be explained
partly because many of these regions (especially Asia) have developed their own national and
regional networks and websites. Therefore, one must still be cognizant of the effects of literacy
in poorer regions such as Africa or poor small non-English countries such as Cambodia, Nepal,
Pakistan, etc., which lack the ability to create their own national or regional networks.
Consequently, if basic computer skills require basic education, we are unlikely to see widespread
Internet use in those countries with high illiteracy (Xiaoming, 2004). With that in mind, we still
need better data on youth usage of the Internet to fully examine the interplay of factors at the
state and country level which shape Internet usage.

Several caveats about these findings should be noted. First, my sample size was not big
enough to carry out more sophisticated statistical analyses that may have allowed me to test my
assumptions better. Therefore, a larger sample size, particularly when doing the regional
testing, may be able to more clearly distinguish the relationships between the explanatory
factors and Internet use. Second, my reliance on secondary publicly available information
imposed great constraints on the depth of the analysis. More and better international
comparative data at the micro level will be needed to understand the impact of these political
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and social variables on the Internet. In addition, micro-level data will allow scholars and
activists to explore the two-way causation that may be operating between Internet use and some
of these variables. Finally, data that covers a longer period of observation may provide the
opportunity to explore endogeneity problems more carefully. Ultimately, there is great hope in
this respect as global data collection efforts regarding Internet use have been garnering great
support the past five years. So, in 10-15 years, scholars will have more and better data upon
which to study this phenomenon.

Finally, the findings lay the groundwork for my two main case studies of Chile, Taiwan,
and supplementary case analysis looking at Indonesia and Peru. Focusing on these countries,
we will see variation in the variables highlighted in this analysis: wealth, ICT development,
population density, human development (HDI), literacy, and education. Table 13 outlines the
key country-level and demographic factors for each country. For one, we have two high income
and two middle income countries with various levels of ICT infrastructure, with Indonesia and
Peru having the least developed ICT infrastructure of the four countries. The countries also
include varying levels of population density according to the World Bank Indicators Database
and the 2005 CIA World Factbook. Taiwan has the highest population density of all the
countries. In fact, it is the 16th most densely populated country in the world with a population
density of 646 people per km.9 Therefore; it provides a good first case study to explore deeper
the relationship between the variables of population density, ICT infrastructure, and education
and literacy on Internet usage.

9

Population density calculated using surface area and population figures from CIA World Factbook. Republic of
China (Taiwan) as of 2005
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Below is a breakdown of all the countries:
Table 13: Case Study Countries
Countries

Wealth

ICT
development

Pop.
density

HDI

Literacy

Chile

High income

Medium

Low

High

High

Taiwan

High income

High

High

High

Indonesia

Lower
middleincome
Upper
middle
income

Low

Medium

Very
High
Medium

Low

Low

Medium

High

Peru

High

Tertiary
Educati
on
High

Internet
Users % of
Population
66.5%

Very
High
Low

80%

Mediumlow

39.2%

15.8%

Together these factors will help us understand the country and demographic level factors
which shape Internet usage. From this point and understanding that ICTs are neutral, I can
explore if these factors can also help us to unravel the ways that ICTs interact with socioeconomic and political context in which they are employed for political purposes. For example,
as we will see in the case analysis, although Indonesia and Peru both have low levels of ICT
development, medium level of HDI, and high literacy, online political participation among
citizens and political parties in Indonesia is vibrant and dynamic when compared to Peru.
During the 2014 Indonesian Presidential election, the Internet was used for the first time ever as
a powerful campaign strategy. This highlights the ways that the Internet opens opportunities,
not usually available via mass media, for politicians who know how to use technology in
innovative ways. Meanwhile, in Peru where Internet use is not high and population density is
low, online political participation and political parties’ use of Internet has been inconsistent and
lackluster with most parties struggling to engage constituents online. The lack of time and
resource investment by political parties in Peru can probably be explained by the fact that
political parties know that most of their constituent base is not accessible online. Therefore,
traditional politicking strategies in Peru are still vibrant and live alongside with the emergence
of the Internet. In the Peru and Indonesia, I explore how the interaction of population density
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and education factors shaped how the Internet was used for political purposes. Finally, as we
will see, the Internet-political parties-democracy relationship is not absolute and there will be
great variability among regions (Best & Wade, 2009).
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Chapter Three
Ethnonationalism, Social Movements, and ICTs, in a HighlyDeveloped Country: Taiwan Case Study

Taiwan has undergone dramatic transformation in the past 70 years: from part of the
Japanese empire, to an authoritarian state governed under martial law, to electing a president
by popular vote for the first time in 1996. Additionally, its impressive economic gains place
Taiwan alongside Japan and Korea as one of the members of the East Asian miracle – countries
which have achieved high growth with equity due to a combination of fundamentally sound
development policies, tailored interventions, and unusually rapid accumulation of physical and
human capital (Boyd et al, 2006; Ngo, 2006; Kay, 2006; Wang and Kurzman 2007; Yi, 2015; Pei
1995; Lim, 2008). Despite the economic achievements, most of Taiwan’s history, political
development has taken a backseat to economic development (Wong, 2002). Most recently,
political polarization and renewed ethno-nationalism tensions have emerged – threatening
Taiwan’s democratic gains. The election of Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2012 has ushered in
an era in which China is seeking increasing nationalistic ties to the country’s special regions,
including Taiwan. At the same time, the election of pro-independence leaders in Taiwan,
including President Tsai in 2016, have elevated the potential for territorial disputes across the
Taiwan Strait to the top of China’s geo-political concerns (Council on Foreign Relations, 2016).
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As these political struggles take shape, China and Taiwan also continue to deepen economic ties,
making it increasingly harder for Taiwan to maintain its autonomy.

During this time, there has been a renewal in activism in Taiwan. The current political
and economic climate have has given way to an increase in domestic political activity—largely
referred to as Taiwan’s “third force” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2016). The “third force” is
used to describe the emergence of new political actors and youth activism in the aftermath of the
Sunflower Movement(太陽花學運) ). These activists used ICTs to communicate and spread
counter narratives in support of a Taiwanese identity, support the election of non-traditional
political actors, hold elected officials accountable, and call for greater transparency in
government. The “third force” has led to electoral gains such as the 2016 local elections and
followed by the election of pro-Independence President Tsai later that year. Meanwhile, per a
2015 survey by the National Chengchi University, and increasing number of residents regard
themselves as exclusively Taiwanese (60%), while 33.7 % identify as both Taiwanese and
Chinese, and 4.1% consider themselves only Chinese (down from 26.2% in 1994) (National
Chengchi University, 2015).

The rise of new ICT-enabled activism must be understood within the broader historical
context of how ethnonationalism has coincided with activism and democratic development in
Taiwan. Scholars have found that while recent social movements, ICTs, and emergence of nontraditional political actors is complicating cross-strait relations (Lee, 2014), they may also be
changing the look and feel of politics in Taiwan for the years to come (Chen, 2014). This chapter
examines how ICTs are creating new political opportunity structures in Taiwan and reshaping
how politics is done by activists and political parties alike. Through survey data collected with
college students and members of political parties during the Sunflower Movement from March
18 until April 10th, 2014, this chapter will explore the bottom-up grassroots appropriations of
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ICTs, and how they may be helping to bring about new political opportunities which may change
the way political parties function. This case study highlights how uniting a case of media, social
movement theory, and democratization we can gain greater insights.

Wealth, Development, and Free Society
Taiwan is generally a stable, wealthy, and free society. Despite, its small size, it is among
the most densely populated(16th world), urbanized, and richest countries in the world (World
Population Review, 2014). Much of this urbanization can be traced to the Republic of China-US
framework and the Kuomintang’s economic, social, and educational policies brought about
several societal changes, such as rising labor problems, urbanization, environmental
degradation and growing a more politically active middle class (Howe, 2014). The World Bank
ranks Taiwan as a High-Income Country with a GNI that fluctuates between $14,000 and
$21,000 (World Bank, 2015)10. Its dynamic capitalist economy continues to be well supported
by its extensive exports of such products such as electronics, technology, machinery, and
petrochemicals. Some reports note that only less than 1% of the population are characterized as
poor (Ferrante, 2012: 238). Overall income distribution across the general population as
measured by the Gini coefficient, is relatively equal and remained stable, resulting in Taiwan
having one of the world’s lowest levels of income inequality outside Europe (Bloom et al, 2000;
Kinugasa and Mason, 2007). Its Gini coefficient was .342 for 2010 and 2011 (World Fact Book,
2011). In return, low income inequality may also have encouraged fast GDP growth by reducing
pressure for market distorting income-redistributive politics; by diminishing political
instability; by raising the supply of and demand for education; and by expanding the internal
market (Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Alesin and Rodrik, 1994; Birdsall, Ross, and Sabot, 1995;
Murphy, Schleifer, and Vishny, 1989). Citizens also enjoy a high level of press, media, and
political freedom. Taiwan has been ranked a free country by Freedom House continuously over
However, it is generally difficult to get statistics on Taiwan’s gross domestic product (GDP) or gross national
income (GNI) because their economic figures are often combined with China’s.
10
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the five years, with 1 out of 7 for political rights in 2014, and 2 out of 7 for civil liberties in 2015
(Freedom House, Taiwan, 2015).

Taiwan also has one of the highest levels of human development in the world. Although,
the United Nation’s does not capture human development data for Taiwan because it includes it
as part of the People's Republic of China, the government of Taiwan conducts their own
calculations using the same methodology the United Nations uses for their human development
index (HDI). PerTaiwan's government calculation, their HDI is believing to be 0.882 (Taiwan
Directorante General of Budget 2011)11. This means that the country ranks 22nd globally, among
such countries like Norway and Australia with HDI of (0.91) respectively and places Taiwan
third in Asia behind Japan (12th) and South Korea (15th) (United Nations Human Development
Index, 2014).The high level of human development has also resulted in citizens enjoying a high
level of education when compared to global standards. Ninety-nine percent of Taiwan’s
population has completed secondary school (Clark, 2010) and the country has one of the highest
literacy rates in the world with 98% (Taiwan Ministry of Interior, 2014). Although, Taiwan lacks
rural poverty, the estimated 1% of the populations characterized as poor come from the rural
areas, especially those of original Taiwanese descent (Lin, Bishop, & Chiou, 2007). However, the
most socially excluded group is made up of Taiwan’s 440,000 foreign workers, who suffer from
low salaries and social discrimination.

11"2011中華民國人類發展指數

(HDI)" (PDF) (in Chinese). Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics,
Executive Yuan, R.O.C. 2011. Retrieved 2011-11-21.
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Taiwan Under Martial Law
Taiwan’s early politics has been shaped by the period of Japanese colonization from 1895
to 1945 (Morris and Gerteis, 2015) and the Chinese Civil War that was taking place between
China’s Nationalist Party, Kuomintang (KMT) and Communist Party of China (CPC) until 1949.
Following the defeat of Japan after World War II, Japan returned Taiwan to China’s ruling
Nationalist Party, Kuomintang (KMT) in 1945. Around this time, the CPC defeated the KMT,
and more than 2 million KMT supporters were forced to flee the homeland and relocate to
Taiwan (Morris and Gerteis, 2015). The rush of migration of KMT supporters to Taiwan led to a
high level of tension between Taiwanese citizens and the newly arrived mainlanders from China.
These tensions escalated on Feb. 27, 1947, after Nationalist Party had a confrontation with a
Taiwanese woman selling black-market cigarettes, which then led to the death of an innocent
bystander (US Department of State, 1949). This event sparked a massive anti-government
rally the following day, which would be labeled as the 228 Incident or February 28 Massacre.
It also marked the beginning of the “White Terror” period when people believed to be antigovernment in Taiwan were arrested, imprisoned and in some cases executed. The KMT’s
brutal repression and the Chinese’s military crackdown of dissidents during this period led to
the death of an estimated 18,000 and 28,000 people12.

Following these incidents, a period of martial law under China’s KMT party began from
1949 until 1987. During this time, local elections and small media (e.g. political magazines and
crude cable service), which were not banned by the KMT, became key outlets for contestation by
the emerging opposition, or the Dangwai movement (outside the party). The KMT enjoyed
broad popularity among rural voters, urban voters, working class, white collar and business
class, theDangwai movement was also organizing citizens which suffered at the hands of the

12“President

suggests identifying perpetrators in 228 Incident”, The China Post, February 23, 2017.
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KMT. Over time the movement expanded to include medical doctors, journalists, intellectuals,
college professors and lawyers who began to challenge KMT’s patron client system, rigid social
control, and what they deemed as a fake consensus (Ho, 2010; Lee, 1993). Political magazines
such as Formosa, Taiwan Political Forum, The Eighties, and Deep Roots (Fan, 2015) became
key centers for organizing and communications (Rigger, 2001; Batto, 2004; Huang, 2009). The
magazines highlighted Taiwan’s origins and heroes of the “political resistance” to provide a
counter narrative to Chinese discourse on a common identity (Fan, 2015).

Themagazine Formosawould become central to opposition activism under martial law.
Founded in 1979, Dangwai leader, Huan Hsin-chieh named the magazine Formosa, meaning
beautiful island in Portuguese, to emphasize Taiwan’s distinct identity (Chang, 2009). 13 The
magazine established branch offices in twelve major cities throughout Taiwan allowing it to
coordinate political activities with many activists (Chang, 2009). By its fourth issue, it became
the second most read magazine in Taiwan with a total circulation of one hundred thousand
copies (Rigger, 2001). By facilitating underground political organizing, Dangwai candidates
won local and provincial seats during the 1977 local elections (Tien and Shiau, 2014). These
electoral gains were considered a resounding defeat for the ruling Nationalist Party (Jacobs,
1998). Additionally, following a riot in central Taiwan in 1977 against alleged voting fraud by
KMT officials, Dangwai members began to form an alliance “based on an updated belief about
the vulnerability of the regime” (Chu and Lin, 2005: 40).

A key turning point in Taiwan’s history was the Formosa Incident which took place on
December 10, 1979 in southern Taiwan. On this day, pro-democracy activists held a
demonstration commemorating Human Rights Day to promote and demand democracy in their
country. In retaliation, the KMT government arrested the main organizers and leaders of the
13

Formosa was the name that Portuguese explorers gave to Taiwan in the sixteenth century. Therefore, its nonChinese origin also posed an implicit challenge to KMT's claim that Taiwan was part of China.

57

Formosa magazine. The KMT also took the opportunity to arrest more than 90 civilians and all
the well-known opposition leaders. Everyone who was arrested was held in prison
incommunicado for two months (Rigger, 2001). Reports of abuse and maltreatment were later
reported (Rigger, 2001; Huang, 2009; Fell, 2005). KMT’s heavy-handed approach did not fare
well with an increasingly weary Taiwanese citizenry as well as Taiwanese organizations abroad.
At the same time, the popularity of Formosa grew during this time. With increased grassroots
support the Dangwai became more vocal about their political demands which now included calls
for an end to martial law, greater press freedoms, the release political prisoners, and freedom to
allow the opposition movement to form a party (International Committee for Human Rights in
Taiwan, 1981: 5)14.

By early 1980’s, Taiwan’s political civil society space was expanding and now consisted of
not only the Dangwai movement, but smaller social movements, and new civil society
organizations in Taiwan and abroad. Spontaneous and smaller movements and protests during
this time centered around obtaining rights for specific sub populations such as farmers, workers,
women, students, consumers, and religious groups, among others (Fan, 2015). From 1983 to
1987, more than 1,500 incidents of mass social protest occurred; in 1986 and 1987, 1,200 and
1,800 street rallies and demonstrations on civil and social issues were recorded respectively
(Ngo, 1993).In the US, Taiwanese human rights organizations worked on increasing ties
between Dangwai politicians and US elected officials, scholars, and media (Cheng, 1989).For
example, during this time World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI), “expanded from
the promotion of political consciousness within the Taiwanese immigrant community and
offering moral support to the domestic democratic movement to targeting American
congressional legislation and public debates”(Fan, 2015: 89).

14

“The Kaohsiung Tapes,” International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan (Seattle, February 1981).
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By the mid-1980s the opposition had succeeded in gaining momentum which was
becoming increasingly difficult for the KMT to stop. Likewise, facing growing international
isolation and US pressure for further liberalization, the KMT did not want their authority to be
delegitimized. Therefore, backed with greater domestic and international support, when
opposition leaders were released they went on to form the basis for the Democratic Progressives
Party (DPP) (Rigger, 2001; Huang, 2009; Fell, 2005), while the ban on opposition party was still
in place. The illegal founding of the Democratic Progressive Party on September 28, 1986
attempted to unite these various congeries of oppositional political figures, intellectuals, and
activists. From the inception, the various congeries under the DPP umbrella struggled to find
common ground outside of their support for democracy and ethnic justice. In absence of a
broad ideological and programmatic consensus, the DPP could hold the party together by
developing rules and structures to accommodate and synthesize as broad range of views and
opinions as possible (Tien, 1992). Together they put pressure on the KMT to bring on political
liberalization and democratization and on July 15 th, 1987 when the KMT-led government
announced the repeal of the 38-year-old martial law, thereby formally restoring the frozen
political freedoms of speech, assembly and organization. This retreat on the part of the KMT
was unprecedented in that there are few examples of transition amid prosperity, where
authoritarian rule retreated at the peak of unprecedented growth and apparent political stability
(Yang, 2007).

Activism Post-Martial Law
After martial law was lifted in 1987, Taiwan continue to experience a growth in social
movements, civic groups, and opposition media which gave birth to a new "demanding civil
society"(Hsiao, 1995; Hsiao and Liu, 1997; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). Seeking greater
electoral support, the DPP quickly discovered the political utility of social protests. As a
strategy, they set out to sponsor and support social protests as an indirect way of challenging the
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KMT hegemony and obtaining electoral gains (Rigger, 2014). In return, the KMT leaders were
conflicted on how to respond. Conservative leaders within the KMT sought to slow down the
liberalization and appeasement of the civil society; while more liberal leaders sought a political
strategy of conceding to the increasing demands form the mobilized civil society. The KMT
leadership ultimately chose appeasement. This increased the civic power and political force of
Taiwan’s civil society and led to a substantial increase in civil society’s impact on government
and society. These movements proved that the KMT’s monopoly on the political system had
been shattered and would never again be restored (Diamond, 2001).

More reforms followed which reflected the KMT’s efforts to defuse tensions and respond
to the demands of civil and political society. During the 1990’s this progressive politics or what
others called “new politics” became part of the mainstream political agenda (Wong, 2003; Tso,
2014). They included further mobilizations for workers’ rights, aboriginals, students, etc. One of
the largest movements that took place during this time was Wild Lily student
movement (野百合學運) or March student movement which was a six-day student
demonstration in 1990 for democracy. The sit-in at Memorial Square in Taipei (since
rededicated as Liberty Square in commemoration of the movement) was initiated by students
from the National Taiwan University. Participation quickly grew to 22,000 demonstrators. The
Wild Lily demonstrators sought direct elections of Taiwan's president and vice president and
new popular elections for all representatives in the National Assembly. The election results were
an outbreak of accumulated youth anger. Although, the Wild Lily Student movement of 1990
did not lead to a change in electoral politics or the party system in Taiwan, it was still critically
important for many reasons. It helped the nation move toward a blueprint for democratization
by increasing public support for greater democratic reforms. Equally important, though, was
that it represented a huge boost for Taiwan’s international image.
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In response to call for greater democratic reforms, the KMT had reinvented itself as
abroad-based party that enjoyed wide support. In return, this left little room for an opposition
party to mobilize economic sectors or geographic areas against the ruling party. Still the KMT
legalized new political parties in 1991, and in 1992, Taiwan saw free elections to its central
parliamentary bodies, the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, for the first time. The
first fully competitive presidential elections were held in 1996 which the KMT won again. It was
not until the 2000 presidential elections that DPP leader, Chen Shui-bian’s (䱇∈᠕) became
Taiwan’s first non-KMT president and marked the end of the political transition and resulted in
the first peaceful and democratic power transfer in any Chinese society. However, it is
important to note that during this time there was also allegations of rampant vote buying by
KMT candidates (including a politician who was once convicted for doing so) (Thinking Taiwan,
2014). Vote-buying in local elections particularly, remains a problem as it is established practice
since the early days of democratization and regarded as inevitable by most politicians.

Chen’s first term (2000-2004) took place as movement activists were achieving
legislative successes. In return, Chen and his accompanying DPP politicians promised to usher
the most open era in Taiwan’s history. They vowed to work for equal rights in a country with a
highly patriarchal traditional culture, to reduce in equality after Taiwan’s long economic boom,
and to guarantee women a certain number of cabinet seats, putting them at the policy-making
table in Taiwan for the first time (Chang 2002; Chen and Lee 2008). However, although social
movements scored some legislative successes, these did not necessarily contribute to structural
changes. Chen was reelected for a second term in 2004, until 2008. During this term, Chen
implemented an economic agenda which was barely distinguishable from the KMT’s. This
included the privatization of parts of the banking, telecommunications and utilities sectors, and
attacks on pensions. Many workers in these sectors remember the DPP’s time in power as one of
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job losses, economic uncertainty and continuing government corruption. When voters threw the
DPP out of office in 2008 it was not out of love for the KMT but rather as a punishment for these
economic policies (Thinking Taiwan, 2014). Thus, the gains that movement activists achieved
through their cooperation with DPP incumbents was often more symbolic than substantive.
President Chen’s second term was mired in controversies regarding his alleged corruption
allegations, and he resigned in 2008. That same year, the DPP government lost power as Ma
Ying-jeou led the rejuvenated KMT to reclaim the presidency. Ma Ying-jeou won the
presidential election by a larger than expected margin of more than two million votes in March
2008(Tso, 2014; Fell, 2010).

The return of conservative hegemony raised concerns for activists in Taiwan. After
several years of working within the government, many social movement organizations had lost
the capacity to mobilize their mass constituencies (Tso 2014; Hsiao and Ku 2010). The student
movement of November 2008 called “Wild Strawberry” (䞢㤝㥧, Ye caomei) put these concerns
to rest. The Wild Strawberry movement started as a protest over police violence and brutality
that took place during the visit of Chinese Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits
Chairman, Chen Yunlin. As part of the movement, protestors evoked a Taiwanese identity by
displaying the Taiwanese national flag and playing Taiwanese songs. In demanded a public
apology from President Ma Ying-jeou, resignation of the head of police, and constitutional
review of Taiwan’s laws on the right to peaceful demonstrations and free expression. Although,
not all of the students’ demands were met, the movement paved the way for Taiwan’s first
general democratic elections in Taiwan (Wong, 2003).
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The Integration of Media and Technology in the Political Stage
The period between the end of the 1992 Consensus and Taiwan’s largest movement to
date, the Sunflower Movement (太陽花學運), was one of rapid technology modernization and
some media diversification. As noted earlier, the Formosa magazine and other smaller regional
underground progressive newspapers, were often a source of additional political conflict rather
than an outlet for political discussion. Therefore, in the period of post-martial law, media was
not always seen as a force promoting greater civility and democracy. Rather, the emerging
competitive and negative nature of politics in Taiwan slowly became reinforced by an equally
negative and adversarial media which further complicated relations among political parties and
strained the democratization process (Chu and Lin, 2001; Fell, 2005; Huang, 2006). Despite
Freedom House rating Taiwan as one of the freest media environments in Asia (Diamond, 2001;
Freedom House, 2015)15, a study found that only 1% of Taiwanese view their media as a trusted
source of information; the lowest in Asia-Pacific (Edelman, 2006). Additionally, despite having
an open and competitive media market, newspapers frequently exploit and exaggerate social
and political issues to attract readers (Rawnsely G.D., 2000). So, many are viewed as
sensationalist rather than substantive.

As of 2015, there were over 2,000 newspapers, 8,100 periodicals, 171 radio stations, and
107 satellite broadcasting programs in Taiwan (China.org.cn). This is a notable achievement,
considering that 20-30 years earlier, KMT had a monopoly on the media systems in Taiwan
(Batto, 2004). However, although a plurality of media exists in Taiwan, many of these are split
into the old political establishment which sympathize with China, and new political
establishment which favor Taiwanese independence. To this day, Taiwan’s traditional news and
newspapers are firmly divided between the two dominant political camps: KMT and DPP
Freedom House, Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1999- 2000 (New
York: Freedom House, 2000): p. 469.
15
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supporters. The main players are ET Today, which try to maintain neutral and shift between a
reunification/independence conversations, Apple News (funded by Hong Kong capital and shift
between both sides), China Times (under the CtiTV group, therefore, centered on the KMT),
UDN (broader pan-blue coverage), Liberty Times (pan-green), and PNN (most of reports focus
on citizens' view, environment, social injustice, considered more independent). Scholars have
noted that by 2005, the China Times and United Daily News became more critical of KMT
leaders, rather than simply serving as political mouthpieces (Fell, 2005). Likewise, three of the
four major television networks are still controlled by the old political establishment (the KMT,
the military, and the government). On the KMT side the Chinese funded CtiTV covers news and
information which is centered around reunification. On the DPP side, SET TV is discusses news
with a slant towards independence. Taiwan’s news programs also feature traditional political
talk shows where professors, politicians and journalists debate current issues.

Regarding ICTs, Taiwan has been a pioneer in the adoption and use of technologies
(Diamond, 2001). By 1994, Taiwan was one of the few countries which had three Internet
service providers (Silkera, HiNet, and SeedNet, the latter two being state-owned) which
emerged to provide dial up Internet connection services. According to the 2015 United Nation’s
Information Technology Development Index (IDI) data, Taiwan’s ICT development is 7.85,
making it rank almost equally with other developed countries such as Singapore (7.6), United
Kingdom (7.81), and Luxembourg (7.85) among others (Unied Nationals Information
Technology Development Index, 2015; Sanou, 2014). The countries with the highest IDI Index
arethe Korea Republic with 8.54 followed by Denmark and Sweden at 8.43 and 8.27
respectively. Therefore, Taiwan’s score is high by international standards. Not surprisingly,
Taiwan’s Internet adoption rate is the fourth highest in Asia (ITU, 2014). Per Internet World
Stats (2014), the number of Internet users is18,639,773 which refers to around 80.0% of total
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Taiwanese population (23,071,779). Therefore, citizens’ access to the Internet is also
unrestricted (Lee et al, 2013).

Internet usage in Taiwan is prevalent among the population and does not show a gender
divide, 56% of men vs 52% women use the Internet (FIND, 2014). However, the most notable
difference emerges among different age groups and location. As of 2014, 95% of people between
15 and 24 years old were Internet users but only less than 10% of people over 60 used the
Internet (FIND, 2014). Research conducted by Taiwan Network Information Center in May
2014, estimated that the number of Internet users (aged 12 years and above) in Taiwan had
increased to 17.64 (75.43%) million as of May, 2014 (TNIC, 2014).In 2004, male users
accounted for 62% and females 59%. By January 2011, these figures expanded to 77% and 73%.
The percentage is also high for citizens 12 years and younger, which accounts for 1.41 million
citizens (TNIC, 2014). These high numbers are warranted by the fact that most individuals
(95.20%) can access broadband internet at home. At the same time, Taiwan’s government has
placed a great focus on integrating Internet in the education sector. Chou, Condron and Belland
(2005) argue that Internet usage in schools has helped improve literacy rates in Taiwan. At the
same time, since English is taught to everyone from fifth grade on, this has contributed to the
high Internet usage found among school age youth (Wu, 2011).

There are also notable differences between rural versus urban regions. This is in line
with the distribution of wealth across different regions of the island as wealth distribution is
more skewed in favor of those in urban areas than those in rural areas (Feng, 2011; Wei and
Chen, 2012). Two of the largest cities in the northern and more urbanized region of Taiwan,
Taipei and Kaohsiung, have the highest rate of Internet users (over 80% respectively) (Wu,
2011). On the other hand, the more southern and rural regions the rate of Internet usage is 68
and 64% (Wu, 2011). However, as Internet becomes easier to access and cheaper, the
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relationship between Internet usage and users’ socioeconomic status is not as significant as it
was before.

Political Uses of Technology in Taiwan
With a highly educated population and well-developed ICT infrastructure, its not a
surprise that technology made its way to the political arena in Taiwan (Lee et al, 2014). Due to
the duopoly and competitive nature of politics in Taiwan,elections are volatile and high-stakes
periods which provide parties with the opportunity to increase electoral power. Elections in
Taiwan are often described as being negative in nature, which is often attributed to the fact that
many potential candidates simply didn’t have cogent platforms to start with. In fact, except for a
few municipalities, the campaigns have been overwhelmingly lacking in substance and
imagination, with candidates relying on securing votes traditionally along party lines (“greens”
voting DPP and “blues” voting KMT, with smaller parties accounting for a small percentage of
the ballots) (Thinking Taiwan, 2014). Even with the integration of ICTs into politics, this nature
of elections has not changed.

In the electoral arena, Diamond and Shin (2014) identify three distinct periods in the
evolution of ICTs. The first use of ICTs took place during the 1994 Taipei City mayoral election.
During this election, DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian became the first politician to create an
online bulletin board station (BBBS) to reach out to young voters (Diamond and Shin, 2014: 34).
BBBS was founded in 1995 by college students and quickly became a central online place for
creating forums and various online communities. Shortly after, other candidates began
utilizing the BBBS platform for voter outreach and developed more complex online forums to
help facilitate a variety of online discussions with constituents. The first political party websites
emerged during the 1996 presidential elections (Diamond and Shin, 2014: 59). The websites
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were utilized by Taiwan’s three major parties KMT, DPP, and New Party. The websites were
used to highlight the policies and political stances of candidates and as communication tool.

The second phase of ICTs incorporation into politics took place between 1998 and 2004.
During politicians began to incorporate multimedia instruments and online donation systems
into their websites (Diamond and Shin, 2014: 68). For example, during the 2002 Taipei
mayoral elections, DPP challenger Lee Ying-yuan and KMT-challenger Chen set up online
donations systems (Diamond and Shin, 2014). Finally, the period between 2005- to the present
saw the utilization of personalized social media platforms and a continued focus on creating
multimedia such as video, blog posts, and in some cases mobile applications and websites
(Diamond and Shin, 2014: 94). Despite the growth in sophistication in terms of ICT use in
politics there are noted differences among local elections in the urban and rural areas. For
example, in the 2010 election candidates in the northern urban region (Taipei and Mew Taipei
city) utilized campaign websites and other web tools than candidates in the central and southern
regions (Taichung City, Tainana City, and Kahsiung City) (Diamond and Shin, 2014: 173).

Beginning in 2005, politics in Taiwan saw the emergence of personalized social media
with multimedia programs as new campaign tools (Diamond and Shin, 2014: 118). This period
began in the aftermath of the 2008 presidential election when DPP politicians shifted their focus
to the virtual world to seek political rejuvenation. During the 2008 elections, the KMT and DPP
invested extensive funds and resources in ICTs to target the 8.89 million eligible voters above
the age of 20, who make up more than 10.47 million Taiwanese that frequently surf the internet
(Wang, 2007; Chen & Lee, 2008). Both parties spent thousands of dollars on YouTube
campaign films criticizing each other’s candidates, ads on YouTube, and professional
consultants to manage their online campaigns (China Times, 2011). During this period, DPP
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politicians were also able to regain popularity among the younger generations simply using
youth-friendly social media tools such as Plurk and Facebook (Diamond and Shin, 2014).

In summary, several points can be made regarding the emergence of ICT use in politics
in Taiwan. First, electoral competitions and the availability of ICTs have been the main drivers
in the adoption of ICT for politics. Second, in Taiwan geography has shaped the use of ICTs for
campaigning; with urban politicians being more active than rural politicians. However, this
geographical distinction is best understood at the local level rather than the federal level where
presidential elections take place. These geographical differences highlight a third driver to the
use of ICTs by politicians, which is their assessment of which key constituents they want to
reach and desire to modernize their party image. In Taiwan, ICT use is often seen as mostly
occupied by a younger and more urban population. However, since all major parties are now
using the same ICT-enabled campaign strategies, this has leveled the playing field in this respect
(Wang, 2007; Myers et al, 1999).

Scholars inside and outside of Taiwan have mixed reactions regarding the utility of ICTs
in politics in Taiwan. With respect to the impact of candidate websites during Taiwan's
elections, Rawnsely pessimistically argues that they only serve voters who actively search for
related information, so they only "preach to the converted" (Rawnsely, 2014; 123). Yet, research
on subsequent elections have shown mixed outcomes. During the 2006 mayoral election, voters
use of traditional media had a stronger effect than the new media on perceptions of the
candidates' images (Diamond and Shin, 2014: 189). But another study of the same election finds
that those who viewed the candidates' websites more frequently were less cynical and more
willing to explore detailed info about the individual candidates (Chen, 2013). Second, scholars
have argued that ICTs have mostly led to a new form of professionalization of campaigns and in
return the weakening of political parties. Rawsley has observed a trend of professionalization in
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Taiwan campaigns since the late 1990s as evidenced by the modern organization, the careful
demographic studies, the nuanced skills to communicate with voters and the constant
monitoring of change in public polls (Rawsley, 2014). Therefore, this new form of
professionalization tends to distance campaign team from the traditional party machines.

Technology and the Amplification Activism in the Sunflower Era

The early 2010s saw the emergence of new economic treaties and agreements between
China and Taiwan such as the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement and Cross-Strait
Goods Trade Agreement which deepened economic relations between China and Taiwan.
Following the trajectory of the use of media and now technology by pro-independence and
opposition groups in Taiwan, during the Sunflower movement in 2014, ICTs were found to help
create new political opportunities for pro-independence activists by helping to elevate a proTaiwan narrative, bringing awareness of these activists’ plights to the international arena, and
the introduction of new political players who would help to challenge both political parties KMT
and DPP policies in this regard. Likewise, the movement and this renewed activism was met
with disappointment and frustration by citizens and scholars who felt it disrupted cross-strait
cooperation and economic integration beginning in 2008 and saw these activists as a backlash
against cross-strait integration (Lee, 2014). Other scholars warned that the Sunflower
movement represented a concerning escalation of disruptive tactics and hostile rhetoric that
threatens the rule of law, the legitimacy of democratic institutions, and the stability of Taiwan’s
democracy (Huang, 2014).

Using the emblem of a sunflower symbolizing hope, the Sunflower Student Movement
became the largest student movement in Taiwan’s history. In many ways, the Sunflower
Movement itself was not solely an anti-China manifestation – it was the culmination of years of
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a maturing social movement scene and social unrest. In past years, civic activists raised
awareness and escalated protests on issues such as forced land evictions and the demolition of
homes in Dapu; the suspicious death of a conscripted soldier that raised issues of accountability
and corruption in the military and saw 300,000 protesters gather on the streets; the legalization
of same-sex marriage; and indigenous land rights (The Diplomat, 2016). But there was still no
viable progressive political party for these progressive causes. In many ways, this all changed
with the emergence of the Sunflower Movement.

On March 18, 2014 at 9:00pm local time, about 300 students, academics, community
groups, and other protestors entered Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan and barricaded themselves for
23 days to protest the cursory review of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA), a
bilateral agreement with Mainland China. Equipped with new media and information,
communication, technologies (ICTs), this energetic and fast-growing movement was united in
their concern over what appeared as greater economic and cultural dependence with China. The
movement also became an umbrella for 54 diverse civic organizations and NGOs operating at
the local and national levels and engaged older generation of activists who served as political
advisors and problem solvers for the students throughout the movement. Traditionally left out
of politics in Taiwan, this upsurge in youth participation demonstrated a dramatic shift in the
country’s political culture.
During and in the aftermath of the Sunflower Student Movement, politicians, scholars,
media, and pundits alike commented on its organization and efficiency, often noted that they
ran a better campaign that traditional political parties16. The core team of organizers consisted
of twenty students from some of the country’s top universities: National Taiwan University,

In the article, “How Technology Revolutionzed Taiwan's Sunflower Movement. The Diplomat”, opposition leader
Tsai Ing-wen was noted as stating that the students, “could probably run a better campaign than the DPP,” said
opposition leader Tsai Ing-wen during a media interview. Retrieved from http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/howtechnology-revolutionized-taiwans-sunflower-movement/om
16
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National Tsing Hua University, National Chiao Tung University, National Cheng Kung
University, and, National Chengchi University. Many were members of the Black Island Youth
Alliance (黑色島國青年陣線) (Chen et al 2016). Its two main leaders were Lin Fei-Fan, a postgraduate student from the National Taiwan University and Chen Ting, a student at National
Tsing Hua University. However, other civic groups who organized it were the Green Citizens'
Action Alliance (綠色公民行動聯盟) and Citizen Action Coalition 1985 (公民1985行動聯盟).

A key reason for protestors’ efficiency and effectiveness was their transformational use of
ICTs. During the movement, students used websites such as Hackpad, Hackfoldr, FB, PTT(BBS,
Bulletin Board System), and mobile apps such WhatsApp and LINE.ion in order to exchange
information between organizers and supporters as well as the international community (Chen et
al 2016; Liberty Times News, 2014). During this time, Taiwan’s emerging civic hacker
community used hack pads, "livestreams", wireless networks, and their networked resources to
provide public WIFI which could not be restricted by the government (Chen et al 2016; Manju,
2014; Liberty Times News, 2014). Live streaming also come to play an important role in
expanding the influence of the movement and keeping supporters abreast of news even though
they may not physically be there (Chen et al 2016; Manju, 2014; Liberty Times News, 2014;
Manju, 2014).

Online communities also emerged and websites such as g0v.tw promoted public
information and government transparency by developing tools for improving citizen
participation in Taiwan. Using online fundraising platforms, the students were also able to raise
NT$6.33 million in the crowd funding site FlyingV to place an ad in the New York Times
(Commonwealth Magazine, 2014; The Diplomat, 2014)17. It was a powerful message, featuring
students with their heads bowed being hosed down by a water cannon. “Taiwan,” it noted,
17

Accessed April 10, 2014 https://www.flyingv.cc/project/2648
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“needs your attention and support.” The placement costs of $208,000 (inclusive of the New
York Times ad at $153,000 and another at the Taiwan-based Apple Daily) was raised using a
Taiwanese online fundraising platform called FlyingV (The Diplomat, 2014). These platforms
and tools also facilitated the development of a cross-border Chinese activist community because
of the Taiwan-Hong Kong collaboration. ICTs were also used to coordinate materials such as
tent, blanket, electronic rechargers, fans, food, monies, etc. that arrived from all parts of
Taiwan18.Likewise, using ICTs movement leaders could tell their story domestically and
internationally. Organizers were aware that international support was not only necessary but
essential in the public relations battle with the government (The Diplomat, April 2014). So, they
sent out regular press releases via Facebook and Twitter and set up a live video feed on
UStream. These were transformative changes in communication among Taiwan’s civil society
and with the international community which would never have been possible during Taiwan’s
early democracy times.

Even though the movement did not accomplish their goal of reinstating a clause-byclause review of the CSSTA with China, they did have several significant unintended outcomes.
The Sunflower movement these newly emergent youth activists and protestors highlighted and
brought attention to narratives in support of a “Taiwanese” rather than a “Chinese” identity.
They also played an influential role in reshaping the Taiwanese political arena post-movement
(Foreign Policy in Focus, 2015). Nowhere was this most noticeable than during the “nine-inone” local elections on November 29, 2014. The “nine in one” local elections put up for grabs
11,130 public offices spanning nine administrative levels from the county to the villages. When
the elections were over the ruling KMT only won 6 of the 22 constituencies in the mayoral and
commissioner elections, while the DPP won 13with sizable leads (CNN, 12/2014). Overall, the
DPP garnered 5.83 million votes, or 47.6%, against the KMT's 4.99 million (40.7%) (CNN,
18

National Taiwan University survey respondent, March 20, 2014.
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12/2014). Thanks to the “star” status that some of the movement leaders had acquired, their
participation in local elections helped in getting third party leaders to win elections and so and
KMT was unprecedentedly defeated. The opposition DPP won 10 out of 16 mayoral and
commissioner races. The ruling KMT, lost ground even in its some of its traditional strongholds
such as the capital city which they had run for 16 consecutive years. Instead, this seat went to an
outsider independent political candidate who had no, political experience.

During the “nine in one” local elections, an unlikely candidate also emerged which went
on to win the Taipei mayoral election. This unlikely candidate was medical professor, Dr. Ko
Wen-je. Dr. Ko Wen-je became the first independent candidate to win the office of Taipei mayor,
which is often a springboard for a later run for the island’s presidency. He was considered an
untraditional political candidate as he had no previous political experience. Yet he ran a
revolutionary campaign in his use of ICTs to develop political power and in how he embraced
Internet culture that was guided by principles and values such as crowdsourcing wisdom,
transparency and openness. Politically, Ko steered clear of color politics by adopting a centrist
line and emphasizing values that have substantial traction among young voters as well as the allimportant “swing voters.” Ko’s wife also actively used ICTs during the campaign. She set up a
public Facebook page and received more than 200,000 followers (World News Radio Today,
2014).In addition, he vowed to implement ideas gathered by his campaign team from social
media users as part of Taipei City policy if he won the election. Many have credited his outreach
on social media with bringing out younger voters in droves. In Ko’s acceptance speech, he
attributed his victory to the power of social media:
I am an ordinary citizen, and I will continue to listen to the voices of the common people upon
starting to serve in the Taipei City government. The power of grassroots was parallel to the rise of
the Internet generation. The entire election campaign was let by the Internet — online donation,
the promotion of ideals, and mobilization to events. From the White T-Shirt Army to the
Sunflower Movement, civic movements have created a new approach to Taiwan politics.
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Ko won with 57.16% of the vote, a landslide compared to the 40.82% his major opposing
KMT-supported candidate, Sean Lienn received (World News Radio Today, 2014). His
nonpartisan campaign strategy has inspired many hopes that his victory can ease political
polarization and open a new era for civic politics in Taiwan. So far, he has announced many
policies that aim to keep his non-partisan appeal right after the election, which signifies his
intention to remain politically independent and outside the DDP’s institutional framework. His
success in winning the capital city as an independent candidate will have a significant impact in
shaping voter behavior and the country's political culture, some analysts have suggested. Due to
the influence of the movement in the November 2014 local elections, it was not a surprise that
the movement was also credited with helping to usher the win of DPP leader, Tsai Ing-Wen
during the 2016 Presidential elections (NY Times, Jan 2016).
Political Polarization or Integration and the Emergence of New Political Actors
ICTs helped to foster a “communicative consciousness” in the form of an oppositional
identity (Chen and Liao, 2014) which contributed to the rise of the “Third Force” which helped
to bring about electoral changes in Taiwan’s party system. For example, in the aftermath of the
Sunflower Movement, movement leaders and the Taiwan Citizens Union” (公民組合) created
several smaller political parties focused on social justice. The three notable ones were: the
Green Party, Social Democratic Party, and New Power Party (時代力量) (NPP) which were
founded in 2015. These “third force” parties marketed themselves as representatives of the
social movement scene and sought to advance a progressive agenda in Taiwan. Of the three, the
NPP has been the most successful to date. They received an endorsement from former
Democratic Progressive Party chairman Lin I-hsiung (Taipei Times, April 2015), who withdrew
his membership in the DPP in 2006. The NPP has been assertive on Taiwan’s independence in
contrast to the DPP, which supports the ambiguous status quo and stability of cross-strait
relations. Their political agenda is strongly focused on progressive social justice, human rights,
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and democratic values such as the environment, same-sex marriage, and indigenous land rights.
Their economic policy focuses on higher corporate and luxury taxes to redress wealth inequality.
During the 2016 general election, the NPP won 5 legislative seats, beating out long-time thirdparty People First Party.

The DPP has taken notice of the growing popularity for “third force” parties. Since, these
parties have raised issues which have become very salient in Taiwan’s society, the DPP sought
for ways to align with movement groups. Nominating the first woman, Tsai Ing-wen, a former
university professor and DPP chairwoman, the DPP could lead the opinion polls and eventually
win the 2016 Presidential elections with their call for a more cautious relationship with China
and greater democratic deepening. Therefore, the future of these small parties remains to be
seen. Since these parties are more movement based than political organizations, and the
political arena is still mostly taken up by the KMT and DPP, it is unclear to see how they can
grow. Unless, they can keep the movements’ grassroots momentum going, the major parties’
will continue to control most of the resources, thereby keeping the small parties marginalized.
Likewise, this new generation of pro-independence activists and elected officials are seen as the
drivers of political polarization in Taiwan (Lee, 2014). Thereby, negatively influencing what was
noted as a mostly flexible and pragmatic view on cross-strait relations among the younger
generations in Taiwan (Rigger, 2006). Thus, some scholars noted that these views mostly
represent a specific group of movement activists born after the 1996 cross-strait missile crisis
and therefore grew up with a high level of native consciousness, or “Taiwanese nationalism” and
therefore, take democracy, freedom, and rights for granted (Lee, 2014).
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Rise of crowdsourcing and transparency and accountability civic groups
Another effect of the emergence of Taiwan’s “third force” has been the development of
new civic watchdogs. After the Sunflower Movement, leaders created a watchdog website which
sought to engage youth in the political process by explaining political issues and make it easier
for them to get involved and hold politicians accountable. The outcome of these efforts was the
creation of the Appendectomy Project 19. The project was called Appendectomy to symbolize the
removal of legislators who were perceived as been ineffective and unaccountable. The project
developed a website seeks to ensure accountability by reviewing campaign promises by elected
officials, and helping to promote grassroots mobilizations to remove what they deem to be
incompetent politicians from office. Using recall, these activists hope to remove politicians
unresponsive to the will of the people. So far, they have largely targeted KMT politicians and so
their work has become synonymous with “remove blue legislator” (Foreign Policy in Focus, May
2015). As of 2017, the Appendectomy Project had succeeded in passing “Public Officers
Election” amendment which made it easier for citizens to remove local elected officials from
office. They also continue to maintain an online active community to expose corruption and
hold elected officials accountable as well as serve as a leadership pipeline for youth interested in
political engagement and participation.

In conclusion, the Sunflower Movement and the bottom-up appropriations of ICTenabled activism that followed continue to shape politics in Taiwan. Although, youth and
progressive initiatives reemerged strong from these efforts, it is still unclear as to whether they
will contribute to democratic deepening in Taiwan. Particularly, in the strengthening of
democratic representative institutions in this emerging democracy. ICTs helped support the
emergence of new political parties after the movement. However, we still need to define the

19

http://appy.tw/
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aspects of ICT usage which interact with a country’s political context and can help understand
its democratic utility. To this end, I conducted a survey with college students and members of
political parties in Taiwan to better understand how they viewed the challenges and
opportunities of ICTs for politics in their country.

Survey and Analysis of Political Websites
At the macro level, we can see the ways that ICTs are contributing to new political
opportunities for pro-independence activists in Taiwan and having some electoral gains.
However, this does not tell us about how the new generation of activists or political parties
themselves view their use of ICTs and their perception of its utility and how it is changing how
they do their work. To help bridge the gap between the macro and micro, this next section
discusses findings from two surveys conducted in March and April 2014 in Taiwan. One survey
targeted college students and the second survey targeted volunteers and staff of political parties.
The survey was developed in English and translated to Taiwanese and posted on Qualtrics
online in a dissertation website that I created called, My Online Political Participation:
http://myopp.org/chinesestudy/.The surveys asked students and political parties a variety of
questions regarding their level of satisfaction with politics today, how they use ICTs, and their
sense of the utility of ICTs. For the sake of brevity, this section will only discuss answers
regarding how these groups use ICTs and their sense of utility. Qualtrics was chosen because it
can encrypt the data collected from human participants over computer networks. Finally, two
Taiwanese research assistants were hired to administer both surveys in Taiwan.

For the college student survey, the two research assistants employed snowball sampling
and recruited sixty-one local college students from universities in northern and southern Taiwan
such as National Taiwan University, National Chengchi University, Soochow University, Taipei
Medical University, and Taiwan Shoufu University to successfully complete the survey online
(Appendix B includes a copy of the surveys that were administered into Taiwanese and English).

77

The college student survey was divided into four parts: demographic information (i.e. gender,
income, education level), views about political institutions and political parties,
media/technology access and exposure, and political interest and activism. In terms of
demographics of the student population, it is important to note that I did not recruit nor sought
to measure differences between mainlander vs islander student populations. Figure 2 outlines
the basic profile of the student respondents. We achieved an almost even distribution of surveys
completed by male versus females. The average age of the respondents was 23 years old. Since
our target audience was college students, it is not a surprise that our samples are all welleducated. Likewise, in Taiwan, most students do continue schooling beyond high school. Posthigh school education is usually classified into: a vocational program, junior college, which is
usually two years, university programs, which could be considered the equivalent of a 4-year
school in America, Masters, and Doctorate. Most our respondents were in 4 year schools or
junior colleges.

As noted earlier, Taiwan is one of the densest countries in the world. Most students were
recruited from urban cities, however, the cities could be divided from high density areas such as:
New Taipei City, Taipei, Hsinchu, Taichung, Kaohsiung, Tainan, to lower density urban areas
such as: Yilan, Pingtun, Keelung, and Miaoli. Regarding income, as of January 1, 2013, the
minimum wage in Taiwan is NT$109.oo an hour (about $3.71/hr in the United States) (Chang,
2012). This comes out to an average yearly salary of $NT228,564 (or equivalent of $6,978
dollars a year). Most survey respondents reported making below $NT200,000 a year, therefore,
below what’s considered an average yearly salary in Taiwan. Despite, their lower income levels
most students reported accessing the Internet daily, using online social networks, and mobile
devices. Most respondents also expressed having moderate to conservative political views.
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Table 14: Profile of N=61 Student Survey Respondents
# of Responses

Percentage of Sample

Male
Female

34
27

56%
44%

Average age

23

Highest Education
Completed
Vocational School
Junior College
University
Masters
Doctorate

2
12
37
9
0

3%
21%
61%
15%
0%

Political Views
Very Conservative
Conservative
Moderate
Liberal
Very Liberal

2
12
38
8
1

3%
20%
62%
13%
2%

59

97%

3

3%

5
3

8.5%
5.1%

51

86.4

Frequency Using the Internet
Daily
Several times a week
Few times a month
Rarely
Never

53
3
3
2
0

87%
5%
3%
3%
0%

Mobile Device Use
Yes
No

55
6

90%
10%

Own a social networking site
account (e.g. Facebook,
Twitter, Plurk, etc.)
Yes
No

44
12

77%
23%

Geographical Distribution
High-Density- Urban Cities: New
Taipei City, Taipei, Taoyuan,
Taichung, Kaohsiung, Tainan
Less-Density-Urban Cities:
Pingtun and Miaoli
Yearly Income
Over NT$ 300,000
Between NT$200,000 and
NT$300,000
Below NT$200,000
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Students’ Perception of How Politicians Use ICTs
Students’ views and expectations of how elected officials use ICTs seem to be mixed.
While (47.5%) reported that they can help keep people more informed about what government
is doing and 37.8% felt that it can make government more accessible, half (52.5%) felt that
government just delivers the same information online as they do through traditional channels.
Some students even expressed that it was a waste of government money and time for elected
officials to think about how to use digital tools to engage with their constituents.
Figure 2: Taiwanese Students’ Communication with Government

Students also seemed to have limited interest in their expectations of how political
parties should use ICTs. Most felt it was important or very important for political parties to: (1)
keep the public informed by posting info and alerts on social networking sites, (2) allow people
to contact parties online, and (3) provide general information to the public through their
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website. Fewer students felt it was important for political parties to allow the public to complete
specific tasks online, such as making donations, etc.
Figure 3: Students' closeness to Political Parties

.

Finally, students were more likely to follow politicians on social media because: (1) they
find the information from these sites are more reliable that what they get on traditional news
organizations and (2) they want to stay current on political and social news. Students were not
inclined to use social media to feel closer to their political party.
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Figure 4: Following Political Parties on Social Media

Students’ Opinions About the Role of ICTs in Politics
The survey asked students for their opinions regarding the role of ICTs both in terms of
how it changes their connection to their government and political system and how its changing
government and politics. Generally, students seem to have a favorable view of how ICTs are
helping to increase access to information about the government and politics. For example,
47.5% of the students felt that ICTs are helping people become more informed about what
government is doing and 39.3% felt that that the Internet generally makes government more
accessible and 52% felt that it also helps to increase access to politicians. The survey also asked
students if they agreed or disagreed with this statement: “The Internet INCREASES the
influence of those with extreme political views, OR the Internet REDUCES the influence of
those with extreme views by giving ordinary citizens a chance to be heard”. Nearly half of
students (47%) reported that it increases the influence of people with extreme views.
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Figure 5: Perception of Extreme Political Views

In terms of the benefits they gain from ICTs, 74% of students reported that the Internet
and social networks give them access to a wider range of views than those expressed in
traditional media and this might shape their political views (71%). In Taiwan’s highly politicized
media environment, its clear to see why youth coming of age in Taiwan may look for the ability
to access a variety of political views outside of what their parents are used to. Students did
report relying on a mix of traditional and new mediums for getting access to news about their
government.
Figure 6 shows that the top three mediums reported were: (1) Internet (38.8%), (2)
television (16.3%), and (3) social media (13.8%). A small number of students did select other
major sources of news and were asked to list them. The top three news sources listed were: (1)
Facebook and Yahoo (33%), Apple Daily (13%), and PTT Bulletin Board System (12%).

83

Figure 6: Students’ News Consumption

Overall, students seem to express positive views towards the utility of social networking
sites in politics. Most students reported that it was somewhat important to very important that
they use social networking sites to (1) keep up with political news, (2) debate or discuss political
issues with others, and (3) learn about what issues and policies political parties are advocating
for. Students were less likely to use social networking sites to recruit people to get involved in a
political cause or find other people who share their political views.
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Figure 7: Affinity to Social Networking Sites

Students’ Sense of Political Efficacy
Generally, and not considering ICTs, more than half of the students felt that they could
have a moderate (14.8%) to small impact (50.8%) in their government. This is revealing for a
country which has experienced a political stalemate since becoming a democracy. Even under
these political conditions, students still feel some degree of political efficacy. Only 31.1% felt
they could have no impact.
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Figure 8: Students’ Perception of Personal Impact

When asked to rate their interactions with either their local, state, or federal government
in the past twelve months, 38.8% of students had mentioned they had not contacted their local,
state, or federal government in the past year. However, a small subset of the students had
contacted their government through a website, email or, in-person. Therefore, if students are to
have contacted their government, it appears that this is more likely to take place by online
versus more traditional offline means. Figure 9 outlines all the responses.
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Figure 9: Students’ contact with Government

While students do report a sense of personal political efficacy, when it comes to day-today political engagement, the majority were less likely to do so. For example, for the question:
“How often, if ever, do you talk about politcs or current events with your family and friends”,
only 39% of the students reported sometimes or rarely (35%). Interestingly, even though
students had positive views about the role of social networks in politics, they were even less
likely to discuss politics and current events online through social networks, websites, forums.
For the question: “How often do you discuss politics and public affairs with others online in
social networks, news websites, forums, etc?”, half of students reported a low amount:
28% said less than once a month;
Or atleast once a month (26%).
Only 5% of students said they discuss politics and current events online every day. When
asking students to rate the type of information they share on social networks, only 37% reported
that some of what they post online is related to politics or the economy. Finally, regarding
whether students use their social media accounts to follow political parties online, most students
(68%) mentioned they do not follow political parties or candidates on social media networks.
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Students’ Political Participation

The survey had two sections which explored students’ participation in both traditional
offline forms of political participation and more contemporary ICT-enabled forms of
participation. It is important to note that in terms of preference nearly half of students reported
enjoying participating both online and offline (47%), rather than only one form. Likewise, the
survey asked students if, “In the past has there been a time when you decided to TAKE ACTION
involving a political or social issues because of something you read online”, and 68% listed no.
However, for those that listed yes, the events most mentioned were: (1) Cross-Strait Agreement
on Trade in Services (2) the suspicious death of 24-year-old Army conscript Hung Chung-chiu in
2013, (3) anti-nuclear protests, and (4) Sunflower Movement.
Figure 10: Students’ offline vs online political participation
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In terms of traditional forms of political participation and activism, the survey asked
students to select the political activities they had ever engaged in. The political activities most
selected were: (1) attend an organized protest of any kind (45.6%), (2) follow a political
campaign (43.9%), and attend a political rally or speech (43.9%). The figure below outlines
those activities which the students were least likely to do. These include attend a political
meeting (89.5%), contribute money to apolitical candidate, party, or cause (87.7%), (3)
participate in volunteer activities related to a campaign (84.2%), and (4) been an active member
of any group that tries to influence public policy or government (87.7%).
Figure 11: Political Activities
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In terms of online forms of political participation, students were most likely to: (1) Read
the blog of a member of a political party (50.9%), watch a video online of a member of a political
party (49.1%), and sign an online petitions or comment on an online news story or blog to
express a political opinion (40.4%). Students are least likely to sign up to receive text messages
from a political party (91.2%), sign up to receive email alerts from a political party (86%), or
follow an election campaign online (80.7%).
Figure 12: Online Political Activities

In terms of engaging in political participation via their mobile phones, students were
most likely to use them to (1) keep up with news (56.1), (2) share photos or videos related to
election campaigns (28.1%), or (3) send text messages to friends and families about the elections
(17.5%).
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Figure 13: Mobile Phone Political Activity

Political Party Survey
The second survey was conducted with volunteers and members of political parties in
Taiwan. Research assistants did phone and online outreach to the various local political offices
to get this target group to complete the survey. Ultimately, 62 surveys were completed.
Appendix B includes a copy of the surveys that were administered into Taiwanese and English.
Table 15 below provides an overview of the demographics of the survey respondents for this
second survey.
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Table 15: Profile of N=62 Political Staff/Volunteer Survey
# of Responses

Percentage of Sample

Male
Female

38
24

61%
39%

Average age

31

Highest Education
Completed
Vocational School
Junior College
University
Masters
Doctorate

7
43
10
2
0

11.3%
69.4%
16.1%
3.2%
0%

Political Views
Very Conservative
Conservative
Moderate
Liberal
Very Liberal

2
12
38
8
1

3%
20%
62%
13%
2%

55

93%

6

7%

23
13

37%
21%

16
9

26%
14%

57
3
1
1
0

91.9%
4.8%
1.6%
1.6%
0%

Geographical Distribution
High-Density- Urban Cities:
New Taipei City, Taipei,
Hsinchu, Taichung, Kaohsiung,
Tainan
Less-Density-Urban Cities:
Yilan, Pingtun, Keelung, Miaoli
Political Party Affiliation
KMT (Chinese Nationalist Party)
DPP (Democratic Progressive
Party)
TSU (Taiwan Solidary Union)
PFP (People First Party)
Frequency Using the
Internet
Daily
Several times a week
Few times a month
Rarely
Never

92

Political Parties’ Views on How ICTs are Changing Political Landscape
Political parties were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement:
“Internet is allowing smaller, less established political parties and politicians to get attention
and build a following.” Most respondents (97%) agreed with this statement, thereby,
illustrating an almost universal belief that the Internet was playing a role in shifting political
power in Taiwan. The survey then asked respondents to identify the purposes they think the
Internet serves best.
Figure 14 outlines the respondents’ responses. The top three items respondents felt the Internet
served best were:
Giving a voice to alternative perspectives (19.1%)
Searching for info about politics or community (12.9%)
Discussion among citizens (12.4%)
The items that respondents felt the Internet least served were:
Putting issues on the political agenda (6.7%)
Networking with other politically active people (6.2%)
Contacting politicians (1.7%)
Figure 14: Utility of the Internet

Which of the following purposes do you think the Internet serves
best? (Please select no more than three please)
Giving a voice to alternative perspectives
Searching for information about politics or community issues
Discussion among citizens
Giving a voice to diverse or less represented groups in society
Discussion among citizens and politicians
Organizing grassroot activities
Affecting media coverage
Linking communities and neighborhoods together
Putting issues on the political agenda
Networking with other politically active people
Contacting politicians
Other
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19.1%
12.9%
12.4%
9.6%
9.6%
7.3%
7.3%
6.7%
6.7%
6.2%
1.7%
0.6%

Figure 15 outlines the same responses but broken down by three of the main political parties in
Taiwan, KMT, DPP, and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). Although, survey responses are too
small to make definitive conclusions, the chart demonstrates how there is very little difference
among the three political parties. The only significant difference was respondents’ view of the
role of the Internet in fostering discussion among citizens. This was rated the highest by TSU
respondents while KMT respondents listed this among the lowest key purposes the Internet
services. Although, the TSU is considered the third largest party in Taiwan and is part of the
Pan-Green Coalition along with the DPP, this could reflect the more grassroots and localized
nature of their party makeup and participation.
Figure 15: Political Parties’ online expectations

Which of the following purposes do you think the
Internet serves best? (Please select no more than three
please)
17.2%
17.5%

Giving a voice to alternative perspectives
Searching for information about politics or
community issues

10.0%

4.5%

Giving a voice to diverse or less represented groups in
society

12.5%
10.0%

0.0%
2.5%

6.3%
5.0%
6.8%

Organizing grassroot activities

4.7%
4.5%

Putting issues on the political agenda

KMT

10.9%
6.8%
7.8%
7.5%
6.8%

Networking with other politically active people

Other

3.1%
5.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

DPP

15.0%

9.4%
11.4%

2.5%

Linking communities and neighborhoods together

Contacting politicians

15.0%
10.9%

Discussion among citizens and politicians

Affecting media coverage

14.1%
13.6%

3.1%

Discussion among citizens

2.3%

TSU
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10.0%

20.5%

22.7%

Political Party’s Use of ICTs
The top three technologies that parties reported most using were: Facebook, website,
and text messaging. Twitter was the least used technology-enabled social network noted by all
respondents. This finding was consistent with my evaluation of political parties’ social
networking and media accounts which will be discussed in the next section. Figure 16 provides a
breakdown of all the technology options that members were given to select.
Figure 16: Technology Use

Which technologies does your political party use/have?
Facebook

31.3%

Website

27.5%

Text messaging

16.5%

Blogs

8.8%

Mobile site
Other social networks or websites
Twitter account

7.1%
4.9%
3.8%

When looking at how political parties are using technologies in their work, the top three
tasks listed were to: (1) increase awareness of relevant political issues, (2) communicate with
other groups and stakeholder in the country, and (3) mobilize members around specific issues.
Half of the respondent mentioned they are least likely to use technologies to raise money.
Responses can be found in Figure 17.
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Figure 17: How Parties use the Internet

Please select the following ways that your party uses the Internet
to achieve its objectives:
Reach out to potential new members/volunteers

26%

Communicate with other groups and stakeholders…

74%

22%

78%

Communicate with other groups and stakeholders in the… 9%
Mobilize members around specific issues

91%

9%

90%

Raise money

57%

Increase awareness of relevant political issues 2%
For administrative purposes

98%
22%

0%

43%
78%

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

No

Yes

Political Parties’ Views on the Utility of ICTs

One of the benefits of the emergence of ICTs in political life, has been its role in helping
less established and emerging political parties and voices to get more public attention and grow
support. But less discussed is about how current political parties feel about this. Figure 18
shows that the more progressive and grassroots-driven parties (TSU and DPP) noted that this
was a good thing about the Internet, while most of KMT respondents agreed with this statement
except for 18.2% of respondents which had noted that it was negative thing.
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Figure 18 Minor Parties Online

The Internet is allowing smaller, less established political
parties and politicians to get attention and build a
following. Do you think this is a good thing?
TSU

100.0%

DPP

100.0%

KMT

18.2%

91.3%
No

Yes

The survey also asked respondents to assess the ways that the Internet and ICTs had
affected key party programmatic functions. Most respondents did note that ICTs had made it
easier to:
Communicate their message and goals (98%);
Increase party membership (69%);
Diversify party membership (95%);
Deepen participation and activism within their party (95%);
Work more effectively and efficiently (92%).
Nearly half of respondents (45%), did report using ICTs to collect donations along with more
traditional fundraising methods. Figure 19 outlines other traditional methods of fundraising
that political parties listed such as event-driven fundraising and collecting party membership
fees.
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Figure 19: Fundraising Methods

What traditional fundraising methods does your party use?
Event-driven fundraising

43.3%

Party membership fees
Direct Mail solicitation
Telephone solicitation
Other

40.0%
6.7%
5.6%
4.4%

Figure 20 breaks down responses by political party. Although, there is not much difference
between the three parties, several key items do stand out. For one, 100% of KMT and DPP
respondents agreed that: (1) that they use the Internet to increase awareness of relevant political
issues and (2) distribute information about policy objectives and messages. Second, TSU
respondents were likely to select a variety of functions that they used ICTs for. Therefore,
although they are more grassroots in nature, their ICT use is quite limited. The only item in
which TSU respondents voted higher than other parties, was their expressed lack of interest in
using ICTs for fundraising.
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Figure 20: Online Objectives Broken Down by Political Party

Regarding political parties’ preference for traditional media versus more technologydriven forms of communication tools, the survey asked respondents to select how much they
agreed or disagreed with the statement, “Traditional media such as newspapers, television,
radio, etc. are more useful than the Internet and other technology tools for party
communications and outreach.” A little over half of the respondents noted that they somewhat
agreed with this statement. Figure 21 outlines all the responses.
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Figure 21: Utility of Different Media Mediums

Traditional media such as newspaper, television, radio, etc.
are more useful than the Internet and other technology tools
for party communications and outreach.
Somewhat disagree
16%

Strongly disagree
2%

Neutral
16%

Strongly agree
11%

Somewhat
agree
55%

When looking at the same question broken down by political party, Figure 22 shows
that once again, there’s not much difference noted between the parties. Most TSU members
somewhat agreed (68.8%) and the majority of DPP and KMT respondents replied that they
strongly agreed to somewhat agree with this statement. This shows that even more progressive
political parties tend to still gravitate towards more unidirectional and traditional forms of
communication. Their responses seem to hint at a possible preference for more traditional
forms of media, even by more grassroots-driven parties such as TSU and DPP.
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Figure 22: Utility of Different Media Mediums, by Party

Traditional media such as newspaper,
television, radio, etc. are more useful than
the Internet and other technology tools for
party communications and outreach.
TSU
DPP
KMT

68.8%
15.4%
21.7%

18.8%

53.8%

7.7%

47.8%

Strongly agree

Somewhat agree

Somewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

12.5%
23.1%

17.4%

13.0%

Neutral

The survey asked respondents to rate how much they agree or disagree with the
statement, “Most of our political party leaders embrace the Internet and other technology
tools.” A little over half of respondents selected that they somewhat agree with this statement.
Figure 23 shows all the responses.

Figure 23: Party Interest in Technology

Most of our party political leaders embrace the Internet
and other technology tools.
Somewhat disagree
2%

Strongly disagree
3%

Neutral
10%
Strongly agree
27%
Somewhat
agree
58%
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Figure 24 breaks down responses by political party, and once again no major difference is noted
between parties. Most respondents noted that their leaders strongly agree to somewhat agree
embrace the Internet and other technology tools. It is important to note that, members from
TSU and KMT were the only ones to note that they felt neutral or strongly disagreed that their
political party leaders embraced technologies. This shows that current campaign culture and
overall political culture drive the use of ICTs for politics and not the other way around.
Figure 24: Party Interest in Technology, by Party

Most of our party political leaders embrace the
Internet and other technology tools.
TSU
DPP
KMT

18.75%
23.1%
34.8%
Strongly agree

56.3%
61.5%

18.8%
60.9%

Somewhat agree

Neutral

Somewhat disagree

6.3%
15.4%
4.3%

Strongly disagree

Even though most parties felt mixed feelings towards the utility of ICTs for politics, a
little over half of respondents noted that they were happy with the interaction they were having
with the public online and have a growing online presence. Figure 25 outlines all the responses.
Figure 25: Satisfaction with Online Communities

From what you know how happy are you with the amount of
interaction you have with members or the public online?
Not happy. We don’t have an
online presence.
5.3%

Not very happy. We
have an online
presence but they are
not very active
28.1%

Very happy. We have a very active
online presence
7.0%

Happy. We have a
growing online
presence
59.6%
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Finally, the last question on the survey was an open-ended question which asked
political party members: “What should your party do to improve the use of the Internet and
ICTs for citizen participation, political/community involvement or dialogue among the citizens
and elected officials?” Most responses focused on getting parties to increase their utilization and
use of Facebook and LINE, the most popular application for instant communication in Taiwan,
to interact with citizens, while others addressed the challenges which parties continue to face
since the emergence of ICTs. Some respondents noted that age and privacy concerns that arise
when using technologies were key factors to consider when thinking about how to use them for
party activities:

“In my opinion, internet and other communication technologies are good tools. Some
party members are not familiar with them because of their age. Therefore, some of them
might ignore some review or posts on the internet. On the contrary, their voters belong to
local chapters, so they usually communicate and talk face-to-face with constituents.” –
DPP party member.
“In general, the information security is not good and safe enough for political social
worker to share information on internet.”- DPP party member.
“I thought the average age in my political party is older than others. Therefore, some
members of the Legislative Council are not familiar with the Internet and technology.
Thus, they can’t link external relationship via internet. But they are very kind when you
both go face to face or you meet them in their service office.” – KMT party member.
A DPP member expressed real concern that the Internet and technologies could ever affect the
real problem of power and arrogance in politics in Taiwan and inherently lack of interest in
integrating citizens’ perspectives into policies:
“The internet or communicated tools might be useful for some left-wing parties (for
example, Taiwan Solidarity Union). However, it is hard to use the internet as a real
communication tool. Only a few members of Legislative Yuan, care about the citizens to
the point that they are willing to spend time to listen people. As we have seen, the
comments or letters citizens post on PTT, the traditional channel, can still be ignored by
members of legislative yuan for political identity or political interest. In my opinion, the
internet could boost opinion exchange or group like-minded people. However, it has
limited influence for politically appointed official or members of legislative yuan. That is
arrogant of power.”- DPP party member.
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“Many public policies were propagated in ineffective way. The ruling party could make
announcement or explanation via internet community. However, the ruling party always
ignore this method. Some people just take a part for the whole to prevent the
implementation of policy”. -DPP party member.
“Our party could post an issue, then citizen would discuss under the post. Currently, the
Facebook page by president Ma Ying-Jeou is the popular page. Unfortunately, they
barely get feedback from comment. Those comments were reduced to the unilateral
communication. No significant effect of communicating.”– KMT party leader.
Others were more open to exploring how technologies can facilitate more live and deeper
interactions between constituents and political parties:
“My party should use Ustream, a live, interactive video broadcast platform for civic
movement. Use social network to connect politician in present,” – KMT party member.
“Talking directly to constituents might be the next trend. However, people in Taiwan
maybe focus on website building and Facebook page.”- DPP party leader.
“It will be attractive that political party members interact with citizen in real person and
real time. However, Internet is one of way communicating. It may be better to keep your
feet on the ground. That is more practical than surfing on the internet.”- DPP party
member.
“My party should create an interactive section instead of F&Q. For example, online
answering on internet. Even though it is troublesome for some people, it is necessary to
interact with citizen. Maybe non-anonymous is better one.”- KMT party member.
“As a middle-edge person, we know the importance of the internet, even I didn’t know
what is internet when I was young. When parties use the internet in proper way, realize
their culture, they could drive the internet tech with effective way for the benefits. The
question is exactly how to implement? They should organize the new department for
social networking related issue. The internet plays a larger role in politic. You will in the
underdog position if you ignore the power of the internet.” – TSU party member.
“Now, most politics Facebook pages are managed by other people. There might have
cognitive difference in the feedback for voter’s question between the politician and the
page manager. For voters, it is difficult to know whether the real politician or other
answered the questions. From my guess, there will have opportunities to make politician
directly interact with voters in online chat room.”- KMT party leader.
Some respondents did feel that there was much more that their parties could still do to utilize
technologies to effectively reach out to constituents. They suggested:
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“I would suggest our party to continue to work on catching more attention of any current
issues, by using the Internet, and to spread out the word. A good way of using the modern
technology is to have the party leaders to directly speak with supporters over the
communication systems on the Internet. For example, supporters can share a same
conference with party leaders such as Tsai Yin Wen, or other representatives, and share
any thoughts or experiences that might help win the election, or to discuss any current
events that is happening around the country that needs attention, i.e., nuclear power.”KMT party member.
Analysis of Political Parties use of the Internet and other Technologies
The next phase of the work involved an analysis of the political party websites, social
media account, and use of other technologies such as mobile apps and text messaging. This took
place during the week of September 22-September 29, 2014. This means that the figures
reflected for each of the parties’ websites and technologies are from three years ago.
The strategies I used to collect this information are as follows:
For campaign and political party websites, I obtained the site’s URL though a
Google search and an estimate of its unique monthly visitors, global rank, and average
time visitors stay on the site from the Site Analytics publicly available service provided
by the market research firm Alexa (http://www.alexa.com).
For Facebook profiles, I obtained the profile’s URL from direct links from candidate
websites or, absent these, from a direct search for the political parties’ name on
Facebook. I then coded the number of “likes” (or “friends,” in the rare instances in which
a candidate had a personal rather than a public page) for that profile. In case a candidate
maintained multiple official profiles, I coded the profile the campaign website linked to.
For Twitter profiles, I identified through the same procedure as for Facebook, I coded
the number of “followers” for each political parties’ profile.
For YouTube channels, I identified through the same procedure as for Facebook and
Twitter, we coded the number of “total upload views,” which is the sum of all views of all
the videos uploaded to a given channel.
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Table 16 below outlines the key findings after analyzing the websites and technologies of the
main political parties in Taiwan.
Table 16: Taiwan Political Parties’ Online Accounts
Politica
l Party

Politica
l Stance

Global
Rank of
Party
Site
High:
332,335

Time
on the
Site

Facebook

Twitter

Other
accounts/technologies

Effectiveness

KMT

CenterRight to
Right
Wing

Medium:
2:10

Friends:
476,778.
High daily
activity

None

Plurk, Google+, LINE,
mobile apps

Centerto Center
Left

Medium:
1,162,307

MediumHigh:
3:18

Friends:
475,400;
High daily
activity

Since
April
2009;
3,903
followers
; High
daily
activity

Blog, Plurk, Google+,
LINE, text messaging
campaign

Modern,
westernized
use; active
online
communities;
not embracing
all technologies.
Modern,
westernized
use; active
communities;
community,
embracing all
forms of social
media and ICTs

DPP

TSU

Centerto
Center
Left

Low:
2,191,68
2

Low:
.22

Friends:
19,161;
High daily
activity

None

Flickr, Youtube

People
First
Party

Center
Right

Low:
3,273,97
7

Not
availabl
e

Friends:
7,125;
Medium
daily
activity

None

Blog, YouTube

Modern,
westernized
use; mediumlow active
online
communities;
not embracing
all social
media & ICTs.
Low activity
in online
communities;
not embracing
all social
media and
technologies.

Several things stand out when looking at the website and various technologies political
parties are using. First, most political parties tend to employ western technologies and
westernized style of campaigning using a combination of traditional and ICT-enabled mediums.
Only two parties are using Taiwanese developed text messaging technology called, LINE. This
means that parties in Taiwan are largely using the Internet and other technologies to build up
their party image, share information about their political agendas, etc. The websites and
accompanying technologies primarily serve as a one-way portal that present information in a
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static manner and don’t encourage citizen-party interaction and communication. The few
interactive features offered are mainly propagandistic intentions, instead of trying to increase
citizen participation in political decision making. Second, consistent with survey findings,
Facebook seems to be the social media tool for political parties in Taiwan. As of September
2014, when this data was collected, most political parties did not have a Twitter account.
However, while Facebook is by far the most popular of these mediums and has a large user base
in Taiwan, its use is not leading to any revolutionary evolution of party-citizen linkages. Rather
parties, seem to be using them as platforms upon which they can try to reach the youth
population. Third, parties that are more grassroots and progressive are not necessarily more
active online and run active online communities. Therefore, grassroots origins do not
necessarily translate to citizen-driven uses of technology. Thus, technology strategies of political
parties are a function and driven by a larger factor such as resources and political culture in
Taiwan. Therefore, after this analysis, I concluded that the opportunities that the Internet offers
to facilitate an interactive dialogue between representatives and citizens in Taiwan are largely
forgone.

Findings
Due to the small sample size for both surveys, findings must be treated as areas for
future research rather than definitive conclusions. There are a few key takeaways that provide
some insight into how a new generation of activists and political parties’ views on ICTs in
politics are both converging in some areas and not others. First, the survey findings show that
there is a wide spectrum of political views among college students and therefore, age is not
predictor of support for progressive politics or anti-establishment. The survey findings revealed
that not one student was wholeheartedly against all the political parties. Therefore, when
understanding emerging-student led movements in Taiwan it is important to point out that
there is a wide spectrum of political views being supported by technology and not just
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democratic or progressive ones. Second, a key function of the Internet and other technologies in
Taiwan is to provide a platform to make it easier for alternative views to be heard and found.
Both students and political parties noted that having the ability to access a variety of political
views and research different policies was one of the key purposes that the Internet and
technologies serve. This appreciation for the information-gathering abilities of the Internet and
ICTs may be due to Taiwan’s high level of education, ICT infrastructure, and digital literacy.
Therefore, it will be important to see students’ views on this in Chile, which has a higher rate of
poverty and lower education attainment among its youth.

Third, in terms of political efficacy over half of students expressed that they can have a
small to moderate impact in their society. This is remarkable for a new democracy and for a
country with a political polarization and duopoly which is not always accountable to the people.
Studies have found higher levels of political efficacy among East Asian youth when compared to
the preceding generations (Chu et al, 2012) and education is widely believed to be a positive
factor for greater civic engagement. Fourth, although students feel a sense of political efficacy,
they are selective in the ways that they engage politically and tend to not necessarily favor
technology-enabled political participation over more traditional methods. Additionally, even
though students had positive views about the role of social networks in politics, they were even
less likely to discuss politics and current events online through social networks, websites, and
forums. For the question: “How often do you discuss politics and public affairs with others
online in social networks, news websites, forums, etc.?”, most students reported a low amount:
28% said less than once a month. Only 5% of students said they discuss politics and current
events online every day. Finally, regarding whether students use their social media accounts to
follow political parties online, most students (68%) mentioned they do not follow political
parties or candidates on social media networks.
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Regarding the survey with political party members and volunteers and the assessment of
their websites, a main take away is that party use of the Internet and technologies is more a
function of current party culture and desire to appeal to modern and young constituents, than
an interest by parties to elevate their interactions with citizens. Facebook seems to the
technology of choice by political parties in Taiwan, followed by home grown text messaging
service, LINE. Consistent with the findings in the book Asian Cyberactivism: Freedom of
Expression & Media Censorship, parties are mainly using technologies for campaigning,
communication and interaction (2015). Therefore, parties are not necessarily interested in
exploring ways to be more responsive to citizens and improve their transparency and internal
party democracy. This is especially the case during periods of electoral campaigning were
political parties and candidates tend to use the Internet as a top-down channel for information
or party propaganda rather than as an opportunity to encourage two-way discussion and debate
with potential voters (Gibson and Ward 2002; Gibson et al. 2003; Jankowski et al. 2005).
Therefore, the Taiwan case study does not support the hypothesis that political parties are less
likely to use ICTs dynamically to reach out to constituents if they know that the citizens or target
population are not using these technologies (Oates, 2003). Here in Taiwan, political parties
have highly educated and connected citizenry, but are not taking the opportunity to truly
transform traditional political party-citizen linkages. Therefore, in Taiwan it is the pre-existing
campaign culture and social context that is driving parties use of the Net, not necessarily the
demographic of the users (Loulis, 2003; Jorba and Bimber, 2013; Gibson et al, 2005).

Conclusion
Taiwan is a wealthy and fully functioning democracy with a highly educated and
technologically-connected citizenry packed into one of the most densely populated countries in
the world. Consistent with other Asia democracies in the region, in Taiwan the most dynamic
use of ICTs for politics can be found within the NGO and civil society communities (Gan, Gomez
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& Johannen eds. 2004). The growing grassroots appropriations of ICT-enabled activism,
dubbed the “Third Force” in Taiwan, is creating a need for a more complex understanding of
power relations among citizens, civil society groups, and political actors. In Taiwan, ICTs are
facilitating the linking together communities of like-minded individuals online, which are
reshaping and reinforcing a Taiwanese social identity rather than “One China” identity (Chen et
al, 2014). Likewise, consistent with this study, Taiwanese scholars have begun to ask whether
these new political players and civic groups will give rise to a changing landscape of party
system, (Lee, 2014) or if they will lead to greater political polarization.

This remains to be seen, but there are several patterns we can note that warrant further
exploration. So far, the surveys with members and volunteers of political parties show although
most embrace and find benefits to using ICTs for politics, most parties do not seem to be using
these technologies to transform traditional political party-citizen linkages. Therefore, political
party use of the Internet and ICTs is much more a function of traditional party culture than a
strong interest to change and transform this culture from top down to more participatory forms
of interactions with constituents. This is a factor which may not be accepted by a population
growing in their sense of personal political efficacy and growing Taiwanese identity. Due to the
wide spectrum of political views that exists within the student community in Taiwan, it remains
to be seen whether youth will continue to lead the way in terms of the deepening democracy in
Taiwan or just contribute to greater political polarization. To better understand the possible
continual divergence between elites and mass attitudes about the changing nature of politics and
cross-Strait policies may depend on changes in Taiwan’s economy, the rise of a new and bettereducated generation, and the increasing use of social media to voice criticism and build
communities, and the role of the traditional highly partisan media in Taiwan (Templeman,
2014). Therefore, a better understand of how ICTs are not only shaping social movements and
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digital media, but also how these changes intersect with other socioeconomic and demographic
factors.
The Taiwan case study also highlights the importance of looking at the local level to
understand how technology is being used to infuse and shape politics. As we can see from the 9
in 1 local elections in 2014, Taiwan saw the emergence of a non-traditional actor, elected mayor
of Taipei City, Dr. Ko Wen-je as well as KMT loss of traditional strongholds throughout the
country. Thus, in Taiwan we are seeing many instances of democratic empowerment enabled by
technology take place at the local level and thus eluding national-level measures of democratic
gains. This is an important distinction to make, because when looking at how ICTs are being
used at the national level by political parties, the surveys hint at the possibility that there are
very little distinctions between political parties and that most simply rely on traditional
westernized campaigning strategies when using ICTs to communicate with the constituents.
Therefore, due to the political stalemate at the national level and lack of institutional
responsiveness that this creates, I can expect that restless citizens, with persistent frustration
with their national political parties, will continue to access technological tools to focus their
energies locally — engaging in their local community. This is consistent with studies from
2000s which have shown (Pharr and Putnam 2000; Norris 1999), how people are either turning
away from politics altogether or demanding greater involvement and finding new ways to
communicate their demands.

Finally, due to several supportive demographic and country-level factors at the national
level, such as high level of education and ICT infrastructure, and urban areas with dense
population, I can expect that technology’s positive political effects will continue to gain traction
in sub-national ways in Taiwan. While this may inject new voices into politics, it can also lead to
weak and fragmented legislatures unable to support stable governing coalitions or create
effective checks on executive power. Moving forth, Taiwanese political parties will need to find
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new ways to co-exist, complement social movements and empowered civic communities
(Nahon, 2015). They must learn to use social media strategies to commit to pursue debates on
issues of concern; design a clear, professional and transparent political party profile: a unified
party presence on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube; and develop and enforce a clear and
transparent communication strategy to engage with the various interests in society. How
technology will impede or promote this transformation will be an area of future research in
Taiwan.
In summary, this chapter argues that recent ICT-enabled activism in Taiwan,
particularly, with the Sunflower movement is creating new political opportunities that are
interacting with preexisting identities (in Taiwan’s case an ethnic nationalistic identity), highly
partisan nature of politics, and previous cultures of resistance. In addition to the successful
block of a major trade deal with China, the aftermath of the Sunflower movement saw increased
expressions of a Taiwanese identity which intensified popular counter narratives around a
Taiwanese vs One China identity and the introduction of new untraditional power players (Dr.
Ko Wen-je, New Power Party, Appendectomy Project, etc.). These factors have increased
demands for greater transparency and accountability of the government to the public and its
citizens, especially as it relates to interactions with China. However, will these factors change
political parties in Taiwan? Based on the surveys from political parties and partisan view on the
use of ICTs by parties and by citizens and activists, I would argue no. It is very likely that
student activism will continue to be seen by elites as a mostly marginal and “disruptive” effort,
rather than legitimate. Therefore, political parties in Taiwan are less likely to change.
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Chapter Four
Political Cleavages, ICTs, Social Movements: Chile Case Study
It has been nearly three decades since General Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship gave way to
redemocratization in Chile. Since then Chile has been dubbed the “Latin American Tiger”
(Pietrobelli, 1998), for its rapid growth, social progress, and strong institutions similarly found in
East Asia countries. Yet these economic successes often hide the complexity of Chile’s political
development which over time has been shaped by the interdependency between historical,
institutional, socioeconomic, and cultural factors (Boyd, 2006). Most notably, these factors have
given way to political cleavages which over time divided Chilean society along two ideological
and programmatic extremes. Originally the political cleavage was divided among the clerical
versus anticlerical during Spanish colonial rule, however, it would later evolve into a Right
versus Left division in terms of socioeconomic policies and programs (Valenzuela, 1995: 199).
While there have been two central political players which have occupied this space, the leftleaning Concertación and right-leaning Alianza por Chile (Alliance for Chile) – other political
actors have introduced a variety of extreme, moderate, or centrist political positions throughout
the years. Consequently, no single party has had an absolute majority of the Chilean electorate,
therefore, instrumental coalitional politics has come to define Chilean politics (Valenzuela,
1995).
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Despite these challenges, Chilean society has benefited from relatively stable political
institutions over time and deeply democratic traditions which date back to the 19 th century and
peaked during the “poder popular” (popular power) era during Allende’s Popular Unity
government despite an often-fragmented poor and working class. Like Taiwan, most recently,
ICTs have been contributing to a rise in new forms of youth-led activism, populism, and new
anti-establishment political identities (Valenzuela et al, 2012). Recent popular mobilizations
have been taking place against free market policies bequeathed by Pinochet and left largely
intact by his successors (Economist, 2014). The student-led movements known as “las marchas
de los pingüinos” (Penguin Revolution) which began in 2006, have been creating new political
opportunities for progressive social issues to be added to the political agenda (Rosemont, 2014;
Cortes-Abad, 2015). These student-led movements are providing a powerful countervailing
trend against historically elitist political institutions (Huneeus, 2009) and challenging neoliberalism as the hegemonic ideology supported by Right, Center, and Left groups (Siavelis,
1997: 37; Boyd, 2006).

Within this context, this chapter will explore what types of political opportunities are
being enabled for ICTs in a wealthy, democratic, yet deeply divided country. Like the Taiwanese
case study, there are questions as to how new political players and new civic groups change the
landscape of Chile’s party system. Additionally, special attention will be given to how existing
political cleavages interact with ICTs and whether they contribute to greater polarization or
greater democratic deepening. The chapter will end with findings from surveys conducted with
college students and members of political parties in Chile which highlight the ways that ICTs are
creating political opportunities which are largely missed due to their limits in promoting citizenparty linkages.
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Current Socioeconomic Context
Since the late 1970s Chile has emerged as the nation with the fastest growing economy in
Latin America, following one of the most extensive economic reform programs ever taken in a
developing country. Chile is now considered an economic powerhouse both in Latin America
and around the world. Chile’s economic model, largely constructed by the Pinochet regime,
remains relatively unchanged. It is still dependent on a flexible and restrictive labor regime
(Frank, 2004; Staab, 2012) and trade liberalization. Its market-oriented economy is
characterized by a high level of foreign trade and a reputation for strong financial institutions
(Bianculli, 2016). On January 1, 2004, it signed a free trade agreement with the United States of
America, however, Chile has twenty-two trade agreements covering 60 countries including
agreements with the European Union, Mercosur, China, India, South Korea, and Mexico” (CIA,
2015: 3). The Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement was originally negotiated by Chile, the
United States of America20, and 10 other participating countries. Chile was the first South
American country to join the OECD by signing the OECD Convention in May 2010.Finally, Chile
has one of the highest GNI’s in South America (World Bank, 2015), which is an indication that
real incomes are continuing to grow.

In 2015, the World Bank estimated a poverty rate of 18.7%, during 2006 global recession
it climbed to over 20%, then dropped to 14.o% in 2013 (World Bank, 2015). At the same time,
Chile has achieved high human development (HDI). Chile’s HDI value for 2015 was 0.832 —
which places it in the very high human development category—positioning the country at 41 out
of 187 countries and territories (United Nations Development Program, 2015). Chile’s citizenry
has the highest literacy rate in Latin America, 98.9 percent of both males and females ages 15-24
are literate (UNICEF, 2013). Yet, despite this remarkable progress, income inequality remains a

20

President Trump pulled the United States out of the TPP in January of 2017.
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significant challenge. Chile’s GINI index of 50.8 (World Bank, 2015) confirms that inequality
still needs to be addressed by the political leadership.

Currently, most of Chile’s national population lives in the urban areas. Forty percent of
Chile’s national population lives in Santiago, the largest city in Chile, while only eleven percent
of the population lives in rural areas (CIA, 2015; World Bank, 2013) 21. Chile’s indigenous
communities are among those in poverty and are mostly concentrated in the rural provinces of
La Araucanía, Bío Bío, Los Lagos, Los Ríos and Valparaíso, with many increasingly migrating to
the cities (UNPO, 2010). The Mapuche are Chile's largest of the seven recognized indigenous
communities, making up around 9% of the national population (Barandiarán 2012, 166). In the
recent years, the Mapuche have been migrating to Santiago (UNPO, 2010). The migration of
indigenous communities to the central more urban regions have reinforced a belief of cultural
and ethnic homogeneity among Chileans (Crow, 2014; Haughney, 2009).

Access to education is essential for social mobility in Chile. For example, in Chile, one
year of additional education can greatly affect the attainable salary of an individual. According
to Kolijatic and Silva (2013), “In Chile, one additional year of elementary education has a
marginal effect of only 6% on salaries; for secondary education, the increase is 10% and for
higher education the increase is 22%” (1427). This has resulted in severe competition for the
available seats at the university level. “Every year, over 200,000 high-school graduates vie for a
slot in prestigious universities, since social mobility largely depends on it” (Kolijatic and Silva
2013, 1427), and only 25,000 are admitted to the most prestigious universities. Those left
unselected go to the lesser esteemed universities or technical training centers. “Needy students
were condemned to a low quality of high school education that limited their capacity to break
free from the poverty circle through access to quality higher education” (Kolijatic and Silva 2013,
The rural population was last calculated in 2013 by The World Bank. According to the World Bank, there were
1,840,766 people living in rural areas of Chile in 2013.
21
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1429). Chile’s rural population has been especially underserved by the education system (BarrMelej, 2001; Silva, 2012). Addressing the rural and urban educational disparities also served as
a catalyst for the student movement (Valenzuela and Dammert, 2006).

Left and Right Divisions and the Emergence of Working Class Politics
Chile is one of the wealthiest, most developed, and democratized countries in Latin
America. Yet despite its success, Chile’s historical legacy of deep social divisions, military
dictatorship, and fragmented civil society continue to pose challenges. Throughout its history,
social conflicts and religious, urban/rural class cleavages have been crystallized into Chile’s
political space (Scully, 1992). These path-dependent aspects of its history have contributed to
the formation of deeply-rooted, yet deeply-divided democratic representative institutions. They
have also led to the formation of a uniquely Chilean tripartite party system made up of a strong
left, center, and right. Although, this tripartite has been relatively stable since the 1930s, there
has and continues to be much volatility within those blocs –intense in some periods as parties
divide and sub-divide, and less so in other times when parties remain intact but just experience
a rise or fall in their bloc vote (Webb & White, 2009; Montes et. al, 2000; Scully, 1992;).
Nevertheless, to this day, Chile’s party system is prone to crisis if majority coalitions cannot be
built. These institutional challenges have been one of the factors blocking the implementation
of a progressive social agenda to address persistent issues of inequality and poverty.

Like in Taiwan, the end of World War II resulted in a period of greater political conflict.
However, unlike Taiwan, Chile experienced growing class conflict between rural, working class,
and state elites (Scully, 1992). During this period, Chile implemented an import substitution
industrialization strategy. This set the stage for the gradual and institutionalized, but
conflictual, integration of socioeconomic groups into the political system as well as highly
politicized struggles for state benefits (Silva, 2007:45). Intensive peasant and urban
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mobilizations emerged from poblaciones and shanty towns which challenged the deeply-rooted
clientelism control of state elites. Scholars have noted this event as a critical juncture in that
these factors contributed to the new the growing politicization of the Chilean party system
(Garreton, 2003; Manni, 2001; Scully, 1992). Together these factors ushered in an era of
expansion for class-based party politics which lasted until the 1970s (Manni, 2011; Scully, 1992).

Following the Popular Front period (1937-1941), two new left-of-center political
coalitions emerged which would define Chile’s political scene for years to come. One of these
leftist coalitions united the Falange Nacional and Social Christian Conservative Parties under a
more centrist yet left-leaning platform which would eventually be called the Christian
Democratic Party. The other coalition, brought together the Socialist and Communist parties
under a new coalition called, Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP) or Popular Action Front
coalition. FRAP was led by Salvador Allende. Believing they were the only party able to rule and
promote change in the climate of social and political instability, the Christian Democrats refused
any other alliances, particularly with the increasingly militant FRAP group which was pushing
for radical change (Manni, 2011; Foweraker and Landman, 2000). Consequently, what were
once united working-class groups had splintered even further as peasants began to mobilize for
agrarian reform and unionization and the urban marginales mobilized for goods and services
through state-linked local organizations. Even though these two left-leaning coalitions were not
united under a common purpose, their emergence created suspicion and insecurity among
conservative and free market parties. In 1958, the conservative parties joined forces and gave
birth to the National Party which was led by Jorge Alessandri, who later that year was elected
President. The emergence of the National Party also signaled a change in ideology for rightleaning groups that were becoming increasingly authoritarian and nationalistic in response to
working class mobilizations. Nevertheless, facing an increasingly oppositional Congress,
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Alessandri was forced to implement modest land-reform legislation to appease increasingly
militant working class.

During the early 1960’s, socialist leader, Salvador Allende, began to gain popularity at
the height of the Cold War. In response, the CIA set about supporting Christian Democrat
leader, Eduardo Frei Montalva by financing most of his campaign and distributing anticommunist propaganda throughout the country (Erikson and Perre, 2002; Schneider, 1998). In
1961, John F. Kennedy the Alliance for Progress, which provided monetary assistance to Latin
American countries which supported democratic governments. Chile also became one of the
biggest recipients of this aid. With the monetary and policy support of the US, Frei won the
presidency in 1964. Shortly after, he began a process of capitalist modernization and
democratization that incorporated previously excluded peasants and urban marginales. He
undertook agrarian reform which consisted of an expansion on social security, education, and
social services to rural areas, as well as state regulation of rural labor relations (Loveman, 1988).
However, as Chile’s economy grew and expanded, dependent capitalist development eventually
came into conflict with the process of democratization (see Garretón 1983, 1986e; Moulián
1983; Pinto 1971; Loveman1979). Despite better living conditions for many rural workers and
good gains in education and public health, the country was still plagued by inflation,
dependence on foreign markets and capital, and inequitable income distribution. At the same
time, the Christian Democrats’ policies threatened the traditional elite and did not satisfy the
expectations of an increasingly militant and polarized society.

Under Frei’s administration, peasants continued to mobilize due to the availability of a
wide assortment of allies (Scully, 1992). Therefore, Chilean peasants and agrarian issues became
central to national political conflicts (Loveman, 1988; Castells, 1976; Kay, 1981). Not
surprisingly, unionization, strikes, and land invasions rose dramatically. Violent groups such as
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the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR; Leftist Revolutionary Movement), which
began among upper-middle-class students in Concepciónand Frente de Trabajadores
Revolucionarios (Revolutionary Workers Front) began to challenge their power and supported
strikes and land seizures. During this time, the US continued to engage in covert and overt
interventions aimed at destroying pro-land reform policies and instead supporting pro-business,
corporate agriculture. Before the Pinochet era, the Communists were “an architect of the via
pacifica, or peaceful road,” and they “favored multiclass political alliances, pragmatic changes in
property relations, strict adherence to constitutional legality, and negotiated compromise with
opposition forces” (Roberts 2005, 496). The Socialist Party, however, “favored a narrower, classbased ‘Worker’s Front’ alliance and rapid economic socialization; believing revolutionary armed
confrontation was inevitable on the road to Socialism” (Roberts 2005, 496). The socialists also
resisted Allende’s efforts to negotiate, and instead “sought to create grass-roots forms of
‘popular power’ as alternatives to ‘bourgeois democracy’ (Roberts 2005, 496).

As the Christian Democrats became increasingly isolated, the coalition Unidad Popular
(UP) led by Allende continue to strengthen. The UP consisted of loosely-united socialist,
communist, and radical parties. The UP coalition was also sustained by college students who
left the city centers for rural and mining towns to work with Allende (Vylder, 1976). Backed by
this coalition, Allende became the first democratically elected Marxist President in 1970. Soon
after he began implementing a radical program of state takeover of private enterprises and
massive income redistribution. These policies pitted the working class against the upper classes,
foreign capital, and Chilean monopoly capital (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Silva, 1988). It
also began to cause concern and apprehension among business owners who began to sell off
properties and assets (Vylder, 1976). Additionally, these factors contributed to an industrial
production decline, hyperinflation and black marketeering. Towards the middle of his term, the
militant factions of Allende’s party became increasingly frustrated with agrarian reform and
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Allende’s indirect style of governing. Most notably, one of these factions, Movimiento de
Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) intensified its guerrilla activities and started forming armed
communist organizations (Roberts, 1998).

Military Dictatorship and the Silencing of Left-Leaning Activists
As divisions within Allende’s own party began to intensify, his government became
increasingly isolated as new alliances were being formed in time for the 1973 parliamentary
elections. This election saw alliances between an increasingly uneasy middle class, the Christian
Democrats, and the Right. At the same time, US government intervention played a pivotal role
during this period as it pursued a policy of political destabilization by refusing to extend
economic aid and supporting his opponents (Vylder, 1976; Valenzuela 1978; Garretón and
Moulián, 1983; Garcés, 1976; and Prats, 1985). Therefore, Allende faced an opposition
Congress, a hostile US government, divisions within his own party, and an increasing number of
middle, upper class, and right-wing extremists who began to support a coup d'état (Vylder,
1976). Therefore, bitter party hostility - in a system described by Sartori (1976: 160) as one of
extreme polarization - led directly to the coup of 1973.

Allende was eventually ousted from power by a military junta led by General Augusto
Pinochet in 1973. Many expected a return to civilian government, however, in 1974 Pinochet
assumed presidency (Valenzuela 1978, Garretón and Moulián 1983, Garcés 1976, and Prats
1985). Pinochet’s presidency began a 17-year period of repression and torture in Chile’s history
where he headed a durable junta that dissolved Congress, banned leftist parties and suspended
all others, prohibited nearly all political activity and ruled by decree (O’Donnell and Schmitter,
1986; Silva, 1988). During this period, the secret police, called the Directorate of National
Intelligence (DINA), apprehended thousands of Socialist and Communist Party members,
Allende appointees, union leaders, other suspected leftists and sympathizers, and either
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detained, tortured, or murdered them. The college students who had supported the UP
movement were also targeted and many disappeared or fled into exile (Vylder, 1976). In total,
almost 28,000 were targeted. In addition to arresting and torturing its victims, the Pinochet
regime exercised complete control over civil society, and eliminated all channels of collective
expression including the media.

In terms of economic policy, the Chilean military regime restructured the economy by
adopting a neoliberal development model which included disbanding anti-poverty relief
programs and reducing the state’s role in the regulation and organization of the rural class
(Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Silva, 1988). This severed the ties between
peasants, rural unions, and the state, and transformed labor relations in the countryside. The
legal framework fragmented and weakened peasant and union organization and political space
for contestation was reduced as regional and socioeconomic differences among popular classes
was further heightened (Bossert, 1980; Silva, 1988; Vylder, 1986). These new grassroots
realities also shaped the dynamics of national partisan competition in that for the first time in
Chile’s post-colonial history the salience of democratic politics for peasants and the availability
of key allies was reduced (Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Bossert, 1980).
Therefore, with limited supply of both internal resources and external allies, rural groups were
not able to regroup and organize at the levels they had accomplished back in the 1960s and
1970s. This condition would go on to persist even after democratic transition in Chile as peasant
politics remained a mainly dormant and elite affair (Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter,
1986).
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The Reemergence of the Popular Sectors and End of the Military Dictatorship
By early 1980’s the effects of Pinochet’s laissez-faire economic policies and global
recession hit small business owners and the middle and working classes who saw their living
standards drop (Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). In response to these
economic and political difficulties, Pinochet began a process of political institutionalization,
resulting in a new Constitution in 1980(Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).
However, the cracks in his power were beginning to show. This period saw the reemergence of
mobilizations, albeit, limited in scope in that they either addressed specific government abuses
or concerns of individual socioeconomic sectors (Martínez 1986, Campero 1986, and Agurto,
Canales, and de la Maza1985). During this time, militant groups began to regroup in
shantytowns and leftist groups reemerged (Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).

It was not until 1983, that groups began to reassert themselves in ways that they had
done pre-Pinochet. Mass mobilizations in the form of the National Protests began in May 1983
(de laMaza and Garcés 1985, Martínez 1986, Campero 1986, and Agurto, Canales, and de la
Maza1985.) By July 1983 these mobilizations became monthly occurrences and gained a
broader geographic scope. Government responded to these mobilizations with increasing force.
Notably, during the Fourth Protest in August 1983, Pinochet placed 18,000 soldiers in the
streets of Santiago and low-income neighborhoods. During this upheaval, hundreds of
protestors were either detained or sent to internal exile (Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and
Schmitter, 1986). At the same time, that Pinochet’s regime responded with force, it also made
attempts at liberalizing their stronghold. During the mid-1980’s, the government increased
freedom of the press, allowed political exiles to return, and met with political opposition groups.

With increased political space to mobilize, working class groups sought to build alliances
with an increasingly unhappy middle class (Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).
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Under Allende, these two groups were violently and militantly opposed to each other, so this was
a dramatic change from the past. Additionally, the involvement of Chile’s most influential
unions, the Copper Workers' Confederation, also helped to bring on board a diverse group of
parties and supporters (Martinez, 1986). Finally, new alliances emerged during this time.
Alianza Democrática (Democratic Alliance) united small parties of the Right, Christian
Democrats, social democratic parties, a Socialist party, and other socialist groups. Movimento
Democrático Popular (Popular Democratic Movement) included the other Socialist party, the
Communist Party, the Left Revolutionary Movement (MIR), and other leftist groups. Since the
Pinochet regime is more reluctant to use force against the middle classes than against
theworking and lower classes, middle class participation reduced fears that the protest would
end in a massacre (Martínez, 1986; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). There were also new forms
of mass mobilizations such as political rallies, marches and human rights campaigns also took
place during this time (Martinez, 1986; Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).

However, the Protest movement underwent another shift between 1983 and 1986.
During this time, the support of the middle class began to wane due to government concessions
to middle class gremios (trade and professional associations) and ongoing fear of government
repression (Martinez, 1986; Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). Nevertheless,
political parties and other opposition groups continued to make attempts to regroup and unite
(de laMaza and Garcés 1985, Martínez 1986, Campero 1986, and Agurto, Canales, and de la
Maza 1985). One of these efforts was the formation of the Asamblea de la Civilidad (Civic
Assembly) in 1986. The Asamblea included representatives of a wide variety of socioeconomic
groups and political parties. Consistent with its goal to establish a broad base, the Asamblea
included the National Workers'Command and representatives of groups of pobladores, college
students, and numerous labor and professional organizations such as, truck drivers, women's
associations, human rights organizations, and the Study Group for an Alternative

124

Constitution(de laMaza and Garcés 1985, Martínez 1986, Campero 1986, and Agurto, Canales,
and de la Maza 1985).United these various groups could organize an effective two-day national
strike in July 1986.

These mobilizations were successful in that they sent a powerful message to Pinochet
that the collective identities of the past would not be eliminated. Rather they were prepared to
build alliances to overcome the fear and repression that had made civil society withdraw
(Schneider, 1985; Taylor, 1998; Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). Although,
most protestors during this period still mainly consisted of young pobladores who faced social
and economic isolation, the Protest movements allowed them to gain a sense of participation
and belonging. However, a main challenge during this period was still the interference of
political parties who were still outlawed, who sought to mobilize pobladores. During this time,
the Christian Democrats, the Christian Left, the Communist Party, and the MIR continued to
build up their own political bases in low-income neighborhoods; and in doing so, they created
divisions among the poor (Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Schneider, 1985).
A defining attempt to unite pobladores came with the formation of the Unitary Congress of
Urban Pobladores in 1986. However, due to the competing activities of the political parties,
groups were not able to build an effective and united broad-based coalition (Schneider, 1985;
Taylor, 1998). A final attempt at uniting opposing forces to defeat Pinochet took place with the
announcement of a national plebiscite in 1987. In response, opposition groups formed the
Concertación de Partidos por el NO (coalition of parties for NO). With 15 minutes of television
airtime every night for 28 nights, the opposition sent a message of hope and unity in order to
helpcitizens overcome fear and isolation (Huneeus, 2009; Ackerman and Duvall, 2000). The
national plebiscite was held on October 5, 1988 and Pinochet lost with a little over half of the
population voting NO (Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Schneider, 1985;
Huneeus, 2009; Ackerman and Duvall, 2000).
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Democracy-Building Initiatives After Pinochet
Pinochet’s military dictatorship and neoliberal policies left an undeniable imprint on
Chile. Although Chile’s political institutions remained strong and stable throughout earlier
periods of political conflict and rapid economic development (A. Valenzuela & J.S. Valenzuela,
1983, J.S. Valenzuela, 1995, Scully, 1992, Luna, 2008) relations between state, party system, and
progressive groups were forever transformed under the dictatorship (Siavellis, 1999; Garretón
1983, 1986). Political parties have played a key role in navigating the tumultuous history and
they are once again central players in helping to promote the consolidation of democracy in
Chile. Post-Pinochet, the Constitution of 1980 effectively split the party system among two main
opposing coalitions (Valenzuela, 1999), left-leaning Concertación coalition, led by the Partido
Demócrata Cristiano party and the right-leaning Conservative coalition, Coalición por el
Cambio, led by the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and National Renewal (NR).
Originally created to contest the plebiscite in 1988, the Concertacióncoalition persisted and
became instrumental as parties were forced to collaborate and unite as electoral necessity in the
elections of 1989 and beyond. So, the new post-Pinochet political division fit the political
experiences of most Chileans – for or against Pinochetismo, or in other words pro- or antiauthoritarianism (Torcal andMainwaring, 2003; Aguero and Tironi, 1999; Valenzuela, 1999;
Fuentes, 1999; Siavellis, 1999; Luna, 2008). Hence, Pinochet’s legacy is a crucial factor that has
structured the party system – and appear to have successfully incorporated the political
divisions of the past based on class voting or religious cleavages (Tironi and Aguero, 1999;
Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003).

This duopoly has created a big incentive for political parties to remain inside one or
other of the two major coalitions that have dominated the political landscape since 1990,
thereby contributing its durability and stability (Scully, 1995; Boas, 2008; Linz, 1996;
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Mainwaring, 2003; Dix 1991; Scully, 1992; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Valenzuela, 1999;
Angell, 2003). However, there is still the existence of deep divisions within the two blocs.
Scholars have noted how, far from encouraging unity and discipline, the electoral system in
Chile promotes interparty bickering, made worse by a tendency toward heightened ideological
polarization (Valenzuela and Dammert 2006). For example, the Communist Party was
marginalized and completely shut out of the Chilean government in the post-Pinochet era. The
Communist Party was “excluded from the multiparty governing coalition and failed to win seats
in the newly installed congress” (Roberts, 2005: 25). In prior years, the Communist Party had
been among the political leaders and was a driving force in the popular protest movements that
helped to weaken and oust the authoritarian rule, but they were unable to rally support once the
democracy was in place.

Post-Pinochet, the Concertación governments have tried to govern and unite the country
but were initially heavily constrained by several key players. Authoritarian enclaves with veto
powers, business leaders whose influence was increased due to market reforms, and reemerged
labor groups all exerted pressure on the Concertación governments (Staab, 2012). Additionally,
although Pinochet was removed from power, democracy in Chile was built on the foundations
set in place by the 1980 Constitution and the systems and institutions implemented during
Pinochet’s tenure (Huneeus, 1998). Therefore, parties found themselves having to operate in
an institutional framework imposed on them by an (anti-party) military regime (Scully, 1995;
Boas, 2008; Linz, 1996; Mainwaring, 2003). Therefore, although the government was
eventually able to relinquish power from authoritarian enclaves through amending the
Constitution several times, for many Pinochet is considered the father of today’s Chile (Navia,
2010; Angell, 2003). Despite these institutional challenges, the Concertación coalition persisted
for over ten years, having won three presidential, four congressional and three municipal
elections, as well as overseeing a period of unprecedented economic growth. Likewise, all of
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Chile’s political parties should be acknowledged for managing a difficult transition more
successfully than in any other Latin American country.

Chile’s Political Parties and Period of Redemocratization

Most recently, new challenges have emerged from Chile’s party system. First, the
percentage of the population identifying with a political party has decreased significantly since
the transition to democracy. This decrease is matched by a drop in valid, registered voters in
Chilean elections, particularly among younger electoral segments (Carlin 2006; LAPOP 2006;
Angell, 2003). Second, scholars have noted that the Chilean electorate is undergoing a process
of partisan dealignment, as more than 85 percent of Chileans do not currently identify with a
political party, according to (LAPOP 2010 results) and party identifiers are not representative of
the electorate (Luna and Altman, 2011). In this regard, Chile seems to be following the pattern
of many countries in seeing a decline of mass party membership. Finally, the continued
existence of clientelism and pork barrel, suggests that constituency-service, patronage, and
brokerage networks continue to play a vital role in institutionalizing and strengthening the preauthoritarian party-system (Valenzuela, 1999; Garretón 1988; Borzutzki 2002; Valenzuela and
Scully, 1997; Posner 1999). Notably, some have found that today linkages forged at the local
level are usually non-partisan and highly personalized, with local candidacies gaining autonomy
and strength from national (partisan) leaders (Jones, 2007). Rehren (1997: 327-8) points to a
new feature of Chilean politics – “the penetration of the locality by the market and the
introduction of private enterprises as a new component of local political machines and
clientelistic networks”. This has created a sense in Chile that those in the higher income and
more political socialization, vote according to their party identity. While those at the lower end
of the spectrum and are not as politically socialized, tend to rely on localized personal ties to
connect with their elected officials, who engage in an exchange of support in return for electoral
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support (Luna, 2008; Drake& Jäksic, 1999). Morgenstern, Polga-Hecimovich, and Siavelis
(2012) compare the analysis of Chilean politics by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Montes
(2000), and found that the Chilean party system has characteristics reminiscent of Europe in
that it is very institutionalized, but it is like other Latin American party systems in that there is
also high electoral volatility, rapid changes in party labels and episodic outbursts of
personalism.

The economic dimensions of Chile’s political system also cannot be ignored. Chile’s
macroeconomic model is rarely questioned - even though paradoxically the opposition to
Pinochet strongly criticized the defects of the economic model. The result is a restricted political
agenda with little debate on important issues such as environmental concerns, income
inequality, the power and role of the trade unions, ways of increasing political participation.
Therefore, as demands for political parties to become more participatory and inclusive increase,
parties also must face the constraints placed by the continued dominance of market-based
policies. This factor has presented challenges to social movements and political parties which
have largely failed to unite a fragmented opposition (Rodrigues, 2008; Roberts, 2002; Svolick,
2012). Both have struggled to unite leftist and middle-class groups to foster and support a
transition to democracy (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Garretón 1986; Valenzuela, 1999).
Thus, scholars have noted that the Chilean experience highlights both the strengths and the
weaknesses of mobilization as a strategy for bringing about a transition from dictatorship to
democracy in the absence of a consensual and coherent political strategy (O’Donnell and
Schmitter; Svolick, 2012; Levitsky and Way, 2010).

In the absence of a consensual and coherent political strategy, the fragmentation of the
poor and working classes can also be an enduring legacy of Pinochet’s regime. The military
dictatorship and neoliberal economic policies gutted and isolated what was one of the most
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highly organized and politicized agrarian sectors with strong social and political roots
(Houtzager and Kurtz, 2000; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). Rather, the post-Pinochet era
saw that the social forces which were most negatively impacted socially, politically, and
economically during the dictatorship remained isolated from both the more established party
leadership and the social bases of the "popular" organizations (Huber et al 2010; Kurtz, 1999;
Evans, 1996). Even to this day these factors contribute to a persistence division and lack of trust
within the leftist coalitions, high inequality, rural poverty, and elitist political culture.

Politics and the Emergence of ICTs and New Modes of Expression and Activism
Like Taiwan, Chile has a developed information technology infrastructure. Per the
United Nations Economic and Social Council (2013), “ICTs represent an average of 3.2 per cent
of the gross domestic product (GDP) in Latin America” of which Chile is a significant part. Chile
is among the Latin American countries ranked in the Upper category of ICT development (IDI
index) of 4.90 (ITU, 2015). Not surprisingly, they also have one of the highest Internet usage in
Latin America. As of 2014, 72.3% of the population were using the Internet (ITU, 2015). It
Chile citizens have achieved an elevated level of ICT access, use and skills (Development Index,
2012). It is significant that by the last quarter of 2008, 32.3 percent of Chilean households were
linked and able to access the internet from home (Cordoba-Pachon 2010, 277). Additionally, it
should be noted that almost the whole population has access to affordable individual handsetbased mobile-broadband subscriptions (International Telecommunication Union, 2014).
Finally, Chile has one of the highest Internet and social media usage in the world, especially
among the youth population. For example, Chile has the fourth-highest usage of Twitter per
person in the world, with almost 30% of the population tweeting and eight out of ten people
under 30 are on Facebook (Forbes, May 2014).
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The ease and availability of low-cost Internet access has also extended to schools with
Chile’s Enlaces Initiative, which partners’ schools with the private sector to provide Internet
access and has been very effective in improving Internet access in schools, resulting in 78 per
cent of schools being connected to the Internet in 2013, compared to just 44 per cent in 2009
(International Telecommunication Union, 2014; Heppet al, 1996; Núñez, 1995). The availability
of the Internet in schools throughout Chile is believed to have played a part in facilitating
student population’s involvement in the political process (Kahan, 2008). Per the UNCTAD
(2004) report, Chile spanned the digital divide and climbed 21 spots from being ranked 67 th in
1995 to being ranked 46th globally in the ICT Development Indices in 2002 (194). The 18-24 age
demographic has the highest proportion of Internet users at 86 percent reportedly using the
internet in their daily lives. This is not a startling increase, as nearly 60 percent of the entire
population uses the Internet regularly (Valenzuela et al, 2012).

The development of the media during Chile’s history has been shaped by the country’s
political circumstances. Before Pinochet, the media was very diverse and included a variety of
political views, from ultra-right to ultra-left. The media also had freedom to question and
critique elected officials and operate without fear of political repression (Fagen, 1974). Most
notably, during President Allende’s tenure, the media played a critical role in reporting political
infighting, economic crises, and movements and protests that took place between from 1970 to
1973 (Fagen, 1974). This ended with the military dictatorship, which saw the media turn into a
tool for promoting state propaganda (Bresnahan, 2003). During this time, radio became the
venue for grassroots and underground activism. For example, the grassroots radio station,
Radio Umbral, played a key role in fostering grassroots activism (Bresnahan, 2003). Although
Pinochet stepped down from power in 1989, the laws restricting freedom of the press were in
effect until June 2001.At this time, President Ricardo Lagos signed the "Law on Freedoms of
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Opinion and Information and the Practice of Journalism" into effect providing the press and
media with more freedoms and the right to political leaders and their policies.

In Chile, the most widely used communication medium has been radios followed by
newspapers. Nearly every household has a radio, therefore, it is often the primary source of
current news and reaches more people in more remote places than any other medium, including
the Internet. Radio news range from political, religious, to covering several working-class
sectors such as Radio Agricultura. Regarding newspapers, the most widely read newspapers are
El Mercurio and La Tercera. According the official statistics by the United States Department
of State, the daily El Mercurio attracted conservative audiences (World Fact Book, 2001). Chile
also has a variety of widely-read magazine publications that present a spectrum of political
opinions. These include magazines such as: El Siglo, the Communist Party's official weekly
publication; Punto Final, a biweekly publication of the extreme-left group Movimiento de
Izquierda Revolucionario (Revolutionary Left Movement).

Political Uses of ICTs
ICTs have been shaping the political landscape in Chile in several ways. First, they
influenced efforts at opening government and increasing citizen participation through various egovernment strategies. Second, they have shaped the political strategies that political parties
have used, especially during periods of electoral contestation. Finally, they have contributed to
the empowerment of civil society and progressive efforts in Chile. Now that political parties and
progressive parties have been empowered and Chile continues to lead among Latin American
countries in terms of ICT infrastructure, the question remains as to whether they will contribute
to greater democratic deepening in Chile.
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Chile is one of the most advanced countries in terms of integrating technology into
government. At one point, the United Nations rated the Chilean e - government among the "top
10" worldwide by 2005 (UN, 2005). Over ten years ago, Chile began implementing traditional
e-delivery programs aiming to (1) deliver information to citizens and (2) allow them to perform
tasks online. Since this time, it has launched at least four key tech initiatives. In 2003, the
Chilean government launched Senador Virtual (Virtual Senator), an application that allows
citizens to vote for bills pending in the Senate and solicit support material for discussion. To
this date, user participation on the platform is relatively low and it remains unclear how far
citizen participation in these forums will impact the formal process of political decision making
(Araya & Barría, 2009). Participation tends to be greater around those issue areas which have
the most public interest such as crime, health and employment (CEP, 2006). Studies have noted
that the platform should aim for greater deliberative democracy by allowing citizens to vote on
legislation rather than just commenting (Moreno et al, 2009). This same year, the government
developed a new platform to improve transparency and public cost efficiency, ChileCompra,
(Chile Buys). The website allows government officials and citizens to compare the costs of bids
to and services purchased by the governments. Since its launch, ChileCompra has become a
popular open data platform which allows citizens to search and download data related to public
procurement22. A year later a pilot video platform called Chat Senators (Senador Virtual) was
implemented from May 2005 until September 2005. The platform allowed citizens to have
weekly video chats with their local senators. Review of this pilot project later revealed that the
service was under-utilized and only 12 senators participated, who were all men (Navia, 2004;
Araya & Barría, 2009). Therefore, the platform failed to engage a wide variety of citizens. As
with the platform Senador Virtual, the belief was that the Chat Senators was also not successful
in opening spaces for deliberation. Some criticized that by placing the senator in the center of
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communication flows diminished the possibility of back and forth exchange and debate between
Senators and citizens (Navia, 2004; CEP, 2006).

Efforts to use ICTs to as a political strategy did not start in Chile until 2005. This year,
the Senate made it possible for all senators to set up their own blog using one common platform.
At the same time, political parties began to launch their own political party websites. The utility
of party websites is best studied during period of political contestation such as elections. Most
notably, candidates have adopted a strategy of using ICTs to detach their public persona from
the political parties and to generate an identity on the web to establish a rapport with the public.
In this sense, ICTs have been used to build a bond between the candidates and the public
(Roberts, 2008). The earliest example of this was seen during the 2005 presidential elections.
During this election, candidates set up blogs to allow for interactive communications with
visitors and made extensive use of the Web and email to recruit, organize, and mobilize a
network of campaign volunteers (Boas, 2008). Bachelet more than other candidates, used ICTs
to spread her campaign slogan “Estoycontigo” (“I am with you”) online and give the impression
to people that she is directly connected with the people (Boas, 2008). She also avoided putting
any of her party’s logo or emblems on her website to reduce her association with them.

Second, per Boas (2008: 56), the 2005 presidential campaigns serve as examples of this
adaptation as several of the candidates “established blogs to allow for interactive
communication with visitors to their websites, and a third made extensive use of the Web and
email to recruit, organize, and mobilize a network of campaign volunteers”. This expands the
reach of politicians to an influential audience across the citizenry. It should be recognized that
politicians have yet another incentive for integrating their campaigns into the web. It allows a
candidate “to project an image associated with being ‘modern’” (Cordoba-Pachon 2010, 278).
Bachelet has successfully used the ICTs to her advantage during her prior campaigns to reach
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the people her party theoretically will represent while in office. However, once the candidate is
in office, the political party is involved in governmental activities rather than solely focusing on
constituent representation. It is a discrepancy “that starts from the premise that the
fundamental role of political parties—at least during much of the twentieth century—has been to
connect society and particular groups of interest with the political system” (Cordoba-Pachon
2010, 278). This disconnect leads to dissension from the party followers who voted per the party
line. This evolution from approval to dissension within the constituency of political parties is
further explained by Cordoba-Pachon: “The aggregation and filter of social demands, social
integration and mobilization, as well as the structuring of the vote” contribute to the discord
once a president has been elected (278).

The United Nation Development Program issued its 2006 Chilean Human Development
report and in it they outlined their findings regarding the utility of party websites in Chile. They
analyzed the websites according to: (1) the information supply, (2) access to public information,
(3) interaction degrees and (4) service rendering. Their study found that the right-wing party,
Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) had the most developed website (UNDP, 2006). In
terms of information made available on the site, the study found that there was no great
different among the various political parties. They all included information about members,
agenda, events, and history (UNDP, 2006). Thus, the integration of ICTs by political parties
could be more a tactic to appear professional and modern, rather than a genuine attempt to use
technologies to get closer with constituents.

ICTs have also been instrumental in helping the emergence of a renewed and
strengthened progressive force in Chile (Fung et al, 2013). Defining this shift in political
activism in Chile, leaders of the movement have turned to ICTs and social media, to
communicate with the student body and to amplify the voice of the demonstrations to attract
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media attention and public support (Valenzuela et al, 2012). Through ICTs, civil society groups
have been able to bypass Chile's generally conservative media and speak directly with the public.
Studies have found that social media has been closely associated with protest activity
(Valenzuela et al, 2012). During the student movements, these tools served a dual purpose of
facilitating conversations and organizations among interested parties (Trippi 2004; Chadwick
2006). Therefore, ICTs continue to nurture further interaction among citizens who before
would have had no contact with one another. With the generation of new relationships, new
meaning formation and new ideologies are also likely to increase (Fung et al, 2013). The
availability of ICT-enabled communication tools has been especially valuable for student
protestors as the Chilean government has been accused of many violations of freedom of
information (World Press Freedom, 2013). Additionally, media ownership continues to be
concentrated in few hands. Two privately-owned companies, El Mercurio and Copesa, own
about 95 percent of the print media while the Spanish media company Prisa owns about 60
percent of the radio stations (World Press Freedom, 2013).

Finally, ICTs have shaped how citizens participate and hold elected officials accountable.
Bachelet’s disapproval rating recorded in 2015 is an example of this disharmony of the political
campaign promises and the tangible activity that occurs during a presidency. University of Chile
Student Federation (FECH) continue to use ICTs to organize to put pressure on Bachelet to
foster greater relationships with other Leftists governments in Latin America and place more
Left-leaning political officials in charge of the Education department23. Regarding her
predecessor, the right-wing Piñera, activists used ICTs to hold him accountable to his campaign
promises. For example, Piñera had pledged that he would prohibit power plants from being built
in environmentally delicate locations, during his presidency (Valenzuela et al, 2012). When the
announcement of the planned power plant was released, environmental activists used ICTs to
23In

2014 the University of Chile Student Federation (FECH) forced the ouster of Bachelet’s newly-appointed
education undersecretary and her replacement with a more politically compatible designee.
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assemble support for halting the project. Following two days after the environmental agency
approved the project, 118 Facebook Groups against the project were created, which together
garnered more than 25,700 ‘Likes’ and 177,450 ‘Fans’ (García & Torres, 2011; Valenzuela et al,
2012). At the same time, 3,000-plus citizens—coordinated via Facebook and, to a lesser degree,
Twitter—marched to the presidential palace in Santiago, demanding Piñera to fulfill his
campaign promise that no power plants would be built in environmentally sensitive areas
(García & Torres, 2011). Consequently, on the following day, Piñera announced that he had
overridden the agency’s approval and personally asked the company to relocate the plant
(Valenzuela et al, 2012).

Absorption or Polarization? The Future of ICTs and Activism in Chile

The back-to-back Concertación administrations from 1990-2006 tried to implement
social reforms despite facing challenges in demonstrating how economic development was
compatible with democracy (Simon and Verdejo, 2005). Trying to unite both, Concertación
President, Richard Lagos (2000-2006), implemented several key poverty-fighting schemes and
sought to equalize womens’ participation in the electoral arena which historically has been maledominated. President Lagos was a founder of the Party for Democracy (Partido por la
Democracia, PPD) and a socialist. It was during his administration that he succeeded in
repairing the economy after the effects of the Asian calamity. “It also promoted and
implemented significant reforms aimed at combating extreme poverty and modernizing
education, health, culture, labor relations, public financing of electoral campaigns, laws on
probity in state management, and constitutional reforms” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014, 3).

The desire for education reform was a key impetus in the consolidation of all the
university student federations which created a new expansive and empowered civic group.
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Initially, the students focused on trying to effect change within the university system. However,
over time students began to take their struggles to the streets. Nicknaming themselves
pinguinos (penguins) for their uniforms, by 2006, the students began to stage marches, sit-ins,
and protests. They were often met with violence by either police or other private citizens who
were unhappy with the disruption they were causing. Yet, by taking their struggle to the public,
they were also able to influence public opinion. They came to represent the widespread feeling
that in Chile, the economy, politics, and the media are all rigged in favor of elites. Consequently,
the students could strike a chord with the middle-class along and aligned their cause with the
existing land miners’ and workers’ rights’ movements.

In 2006, Michelle Bachelet, who herself was imprisoned and tortured under Pinochet,
became Chile's first female President when Ricardo Lagos stepped down in early 2006.
However, despite her progressive outlook, she faced deep divisions within her coalition which
made passing reforms difficult (Garcés, 2012; Mayol, 2012). For example, although she raised
the voucher to $100 per pupil each month, and added an extra $50 for poorer children, her
finance minister, agreed this was not enough to make enough impact for poor students. She also
orchestrated the loosening of eligibility requirements for certain benefits (Bachelet, 2014). Her
strategy included a ‘life-course approach… to create equal opportunities and protect citizens”
from birth to senior adulthood (Staab 2012, 307). During her tenure, she spearheaded health
reform, pension reform and childcare service expansion to enhance equity, while shying away
from reforms related to the country’s labor market where many of the fundamental social
inequalities originate (Staab 2012, 307; Garcés, 2012; Mayol, 2012). For example, she
developed, Chile Crece Contigo(Chile Grows with You), an integrated early childhood protection
system that featured a roll out of massive childcare service expansions.
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The Concertacion’s winning streak came to an end with the election of the first
conservative President since the 1988 plebiscite, Sebastian Piñera, in 2010. During his tenure,
Piñera’s administration faced a surge in protests by students, indigenous organizations and
citizens who felt their demands were not being met (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014, 2). Piñera’s
popularity continue to decrease as his defense of the private market education and rejection of
the students’ request for public ownership led to two waves of massive nationwide protests from
in 2011. During this year, Chilean students intensified their efforts to end the unequal,
privatized, and market driven education system and challenge Chile’s neo-liberal system. The
eight month long protests spread through the whole country. These protests were noted for
their ability to combine old and new repertoires of contention (Della Porta and Diani, 2006).
For example, they used newer repertoires such as flash mobs, with older ones such as the
traditional cacerolazos, the banging of pots reminiscent of the Salvador Allende era (Figueroa,
2012; Jackson, 2013; Della Porta and Mosca, 2009; Papacharissi, 2011).

In the run, up to the 2013 Presidential election, the student movements played a pivotal
role in creating political space for progressive voices and placing issues of extreme inequality on
the center of the national agenda (Rosemont, 2014). Several creative acts received extensive
domestic and foreign media attention, including flash mobs, a zombie walk in front of the La
Moneda presidential palace (a metaphor for Chile’s “walking dead” educational system), as well
as kiss-ins and a massive “pillow fight for education” (Haynes, 2016:72). Despite these
lighthearted methods, the protests have had serious consequences. Public elementary and high
schools and some college departments (facultades) were completely shut down and occupied,
and students forced to lose a year of schooling (Haynes, 2016: 58). Massive demonstrations
continued, mobilizing up to two hundred thousand demonstrators, with others turning violent.
At the height of the protests in August 2011, almost 900 protesters were detained and police
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cordoned off the streets and used tear gas, with protesters setting fires in the streets and reports
of 100 injured police. One student has been killed, and many were injured and arrested.

The student movement also helped to transform the political landscape during the 2013
Presidential election. Progressive movements highlighted the increased unpopularity of both
major coalitions and their lack of policy answers to the issues at hand. The Concertation lost the
trust of progressive social groups as they became deeply-engrained in the state’s bureaucratic
structure and implemented policies which deepened Chile’s neo-liberal system. Although the
student movement eventually settle on an uneasy alliance with Bachelet and the leftist coalition,
the students did express tension with this union. They hung up signs in Bachelet’s campaign
headquarters which quoted Salvador Allende last words, “Change is not in the Presidential
Palace, but in the ‘wide avenues” (Achtenberg 2014, 20). In response, the Concertación changed
their name to Nueva Mayoria (New Mayority). The Nueva Mayoria became a center-left
coalition made up of her own Socialist Party, the Christian Democratic Party, Party for
Democracy, and the Communist Party backed up Bachelet for the elections. Bachelet opted for a
more radical platform and sought to build an alliance with the student movement (Randall,
2011). Likewise, conservative parties also rebranded themselves as the Chilean Alliance for the
elections in hopes of getting right-wing youth support. They occupied a hard stance against any
progressive initiative, therefore, moving away from leading a center-right movement. This was
initially led by the charismatic candidate, Laurence Golborne, however, he had to step down
after it was revealed that his company was involved in fraud which affected 600,000 consumers
(Al Jazeera, 2013). This created a political vacuum which shaped the landscape of potential
candidates.

The growing gap between progressive grassroots movements and the duopoly coalitions
led the emergence of non-traditional alternative political actors. The fact that the Communist
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Party joined the Nueva Mayoria in supporting Bachelet was a testament of how much they had
lost touch with popular grassroots movements. The lack of a strong leftist voice and weak
Communist Party, led to the development of Partido Igualdad (Equality Party). The precursor
to this party was the Movement of Dwellers in Struggle (MPL) which mobilized citizens around
housing rights and gentrification in the poorest area of Santiago. The leader of this party,
Roxana Miranda, became a local celebrity and personified the new generation of Chilean
activists. She led several local occupations and protests against financial institutions and
politicians, including Michelle Bachelet. The Partido Igualdad did not align with either the
Communist or other left-leaning parties and claimed to be the only party which truly
represented the interests of the poor (Haynes, 2016). Alternatively, the lack of a strong
alternative to the charismatic right-wing leader, Goldborne led to the rise of Franco Parisi.
Parisi ran as an independent and embodied a more center-right platform which focused with a
focus on some liberal values and social rights (Benedikter et al, 2016). Other new dynamic
candidates that broke up the dual political landscape during the 2013 Presidential elections were
Alfredo Sfeir and Ricardo Israel who brought environmental issues onto the political agenda.

The rules of the election process were also changed in 2013. Citizens were no longer
mandated to go to the polls to vote, and they could make their decision on their own if they
wanted to vote or not. This led to voter apathy. Yet, together they drew a total of 5.7 million
voluntary voters to the polls in the first round of the election, but the margin was too close to
call, and it required a second-round runoff election to determine that Bachelet had won by a
clear majority (Achtenberg, 2014, 20). The promise of structural reforms to address the deep
divide between rich and poor in Chilean society propelled Bachelet and her center-left New
Majority coalition to a landslide victory in December over Evelyn Matthei, candidate of the
center-right Alliance (Achtenberg, 2014). Bachelet’s promise to equalize the economy that tends
to favor the wealthy stems from the opposition of the former dictatorship. “The political and
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economic system inherited from the dictatorship that largely favors the wealthy” is one of the
central criticisms of the constituency (Achtenberg 2014, 20). Ultimately, only 51% of the voting
age population cast ballots, with the lowest voter turnout taking place in the poor northern and
southern districts along with the youth population. When looking at the 18-34 age group,
analysis found that more than half, 60%, did not vote24.

The New Majority’s progressive focus was well-received and the left was once again able
to garner enough public support to go on to win strong majorities in both houses of the National
Congress. Riding on the wave of popular support, the student movement could gain the support
of more than two thirds of the population, so they have the national attention. Several student
movement leaders also went on to be elected into office. Most notably, Camila Vallejo (of the
Communist Party) and Gabriel Boric (an Independent), both won their bids to join the Chamber
of Deputies. With a clear mandate from citizens, Bachelet’s government set forth a plan to
develop constructive relations with the new civic and progressive energy in Chilean society. She
quickly set forth to implement her ambitious agenda by raising the corporate tax rate from 20%
to 25% and closing significant loopholes. She then planned to use half of this new revenue
stream to provide free education for all Chileans by the year 2020 and roll back the for-profit
schools from the military dictatorship era. The other half of these funds would be used to
improve the health care system and other social programs. Bachelet’s administration could pass
the bill through the Chamber of Deputies and secured a 33-1 victory in the senate. On
September 28, Bachelet signed the bill into law. Her administration also “created advisory
councils for policy development and launched projects with the goal of promoting social
protection and equity” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014, 4). However, by 2016, social unrest was
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beginning to reemerge from the student body, who expressed frustration that Bachelet had
failed to deliver the reforms in education that were expecting .25

Student and Political Parties Survey

In a country like Chile with a historical legacy of political polarization, it was interesting
to see how views about the utility of ICTs and how it is changing politics would differ from
Taiwan. Thus, this section discusses the findings from two surveys conducted from December
2013 until February 2014 in Chile. This period also covers the aftermath of the 2013
Presidential election which took place between November and December 2013. As with the
survey conducted in Taiwan, one survey targeted college students and a second survey targeted
volunteers and staff of political parties. The survey was developed in English and translated to
Spanish, then posted online on Qualtrics on the dissertation website: http://myopp.org/enespanol/. Finally, three Chilean research assistants were hired to administer both surveys in
Chile.

For the college student survey, the research assistants employed snowball sampling and
successfully recruited eighty-eight local college students to complete the survey (Appendix B
includes a copy of the surveys that were translated from Spanish to English). The college
student survey was divided into four parts: demographic information (i.e. gender, income,
education level), views about political institutions and political parties, media/technology access
and exposure, and political interest and activism. Table 17 outlines the basic profile of the
student respondents. Most of the students surveyed were males (60%). Most of the students
that we spoke to are attending University (74%) and not a technical program. Additionally, only
17% of the college students are in graduate school for a Master’s Degree.
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Chile is one of the densest countries in Latin America, therefore, we tried to recruit
students from major city hubs such as Santiago de Chile, Viña del Mar, Valparaíso. Regarding
income, as of January 1, 2013, the minimum wage in Chile was $257,500.00 (Chilean Pesos) a
month (about $390 a month in the United States)26. Most survey respondents were making
under $CLP200,000 a year, below what’s considered an average yearly salary in Taiwan.
Despite, their lower income levels most students reported accessing the Internet daily, using
online social networks, and mobile devices. Most respondents also expressed having moderate
to conservative political views.
Table 17: Profile of N=88 Student Survey Respondents
# of Responses

Percentage of Sample

Male
Female

53
35

60%
40%

Average age

26.6

Highest Education
Completed
University
Institute professional
Technical education center
Master

65
5
3
15

74%
6%
3%
17%

Political Views
Left
Right
Center
Independent
Any-Flexible

37
10
8
24
9

42%
12%
9%
27%
10%

73

75%

13

15%

42
11

51%
13%

Geographical Distribution
High-Density- Urban Cities:
Santiago de Chile, Viña del mar,
Valparaíso, Temuco
Less-Density-Urban Cities:
San Felipe, San Bernardo, San
Vicente
Yearly Income
Below 500 mil CLP
500 – 800 mil CLP

26

"¿Cuál es el valor del ingreso mínimo mensual? - Centro de Consultas. Dirección del Trabajo. Gobierno de Chile".
Dt.gob.cl. 2013-08-24. Retrieved 2016-01-04.
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Over 800 mil CLP

29

35%

Frequency Using the Internet
Daily
Several times a week
Few times a month

82
5
3

93%
6%
3%

Rarely
Never

1
0

1%
0%

Own a social networking site
account (e.g. Facebook,
Twitter, Plurk, etc.)
Yes
No

70
5

93%
8%

Views on Political Parties Use of ICTs
More than half of students (64%) reported that they disagree to strongly disagree that
elected officials’ use of digital tools was a waste of money. This highlights
the fact that most students value having government be more technologically-savvy and
therefore see it as a worthwhile pursuit.
Figure 26: Chile Students’ views on Political Party Tech

Some politicians and elected officials allow citizens to obtain information
and communicate online using digital tools. Do you agree or disagree with
the following statements regarding the use of these technology tools:
Is one way more for communicate the same information

7.1% 11.9% 14.3%

They make the government waste time and money

50.0%

Help people to be more informed about what
4.8%7.1%10.7%
government does
Overall, they make government and politicians more
3.6% 11.9%
accesible

Strongly disagree

Somewhat disagree

29.8%

Neutral
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14.3%

38.1%

22.6%

36.9%

20.2% 7.1% 8.3%

39.3%

35.7%

Somewhat agree

26.2%

Strongly agree

In terms of being able to perform specific tasks and have interactions with political parties
online, most people felt it was important or very important for political parties to: (1) provide
general information to the public through their website, (2) keep the public informed by posting
info and alerts on social networking sites, and (3) allow people to contact parties online. To a
lesser degree, students expressed not being as interested in having the ability to perform specific
tasks online, such as make donations. Therefore, one can form the hypothesis that students may
be more inclined to view ICTs as mainly a communication platform rather than on a more
functional level.
Figure 27: Chile Students’ utility of Political Parties online platforms

In general, how important you think it is for a political party or
coalition…?
3.6%
To provide useful information and remainders on social
networks (Facebook, Twitter, etc.)
To allow people make arrangements trough the website
(donations, etc.)

11.9%

28.6%

56.0%

4.8%
15.5%

26.2%

53.6%

3.6%
To allow people connect trough a website

13.1%

31.0%

52.4%

4.8%
To provide general information to the public on their
website
Not important at all

7.1%

Not very important

28.6%

Important

59.5%

Very important

Finally, students were more likely to follow politicians on social media because: (1) they want to
stay current on political and social news and (2) they find the information from these sites are
more reliable that what they get on traditional news organizations. Students were not inclined to
use social media to feel closer to their political party. Finally, students were more likely to follow
politicians on social media because: (1) they find the information from these sites are more
reliable that what they get on traditional news organizations and (2) they want to stay current
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onpolitical and social news. Students were not inclined to use social media to feel closer to their
political party.
Figure 28: Chilean Students following Political Parties online

People follow politicians or political parties on Twitter, Facebook, or other social
networking sites for a number of reasons. Please tell me if each of the following is
a reason why you follow political candidates or organizations on social networks.

The information I get on these sites is more reliable than
11.4%7.1%
the information I given on traditional chanel news

I feel more personally connected to the political
candidates or groups that I follow

I like to stay current with political and social news

Not applicable to me

15.7%

31.4%

30.0%

14.3%5.7%15.7%

Not a reason

Minor reason

50.0%

31.4%

22.9%

64.3%

Major reason

Students’ Opinions About the Role of ICTs in Politics
The survey asked students for their opinions regarding the role of ICTs in politics.
Generally, students seem to have positive views. Seventy-four percent feel like the Internet
makes it easier to connect with politicians. Eighty-eight percent of students felt that the
Internet gives them access to a broader spectrum of points of view and opinions about politics
than the traditional media such as TV, newspapers, and radio (Figure 29).
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Figure 29: Alternative Viewpoints Online

Do you think that the Internet gives access to a broader spectrum of points of
view and opinions about politics than the traditional media as diaries, T.V, and
radio?
No, 11.4%

Yes, 88.6%

Additionally, nearly half (47%) of students mentioned that online social networks and
media expose them to other points of views that can help change their political opinions. In
Chile’s highly politicized media environment, it is not surprising that youth appreciate having an
avenue that can provide them with a variety of viewpoints. Nevertheless, students did report
that they still rely on a mix of traditional and new mediums for getting access to news about
their government. Figure 30 shows that the top three mediums reported were: (1) Internet
(77%), (2) television (61%), and (3) social media/networks (57.8%). Students are least likely to
get news about their government and politics from magazines (15.7%) and radio (31.3%).
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Figure 30: Chile Students’ News Consumption

How do you get most of your news about government and
politics in your country … (Check off all that apply)
Internet

77.1%

TV

61.4%

Social networks

57.8%

Newspapers

55.4%

A combination of these

42.2%

Radio

31.3%

Magazines
Other

15.7%
2.4%

A follow up question asked students to list their top five websites to get most of their
political news. The top sites listed were: Elmostrador, Emol, and Latercera-Diario. The full
breakdown of sites is in the figure below:

Table 18: Chilean News websites
Top Websites for Political News – College Student Survey
www.elmostrador.cl
www.emol.cl
www.diario.latercera.com
www.facebook.com
www.cooperativa.cl
www.twitter.com
www.theclinic.cl
www.elciudadano.cl
www.biobiochile.cl
www.mercurio.cl
www.eldinamo.cl
www.lanación.cl
www.ciperchile.cl
www.biobio.cl
www.terra.cl
www.lasegunda.cl
www.elquintopoder.com
www.lun.cl
www.cnnchile.com
www.radio.uchile.cl
www.24horas.cl
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# Responses
30
30
24
19
16
16
15
11
11
10
10
8
7
7
6
5
4
4
4
3
3

www.adnradio.cl
www.adnradio.cl
www.el-observatorio-politico.blogspot.com
www.publimetro.cl
www.feuv.cl
www.elpais.com/elpais/portada_america
www.taringa.net
www.soytemuco.cl
www.quepasa.cl
www.nytimes.com
www.papeldigital.info
www.mer.cl
www.americaeconomia.com
www.rbb.cl
www.senado.cl
www.coyunturapolitica.wordpress.com
www.americo.usal.es/iberoame/americalatinahoy
www.rompiendoelcercoinformativo.blogspot.com
www.congreso.cl
www.diariooficial.cl
www.clarin.com/

3
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Overall, students seem to express positive views towards the utility of social networking
sites in politics. Most students reported that it was somewhat important to very important that
they use social networking sites to (1) keep up with political news, (2) debate or discuss political
issues with others, and (3) learn about what issues and policies political parties are advocating
for. Students were less likely to use social networking sites to recruit people to get involved in a
political cause or find other people who share their political views. Additionally, nearly half of
students (47%) mentioned that social networks give them exposure to alternative political views
that can change their own and that the Internet makes it easier to be in touch with politicians
(74%).
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Figure 31: Chile Students’ Online Political Participation

In general, how important are the social networks when it
comes to…
2.5%
Finding out what are the issues and political policies that
8.9%
35.4%
the parties intent to promote or advocate for
5.1%
Recruiting people to get involve in political issues that you
29.1%
26.6%
are interested
3.8%
Finding other people that share points of vew about
11.4%
44.3%
important political issues
5.1%
Debating or discuss political issues with others
Keeping updated about political news
Not important at all

2.5%

12.7%

3.8%

Not very important

53.2%
39.2%
40.5%

44.3%

25.3%
Important

38.0%
68.4%
Very important

Students’ Sense of Political Efficacy
Not considering ICTs, students were asked to rate how much impact they thought they
could have if they wanted to improve their community. More than half of the students felt that
they could have a moderate (42%) to small impact (23.9%) in their government. This is notable
for a country which has not always provided an avenue for political organization and
participation. Only 3.4% of students felt they could have no impact.
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Figure 32: Chile Students’ Political Efficacy

If you would like to make your community a better place to live,
how much impact do you think to have?
3.4%

30.7%

42.0%

Not impact at all

Small impact

23.9%

Moderate impact

Big impact

When asked to rate their interactions with either their local, state, or federal government
in the past twelve months, 40.5% of students had mentioned they had not contacted their local,
state, or federal government in the past year. However, a notable segment of respondents
(33.3%) mentioned they had contacted government via social networks. Therefore, I can assume
that if students are to have contact with their government, it is most likely to take place by
online versus more traditional offline means. Figure 33 outlines the responses.
Figure 33: Chile Students’ interaction with Government

In the past 12 months, have you contacted the autorities, local,
state or federal government by… (Mark all that apply)
I never have contacted government

40.5%

Via social networks (like Facebook, Twitter, others)

33.3%

Email

28.6%

In-person by visiting a government office or agency

22.6%

Phone
Letter

11.9%
2.4%

In terms of political efficacy, the survey asked, “How often, if ever, do you talk about
politcs or current events with your family and friends”? A majority of students reported
discussing politics or current events on a regular basis. Seventy percent reported they discuss
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this very often and 23% reported sometimes. Interestingly, even though students had positive
views about the role of social networks in politics, they were less likely to discuss politics and
current events online through social networks, websites, forums. For the question: “How often
do you discuss politics and public affairs with others online in social networks, news websites,
forums, etc?”, students reported:
Everyday (28%)
Atleast once a week (26%)
Less than once a month (18%)
Once a month (17%).
Only 11% of students reported never talking about politics or public affairs online. When asking
students to rate the type of information they share on social networks, only 33% reported that
some of what they post online is related to politics or the economy. Finally, regarding whether
students use their social media accounts to follow political parties online, 52% said that they do
follow political parties or candidates on social media networks.

Students’ Political Participation
The survey had two sections which explored students’ participation in both traditional
offline forms of political participation and more contemporary ICT-enabled forms of
participation. It is important to note that students did not express a preference for either online
or offline forms of political participation, 31.6% said preferred any and 31.6% said they preferred
both. Likewise, the survey asked students if, “In the past has there been a time when you
decided to TAKE ACTION involving a political or social issues because of something you read
online”, and 67% mentioned no. For those students that checked off yes (33%), the survey then
asked for them to list the issues they read online which caused them to take action. The most
common were education and the student movements. However, other issues noted were general
human rights issues such as: the defense of the Panul Forest in Santiago, protection of animals,
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abortion, and child abuse. Meanwhile, only 39% of students mentioned they were currently part
of an online political group or social network site.
Figure 34: Chile Students’ Political Participation Preferences

Do you prefer participate in political issues online, offline (such
as in events and activities) or both?
Offline (in events and
activities), 17.7%
Any, 31.6%
Online, 19.0%

Both, 31.6%

In terms of traditional forms of political participation and activism, the survey asked
students to select the political activities they had ever engaged in. The top three most reported
political activities were: attended a march or political speech (79.5%), attended an organized
protest (73.5%), signed an online petition (67.5%). Students were least likely to contribute
money to a candidate, political party, or any organization or cause, participate in activities as
volunteer related with a campaign, work as a volunteer for a political party or candidate.
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Figure 35: Chile Students’ Offline Political Participation

Have you ever done or participate in one of the following
political activities?
Participate in activities as volunteer related with a campain
(ej. Making calls, sending emails, helping people to enroll, or
looking for people to vote)

71.1%

Follow a political campain

Signed an online petition

44.6%

67.5%

78.3%

Worked with other citizens to resolve problems in your
comunity

No, I haven’t done it

59.0%

60.2%

Worked as volunteer for a political party or candidate

Attended a march or a political speech

21.7%

41.0%

Been member of a group with intention of influencing on
public policies, without political parties

Attended an organized protest

55.4%

32.5%

Contributed money to a candidate, political party, or any
politic organization or cause

Attended a political meeting in your town or school

28.9%

39.8%

67.5%

36.1%

26.5%

20.5%

32.5%

63.9%

73.5%

79.5%

Yes, I have done it

In terms of online forms of political participation, 93% reported having either a
Facebook or Twitter account. However, these social networks were not always utilized for
political participation. When looking at specific forms of ICT-enabled participation students
were most likely to: watch a video online of a member of a political party (77.3%), post pictures
or video online related to a political or social issue (69.3%), comment, post questions or
information online about public or government policies (66.7%). Students are least likely to sign
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up to receive text messages from a member of a political party, sign up to receive email alerts
from a member of a political party), send text messages to others about a political or social issue.
Figure 36: Chile Students’ Online Political Participation

Please check off if you have use the Internet for any of the
following activities:
Participate in a group online that is traying to influence
on the governement’s public politics
Watched a video online of a member of a political party

62.7%

37.3%

22.7%

77.3%

Signed up to receive TEXT MESSAGES from a member of
a political party

93.3%

Signed up to receive email alerts from a member of a
political party

6.7%

82.7%

Read the blog of a member of a political party

37.3%

Sent text messages to others about a political or social
issue

17.3%
62.7%

70.7%

29.3%

Posted PICTURES or VIDEO online related to a political or
social issue

30.7%

69.3%

Commented, posted questions or information on a Blog,
online discussions, listserv, or forums about public or…

33.3%

66.7%

Contacted a national, state or local government official
ONLINE, by email or by text message about an issue…
No, I haven’t done this

60.0%

40.0%

Yes, I have done this

In terms of engaging in political participation via their mobile phones, students were
most likely to use it to keep up with news relate to the election or politics (57.3%)share photos or
videos related to the election campaigns (36%), download or use any software applications or
"apps" that provide updates from a candidate or a political party (17.3%).
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Figure 37: Chile Students’ Mobile Phone Political Participation

We’re interested in how people use their cell phones for political
participation. Can you tell if you have ever used your cell phone
to:
Download or use any software applications or “apps” that
provide updates from a candidate or a political party

82.7%

Share photos or videos related to the election campaigns

64.0%

Contribute money by text message to a candidate, group, or
political party

36.0%
98.7%

Send text messages related to the election campaigns to
friends, family members or others

1.3%

85.3%

Keep up with news related to the election or politics

No

17.3%

42.7%

14.7%
57.3%

Yes

Political Party Survey
For the second survey, the research assistants recruited volunteers and members of
political parties in Chile. The research assistants called and emailed the local field offices of
political parties in Chile to recruit participants to take the survey. Ultimately, 62 surveys were
completed with this target group. Table 19 below provides an overview of the demographics of
the survey respondents for this second survey. Notably, most of the respondents had left-leaning
political views (90%) and identified with the following political parties: Socialist Party of Chile
(Partido Socialista de Chile), Party for Democracy (Partido Por lar Democracia), and Communist
Party of Chile (Partido Comunista de Chile). Therefore, we were not able to get any complete
surveys from the more conservative leaning parties: Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) and
Renovación Nacional (RN). This is an important point to keep in mind for the results that
follow. Additionally, most respondents were from high urban areas and used the Internet daily.
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Therefore, I can assume their opinions and views would greatly differ from political party
members that are in more rural areas of Chile and have more limited access to the Internet . The
survey asked members and volunteers of political parties assess their parties’ use of ICTs as well
as how they feel these technologies are changing the political landscape.

Table 19: Profile of N=62 Political Party Staff/Volunteer Survey Respondents

Male
Female

# of Responses
30
27

Average age

36

Highest Education
Completed
University
Professional Institute
Technical School
Masters
Doctorate

37
4
2
16
1

60%
7%
4%
28%
2%

Political Views
Right-Wing
Center-Right
Left-Wing
Center-Left

2
3
37
14

4%
6%
60%
30%

52

93%

6

7%

Political Party Affiliation
Partido Socialista de Chile
Partido Por la Democracia
Partido Comunista de Chile
Partido Democrata Cristiano
Partido Radical Socialdemocrata
Renovacion Nacional
Union Democrata Independiente

22
10
8
4
6
2
2

42.3%
21.54%
10.53%
7.02%
9.15%
5.26%
5.26%

Frequency Using the
Internet
Daily
Several times a week
Few times a month

50
5
2

88%
9%
4%

Geographical Distribution
High-Density- Urban Cities:
Santiago, Coquimbo,
Concepcion, Antofagasta,
Valdivia, Rancagua
Less-Density-Urban Cities: El
Quisco, Rengo, Puerto Montt, La
Serena,
San Felipe

Percentage of Sample
53%
47%
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Rarely
Never

0
0

0%
0%

ICTs and the Evolution of the Chilean Political Landscape

Political parties were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement:
“Internet is allowing smaller, less established political parties and politicians to get attention
and build a following.” In Chile, most respondents (82%) agreed with this statement, thereby,
illustrating a potential view among politicians that the Internet is shifting political power. The
survey then asked respondents to identify the specific purposes they felt the Internet serves best.
Figure 38 outlines the respondents’ responses. The top three items respondents felt the
Internet served best were:
Putting issues on the political agenda (51%)
Networking with other politically active people (40%)
Conversations among citizens (38%)
The items that respondents felt the Internet least served were:
Contacting politicians (9%)
Organizing grassroots activities (11%)
Linking together communities and neighborhoods (11%)
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Figure 38: Chile Political Parties’ view of the Internet

Which of the following purposes do you think the Internet serves best?
Putting issues on the political agenda

51%

Networking with other politically active people

40%

Conversations between citizens and politicians

37%

Conversations among citizens

38%

Giving voice to alternative perspectives

28%

Giving a voice to diverse or less represented groups in…

26%

Search for information about politicians and community…

18%

Linking communities and neighborhoods together

11%

Organize grassroots activities

11%

Contact politicians
Other

9%
4%

Figure 39 outlines the same responses but broken down by three of the main political parties in
Chile, Socialist Party of Chile, Party for Democracy, and Communist Party of Chile. Although,
survey responses are too small to make definitive conclusions, the chart demonstrates
significant differences among these three left-leaning parties. Socialist Party of Chile found the
Internet is best for searching information about politicians and community issues and expressed
that the Internet is least effective at giving a voice to the less represented in society. Party for
Democracy rated the ability to contact politicians and facilitate conversations among citizens as
the best purpose the Internet serves and giving a voice to the less represented as the least.
Finally, members of the Communist Party of Chile expressed the Internet is best for giving a
voice to less represented of the society and least effective at facilitating conversations among
citizens and politicians.
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Figure 39: Chilean Parties’ view of Internet divided by Political Party

Which of the following purposes do you think the Internet serves best? (Split
up by political party)
Networking among people that actively works on
politics

9.1%

Search information about politicians and community
issues

40.0%

20.0%
20.0%

Give a voice to the less represented of the society

7.7%

Give a voice to different perspectives

15.4%
30.8%
40.5%

16.2%
18.8%

Incorporate issues in the politic agenda

7.7%

Conversations among citizens and politicians

Socialist Party of Chile

44.4%

11.1%
11.1%

To get in contact with politicians

Conversations among citizens

36.4%
13.6%

5.6%

0.0%

Party for Democracy

15.4%

34.6%

38.9%

16.7%

20.0%

30.0%

Communist Party of Chile

Political Party’s Use of ICTs
The top three technologies that parties reported most using were: website, Facebook,
and Twitter. Text messaging was the least-used technology-enabled social network noted by all
respondents. Figure 40 provides a breakdown of all the technology options that members
were given to select.
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Figure 40: Political Parties’ Technology usage

Which technologies does your party have/use?
Website

93%

Facebook

93%

Twitter

89%

Blogs

17%

Other social networks or websites
Mobile site
Text messages

15%
11%
6%

When looking at how political parties are using technologies in their work, the top three
tasks listed were to: (1) distribute information about policy objectives and proposals, (2)
mobilize members around specific issues, and (3) increase awareness of relevant political issues.
Over half of respondents, mentioned they are least likely to use ICTs to raise money. Responses
can be found in Figure 41.
Figure 41: How Political Parties use the Internet

Please select the following ways that your party uses the Internet to achieve
its objectives:
Distribute information about policy objectives and… 9%
Mobilize members around specific issues
15%
Increase awareness of relevant political issues
17%
Reach out to potential new members/volunteers
19%
Communicate with other groups and stakeholders in…
21%
Communicate with other groups and stakeholders…
23%
For administrative purposes
Raise money
Other
No
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Yes

91%
85%
83%
81%
79%
77%
58%

42%
77%
89%

23%
11%

Political Parties’ Views on the Utility of ICTs
The survey asked respondents to assess the ways that the Internet and ICTs had affected key
party programmatic functions. Most respondents did note that ICTs had made it easier to:
Communicate their message and goals (82%);
Increase party membership (53%);
Diversify party membership (54%);
Deepen participation and activism within their party (76%);
Work more effectively and efficiently (76%).
A small subset of respondents (38%), did report using ICTs to solicit donations. Figure
42 outlines other traditional methods of fundraising that political parties listed such as eventdriven fundraising and collecting party membership fees.

Figure 42: Political Parties’ Fundraising Strategies

What traditional fundraising methods does your party use?
Party membership fees

87%

Event-driven fundraising

74%

Direct mail solicitation

19%

Telephone solicitation
Other

9%
4%

Regarding political parties’ preference for traditional media versus more technologydriven forms of communication tools, the survey asked respondents to select how much they
agreed or disagreed with the statement, “Traditional media such as newspapers, television,
radio, etc. are more useful than the Internet and other technology tools for party
communications and outreach.” Forty-five percent of respondents mentioned that they strongly
to somewhat agreed with this statement. Figure 43 outlines all the responses.
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Figure 43: Chilean Parties’ Communication and Outreach

Traditional media such as newspaper, television, radio, etc. are more
useful than the Internet and other technology tools for party
communications and outreach.
Strongly disagree,
12%
Strongly
agree,
17%
Somewhat
disagree, 31%

Somewhat
agree, 28%

Neutral,
11%

The survey asked respondents to rate how much they agree or disagree with the
statement, “Most of our party-political leaders embrace the Internet and other technology
tools.” A little over half of respondents selected that they strongly agreed with this statement
(51%). Figure 44 shows all the responses.
Figure 44: Parties’ embrace of Technology

Most of our party members embrace the Internet and other technology
tools.
Neutral, 10%

Somewhat
agree, 39%

Strongly
agree, 51%
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Figure 45 breaks down responses by political party. Members and volunteers for the
Socialist Party of Chile were the ones most in agreement with the statement that party members
embraced the Internet and other technologies. Respondents for the Communist Party of Chile,
expressed the most ambivalence towards whether their members embraced new technologies.
This shows that current campaign culture and overall political culture drive the use of ICTs for
politics and not the other way around.
Figure 45: Parties’ embrace of Technology (broken down by Party)

Most of our party political leaders embrace the Internet and other technology
tools

Communist Party of Chile 5%13% 22.20%

Socialist Party of Chile

Party for Democracy

30%

34.80%

33.30%

100.00%

15% 17.40%

0%
Strongly agree

50%
Somewhat agree

100%
Neutral

150%
Somewhat disagree

200%

250%

Strongly disagree

Although, overall most respondents expressed an interest in ICTs and their utility in
their daily politicking, there were split about their views on how successful their online
communities were. The survey asked them to rate how happy they were with their political
parties’ online communities. Response were almost evenly split, between 41.5% which were
happy and 41.5% which were not happy. Figure 46 outlines the responses.
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Figure 46: Parties’ satisfaction with Online Communities

How happy are you with the amount of interaction among party members
and their public online?
Not happy. We don’t
have an online
presence., 1.9%

Not very happy. We
have an online
presence but they are
not very active, 41.5%

Very happy. We
have a very active
online presence,
15.1%

Happy. We have a
growing online
presence, 41.5%

Finally, as seen in the Taiwan survey responses, 82% of respondents mentioned that they
thought it was a good thing that the Internet helped small, less established political parties and
politicians get attention and build a following.
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Figure 47: Parties’ Perception of New Actors

The Internet is allowing smaller, less established political parties and
politicians to get attention and build a following. Do you think this is a good
thing?

No, 17%

Yes, 82%

Looking Ahead

The last question on the survey was an open-ended question which asked political party
members: “What should your party do to improve the use of the Internet and ICTs for citizen
participation, political/community involvement or dialogue among the citizens and elected
officials?” Most of the comments and suggestions were centered around finding ways that ICTs
can facilitate greater substantive engagement and communication between political parties and
citizens. At the same time, some respondents felt that political parties still had to be taught how
to use ICTs effectively, while others felt that a more sophisticated and strategic approach was
needed to really build unity and effect change using ICTs:

Need for more substantive direct communications and interactions
Establish the option of multiple/simultaneous video chats between citizens and party
officials, deputies, mayors, etc., so that they can directly approach some sensitive
issues. -Member of Party for Democracy
Create more interaction between the party leaders and civil society. Also, deliver
information about the performance of congress party. -Member of Party for
Democracy
Enable new ways of communication that are more effective and creating direct links
between the party, representatives and citizenship in unique platforms. -Member of
Communist Party of Chile
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Generate discussion forums open to anyone. Also, it seems interesting to explore a
communication system using instant messaging such as Google Hangouts or
Whatsapp. -Member Social Democrat Radical Party
Set face sessions and online conversation with representatives of the party to take
citizens' demands and incorporate them into the public agenda.
Set rounds of online questions with party representatives in several geographical
places. -Member of Citizen Left (formerly the Christian Left Party).
Generate massive video conferences with leading representatives of the party.
Promote the "brand" of the party and the position regarding politically-relevant topics.
-Member of Progressive Party
More efficiently use of existing social networks to increase dialogue with the
citizenship. Humanize the contents, meaning that the way to express ideas it uses a
language that facilitates understanding. -Member of Socialist Party of Chile
Need for greater digital literacy among political parties
Acquire good computers, enable computing rooms at our headquarters with modern
technologies and train our members in its use, motivating the interest towards these
modern technologies and the need for being connected and communicated on other
social realities. -Member Christian Democratic Party.
Promote the use and management of IT in senior party members and have greater
presence online. -Member of Communist Party of Chile
Encourage better use of social networks on all party members to increase online
presence. -Member Party for Democracy
Assess mechanisms for better information delivery to citizenship. Above all, to research
in what way we can bring the party closer and more visible.
Deepen the use of Twitter by the authorities of the party who become the party voice.
Member of National Renovation.
Establish party accounts with their respective regional representations and encourage
the use of these accounts at national level to respond to citizens' requests-Member of
Socialist Party of Chile.
What should be done is to develop an instructional guide of the proper use of
technological tools, to give a unified image addressing certain issues for the public
opinion. -Member of Party for Democracy.
Better strategies for engaging youth and uniting different voices and perspectives
To formalize the position of the movement against certain issues and appear as a
united front. -Member of Democratic Revolution
Use social networking is important to approach more young militants because
generally most of contact with adult militants is made on the headquarters, through
meetings. -Member of Christian Democratic Party
I think we should join youth with more emphasis, is the youth who use the Internet the
most, so the party can recruit new members. -Member of Communist Party of
Chile.
Need to confront challenges reducing the utility of ICTs
It is difficult because interactions can lead to discussions with people from other
parties. However, ultimately the goal of putting on the agenda the opinion of the party
is not achieved. -Member of Socialist Party of Chile.
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Overall my view is that the Chilean voter is not very open to the use of new
technologies. -Member of Socialist Party of Chile
While the party is using more active forms of certain technologic tools, like twitter as
an interactive platform for stakeholders seeking to understand the public opinion
addressing issues and specific situations, Internet is used only for general aspects not
working to generate a permanent and systematic relationship between the party
organization, its politicians and militancy, and the global adherence. This last
constitutes a great niche and challenge in which the party can maximize the use of
Internet. - Member of Socialist Party of Chile
I think in Chile dissatisfaction with politics is associated with the non-compliance of
promises, therefore, more than use ICTs, I think parties must return to its essence.
Similarly, I think it should be increased the politician interaction with citizens through
Facebook or Twitter, be closer to each other, but it is important to understand that
many ordinary citizens do not have these tools. - Member of Socialist Party of
Chile

Analysis of Political Parties’ use of the Internet and other Technologies
Table 20 below outlines the key findings after analyzing the websites and technologies of
the main political parties in Chile.
Table 20: Analysis of Chilean Parties’ Social Media Sites
Political
Party27

Political
Stance

UDI

Rightwing

PDC

Center

Global
Rank of
Party
Site
Medium:
1,621,992

Time
on the
Site

Facebook

Twitter

Other
accounts/techno
logies

Effectiveness

Low:
1.26

Friends:
8,929.
Medium
activity

Since May
2009, 30.2k
followers; daily
activity

Blog, website, SMS
text messaging,
YouTube and Flickr
Account

Low:
3,948,074

Low1:00

Friends:
26,456;
Medium-

Since Sept.
2010; 11.9k
followers; Low

YouTube

Modern,
westernized
use; activity and
interaction
varies by
platform,
Twitter being
most active, and
others not very
active (e.g.
Facebook), they
are embracing
various
platforms
Not very active
in any social
media, in both

27

List of party names: UDI: Independent Democratic Union (Unión Demócrata Independiente); PDC: Christian
Democratic Party(Partido Democrata Cristiano); RN: National Renewal (Renovación Nacional); PPD: Party for
Democracy (Partido Por la Democracia); PSC: Socialist Party of Chile (Partido Socialista de Chile); MAS: Broad
Social Movement (Movimiento Amplio Social); PCC: Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Chile); PRS: Social
Democrat Radical Party (Partido Radical Socialdemocrata); PP: Progressive Party (Partido Progresista); PH:
Humanist Party (Partido Humanista); PEV: Green Ecologist Party (Partido Ecologista Verde); PI: Equality Party
(Partido Igualdad).
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High daily
activity
Friends:
26,456;
Daily vibrant
activity

sporadic
activity
Since July
2007; 38.5k
followers.
Vibrant and
active daily
activity

RN

CenterRight

Low:
981,898

Mediu
m:
2:04

PPD

CenterLeft

Low:
4,137,731

Low:
1:00

Friends:
1,572; Some
activity,
minimal
engagement

Since May
2011; 5,489
followers; daily
activity and
interactions

Blog, Flickr

PSC

CenterLeft

Medium:
429,195

Not
availab
le

Friends:
5,789;
Medium
activity and
low
engagement

Since May
2010; 11.4k
followers;
regular daily
activity, some
interactions

No other

MAS

Left wing

Not
available

Not
availab
le

Friends: 263;
Sporadic
activity and
low
engagement

No official
party Twitter

Not available

PCC

Left-wing

High:
233,023

Mediu
m: 2:35

Since February
2011; 6,809
followers;
Irregular
posting and
participation

Key leaders have
blogs. YouTube.

PRSD

CenterLeft

Not
available

Not
availab
le

Friends:
83,451; high
daily
engagement
and
communicati
on
Did not have
a Facebook
Account at
the time

None

PP

CenterLeft

Low:
2,572,894

Mediu
m:
2:58

Friends:
16,831; Daily
interactions
and vibrant
community

PH

Left

Low:

Low:

Friends:

Since Sept.
2011; 1,711
followers;
Irregular
posting
Since July
2010; 8,996
followers; daily
interactions
and vibrant
communities
Since March
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Instagram,
Soundcloud, Flickr,
YouTube

Blog

Flickr, YouTube

participation
seems irregular
Modern,
westernized
use; very active
on all social
media. Good
online
community and
employs
innovative
online
strategies.
Modern,
westernized use.
Trying to create
a community
using several
online
platforms,
employs some
innovative
strategies,
however,
engagement
varies by
platform
Only using
Facebook and
Twitter. Online
communities
seem irregular
and not very
cohesive.
Twitter is the
most active.
Weak social
media strategy
and weak
community
engagement.
Twitter is the
most successful.
Inconsistent
strategy and
online
communities
with Facebook
being the most
active.
Inconsistent
and limited
social media
activity and
community
Active social
media and
online
communities;
not especially
innovative
Inconsistent

1,315,974

1:13

PEV

Left-wing

Not
available

Not
availab
le

PI

Left-wing

Low:
6,873,046

Low:
1:00

5,403;
Irregular
postings and
interactions,
not an active
community
Friends:
1,405; Have
a closed
community
not open to
public.
Appears to
be active
Friends:
4,217; Daily
postings but
limited
engagement
and
community

2010; 2,877
followers; Daily
interactions
and vibrant
community
Since August
2009; 14.4k
followers;
Inconsistent
posting and not
very engaged
community

None

Since Jan.
2012; 4,695
followers; Daily
postings and
more engaged
community

A political leader
has a personal
YouTube page

social media
strategy;
vibrancy and
activeness
varies by
platform.
Inconsistent
strategy; online
community
appears
fragmented, yet
active and
engaged in
some areas.
Small
community and
limited
engagement.
Still seem to
invest time and
resources.

There are several insights which we can gain by looking at the online strategies of
political parties. First, most political parties started employing online strategies in the late
2000s. For example, the first party to have opened a Twitter account was the National Renewal
(Renovación Nacional) party in 2007; while the Equality Party (Partido Igualdad) opened theirs
in 201228. Second, Twitter seems to be the online platform of choice, with most parties seeming
to apply most of their focus to using Twitter when communicating with constituents and the
public. Third, there is a lot of variation in terms of the sophistication and effectiveness of online
strategies. Some parties which appear especially innovative and effective in their online
strategies are, Party for Democracy (Partido Por la Democracia) and National Renewal
(Renovación Nacional). These groups standout above the rest because they employ more than
one online tool and are effectively using them to create community and facilitate
communications with the public.

Fourth, although the list of parties is not definitive, there are some conclusions I can
make about right and left-wing differences. As noted earlier, political alliances in Chile have
historically been divided between the left-wing and the right-wing. Although there are multiple
28

This party is fairly new, being founded in 2009.
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parties involved in the Chilean political arena, these parties tend to flow along a continuum that
trends toward one or the other extremes. For the most part, the Christian Democrat Party has
been the only central party that based its opinions in the mid-range between the two poles.
However, based on the way that the Christian Democrat Party employs online platforms, their
voice and community and consensus facilitation appear minimal as they have a weak online
presence and community engagement. There could be many internal reasons for this, but it
does highlight the potential limits of technology to help parties build consensus. The case of the
Communist Party also highlights this. Schneider (1991) pointed out that former “residents of
Communist-influenced neighborhoods absorbed the lesson that individuals can make a
difference that they can, in collective organization with others, take control over their lives”
(263). Yet, when you look at the online participation of supporters of the Communist Party, you
see a mix of limited interaction and engagement using online platforms. We know that students
from the youth wing of the Communist Party have been key leaders in the mobilizing of the
student movement, yet their energy and commitment may be a function more of their youth and
age and technology as secondary. Fifth, most political parties tend to employ western
technologies and westernized style of campaigning using a combination of traditional and ICTenabled mediums. Sixth, as seen in the Taiwan case study, parties that are more grassroots and
progressive are not necessarily more active online and run active online communities.
Therefore, grassroots origins do not necessarily translate to citizen-driven uses of technology.
As a result, political parties’ Internet and technology-driven strategies appear to be influenced
by resources available and political culture in Chile. Finally, most political party websites
appear to be under-utilized. The time that most visitors spend on these sites are low (under 2
minutes). The political parties that appeared to have the most engaged visitors to their website
were: Progressive Party (Partido Progresista), Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Chile),
and National Renewal (Renovación Nacional).
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Conclusion
There is no doubt that democracy in Chile is more consolidated and inclusive than it is
ever been. Chile’s fledgling democracy continues to show that the country is making efforts to
shed its authoritarian past (Navia, 2010). Nevertheless, there are still considerable challenges
getting in the way of greater democratic deepening. Although, ICTs have proven to be very
effective at facilitating the emergence of new participation forms (Cordoba-Pachon 2010, 278)
and greater communication among civil society and progressive forces, the question remains as
to whether it will deliver more substantive change in the relationship and dynamics between
citizen and political parties. Therefore, it is a good reminder that while ICTs help to facilitate
communication and interaction and makes it easier to disseminate information, this does not
necessarily make it democratic (Antiroiko, 2003: 125).

Chile’s modern society and stable economy have laid down the foundation for an
advanced technology and communications infrastructure. Not surprisingly, Chile has one of the
highest Internet usages in the world. Chilean political parties are as advanced as western
countries in term of employing ICT-enabled strategies. Therefore, Chile is in many ways a
fascinating case study to examine the potential democratic utility of ICTs. What we learn from
Chile is that although ICT usage is advanced there and has contributed to the creation of
political opportunities like Taiwan, it remains to be seen how these changes will shape the party
system landscape. ICTs have not been successful at facilitating the greater consensus that is
needed between political parties and Chile’s institutionalized collective interests, such as the
impoverished and labor unions. Second, Chile’s multi-party system continues to demonstrate a
remarkable ability to survive and adapt (Valenzuela, 2012), which in turn is one of the
impediments to gaining greater political consensus. There continues to be an inadequate
balance of clout between the parties and their fragile coalitions. Party leaders have tried to work
the multi-party system to their advantage (Venezuela and Dammert, 2006). Rather, as seen
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during the 2013 Presidential elections, ICTs are facilitating the emergence of non-traditional
third-party political actors and greater personification of political parties, such as seen in the
case of Laurence Golborne and Franco Parisi. The survey responses from students and
members of political parties reveal this to be a favorable outcome of ICTs, but it remains to be
seen the ways that the emergence of third parties can shape political parties or evolve them into
less elitist institutions.

Scholars have noted that one reason for the limited democratic utility of ICT’s is the lack
of activism of “empowerment” (Santana, 2013). The expectations of progressive groups were
magnified with the emergence of ICTs and political rhetoric calling for strengthening of
“authentic participation” (Picazo 2005, 2). Defining this shift in political activism and as seen in
the surveys, students would like more substantive interactions and voice in the policy making
process and for the most part have a healthy sense of political efficacy. They have turned to ICTs
to amplify their voice in order attract media attention and public support (Valenzuela et al,
2012). However, when it came to policymaking the movements were coopted by the Bacheletled Nueva Mayoria (previously the Concertación) (Randall 2011, 20). In this sense, they have
been divided and so the student movement has been weakened. At the same time, for the
members and volunteers of political parties that we spoke to, ICTs were mostly a
communication tool with only a subset of respondents being interested in exploring how it could
be used to transform power imbalances between collective interests and parties. Therefore,
ICTs are forcing political parties to act more like professional organizations and less like
grassroots-driven entities.

Finally, the future of Chile’s democracy rests on the ability to build consensus among the
various single-issue groups. It is not until they can merge and present a united front against the
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current political system, (Randall, 2011) that true transformative change can happen in partycitizen linkages. There is a possibility that ICTs can help play a role in this by helping providing
tools and platforms for bottom-up political uprisings and social forces to be heard and
acknowledge and to strengthen and continue to grow the new civil society in Chile. However, it
remains to be seen what role ICTs will play when it comes to helping Chile’s progressive forces
find common ground. The case of Chile also shows that there is still much more work to be done
to increase direct connections between citizens and politicians and policy makers. Scholars had
originally believed that a "central contribution of the new ICTs to democracy would be to take
out the ‘middle men’—the intermediaries of traditional organizations and media” (Fung,
Gilman, and Shkabatur 2013, 37) and usher in an era of direct and participatory digital
democracy. However, as we see here, this is easier said than done. Persistent inequality and
citizen apathy when it comes to politics will be barriers to implementing strategies to achieve
greater direct connections. Therefore, concern over a widening democratic divide because of the
diffusion of ICTs (Nam & Stromer-Galley, 2012) should be one to be monitored closely in Chile.

In summary, although Chile and Taiwan share similar socioeconomic factors, ICTenabled activism there is taking a different shape. Unlike in Taiwan, the uses of ICTs in activism
are as much about the introduction of new political players and parties as they are an extension
of Chile’s preexisting cultures of resistance and activism which have been a long running
response to Chile’s religious, urban/rural class cleavages which have been crystallized into
Chile’s political space. Unlike Taiwan, Chile has deeply democratic traditions and the current
discourse regarding new activism in the digital era is framed as the emergence of a “New Left”.
Therefore, while Taiwan would be a continuation of political identities with new ones, Chile
there is a longer historical continuum, and ICTs are amplifying existing collective and political
identities. When reviewing the political party surveys, political parties expressed interest in
using ICTs to legitimize these acts of activism and try to engage these new actors, rather than
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marginalizing them, as in the case of Taiwan. I argue that it is in cases such as this, where we
might see political parties becoming more like movements. -
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Chapter Five
Political Cultures, ICTs, and Low Human Development:
Indonesia and Peru Case Studies

The Taiwan and Chile case studies highlight the ways that ICTs are creating new political
opportunities in politics as well as how these factors interact with preexisting political cultures.
The case studies of Indonesia and Peru explore how socioeconomic factors and preexisting
cultures play out in two countries with considerably less wealth, human development, and ICT
usage. Like Taiwan and Chile, Indonesia and Peru also have authoritarian legacies which have
shaped political and economic development. In Indonesia, after four decades of
authoritarianism, the country has emerged as the world's third largest democracy. Although, the
country faces persistent problems of political elitism, poverty, weak justice systems, ethnic
divisions, and economic growth (Bhakti, 2004), its democratization experience is notable. At
the forefront of the various attempts at democratization, has been Indonesia’s civil society and
student-led movements which have forced oppressive leaders from power and pushed for
progressive policies. While in Peru, the legacy of Fujimori’s authoritarian regime persists in
Peru’s weak democratic representative institutions.
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In Indonesia, ICTs are playing a significant role in contemporary political politics. With
more than 50 million active users, Indonesia is the fourth largest source of Facebook users after
the USA, Brazil and India (Socialbakers, 2016; Alexa, 2016). Social media with their usergenerated and peer-to-peer sharing features has significantly changed people’s modes of social
and political participation (Fortunati, 2009). While in Peru, ICTs have yet to make their mark.
This chapter explores the contextual and historical factors that can account for differences
between each countries’ use of ICTs to increase political opportunities.

Human Development in Indonesia

Indonesia is rated as a middle-income country by the World Bank (World Bank, 2016).
With a GNI per capita of $3,630, it is considered one of the largest economies in the world
(Asian Development Bank, 2015). However, despite its sustained economic growth, inequality
has also been rising faster there than in any other East Asian country due to high child rural
poverty. Inequality is most visible when comparing rural Indonesian areas and the big cities.
Urbanization and development of urban economic activities are still heavily concentrated in big
cities, particularly Greater Jakarta, Surabaya and its buffer cities, and Greater Bandung, while
the development of cities outside Java remains slow, except for Medan, Palembang, Makassar
and Manado (Firman, 2011). Fifty-two percent of Indonesia’s more than 240 million citizens
live in urban areas, which are characterized as having high poverty, crime, slums, overcrowding,
and high unemployment (UNDP, 2015).A second area were Indonesia’s inequalities are rampant
are reflected in its education system. Despite having one of the 4 th largest educational systems
in the world (The Economist, 2014), the quality of the education varies greatly between the
urban and poorer rural areas, resulting in poor overall educational outcomes (Welch, 2007).
Additionally, it has been noted that adolescents in secondary school are still at risk to drop-out
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of school because of financial issues, pregnancy or marriage. For example, data from the
National Statistics Office, abound 1 in 4 girls are married before the age of 18 and around
300,000 girls are married before age 16 every year (UNDP, 2015). Most recently Indonesian
President, Jokowi made education a cornerstone of this campaign. Right after his election, he
fulfilled one of his campaign promises to launch the “Indonesia Smart Card” which pays for
school fees and stipends to 24 million poor students across Indonesia, guaranteeing them 12
years of free education29. Despite the societal challenges, Indonesia has a high national literacy
rate of 99% and youth are increasingly well educated, socially mobile, and digitally connected
(UNDP, 2015).

Media and Technology in Indonesia

Indonesia is an emerging democracy, facing a multitude of challenges such as
corruption, oligarchy, cartel, and issues regarding transitional justice. Corruption is one the
most serious issues in contemporary Indonesia (Henderson & Kuncoro, 2004). According to the
recent statistics released by Transparency International, Indonesia’s corruption score was 36
out of 100 (on this scale, 100 denotes the cleanest and 0 shows least transparent country
(Transparency International, 2014). At the face of these challenges, media and technology have
played key roles, helping to facilitate collective action, participatory culture, and civil
engagement (Arifuddin, 2014; Nugroho & Syarif, 2012 Lim, 2013; Nugroho, 2007, 2008).
However, while contributing to a vibrant and empowered communities, the media landscape
also faces many challenges. First, after the return of freedom of expression in Indonesia after
Suharto’s regime, the corporatization and centralization of media ownership took place postSuharto (Haryanto, 2010; Robinson & Hadiz, 2004). These two factors combined contributed to
rural-urban divisions in media infrastructure and corporate and political control of the media

29

The National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction, Government of Indonesia’s Smart Card Program.
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(Bagdikian, 1997). For example, most media conglomerations currently in Indonesia are owned
by oligarchic political parties rooted in the legacy of the Suharto’s authoritarian regime (V. R.
Hadiz, 2004, 2008; V. Hadiz, 2003; A Heryanto & Hadiz, 2005). As a result, a positive attribute
of ICTs in Indonesia has been its ability to provide spaces for alternative political information
and discourse to be created and shared.

Despite, Indonesia’s low ICT development and infrastructure30, Indonesia is one of the
most digitally active countries in the world. Statistics show that only 55 million Indonesian
citizens had Internet access and there currently 85% of the population have mobile phones (ITU,
2016). Three factors in this growth have been the expansion of (1) mobile phone usage, (2)
freedom of expression, (3) commercialization of the media following Suharto’s fall (Lim, 2011).
It should be noted that early in the internet boom, internet cafés were the primary points of
access for 2/3 of Internet users (Wahid, Furuholt, & Stein, 2004). “In their heyday, Internet
cafés could be found inside shopping malls or by the main roads in Jakarta, but now the
establishments are more often deep in the back alleys of crowded neighborhoods”(Internet
Cafes are still alive in Jakarta, Barely, 2011). The proliferation of Internet access and mobile
phones led to the development of a ‘cyber-civic space’ in Indonesia (Lim, 2013, p. 639) that
played a critical role beginning with the removal of Suharto (Armando, 2011; Harris and
Forresti, 2011).However, the democratic utility of ICTs continued after Suharto as the reform
movement produced an assortment of websites devoted to political change in Indonesia. “KdPnet and SiaR are only the oldest and longest surviving of them” (Hill & Sen, 2002, p. 172).
Censorship and page space restricted what the groups could publish in formal media
publications, but the internet continues to provide a new venue for opinions to be shared with

30

Indonesia’s ICT Development Index is low by global standards. The UN’s International
Telecommunication Unit gives Indonesia a rating of 3.94 in terms of the ICT Development Index.
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the public. The Indonesian political activists joined with a variety of international human rights
organizations to spread their message to a global audience.
Most recently, Indonesia has witnessed a tremendous growth in social media usage, with
90% of online activities devoted to browsing social networking sites (Lim, 2013, p. 639). During
2015, only 29% of the population “have access to the web, and most connections are relatively
slow” (Plucinska, 2015). Not surprisingly studies have found that Indonesians are among some
of the most social media active citizens around the world (Lim, 2013, p. 636). A recent study
found a vibrant social media scene with Facebook and Twitter as the dominant platforms as well
as extremely affordable mobile phones (Nugroho et al 2012). Social media users are
concentrated in urban areas with over 60 per cent of traffic coming from big cities such as
Jakarta, Bandung, Medan, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, and Semarang (Saling and Silang, 2011). This
is reflective of the broader pattern of technological dependency in Indonesia in that there are
still gender and age disparities when looking at ICT usage. For example, when looking at
Facebook, a study found that users are predominantly 18-34 years old (62 per cent) with only 2
per cent over the age of 5531. Similar disparities are found with mobile web users: 53 per cent are
18-27 years and 82 per cent are male 32. Finally, getting news from the Internet has also become
a major online activity of Indonesian users. The most popular local news sites are Detik.com,
followed by Kompas.com, Vivanews.com and Okezone.com. The most popular websites among
Indonesians, however, are global rather than local sites such as Facebook, Google, and
Blogger.com. Blogging is very popular in Indonesia and as of 2012, the country supported over
150,000 bloggers33.

31

Ibid
InMobi, 2009. Blackberry Beating iPhone in Indonesia by Mobile Ad Requests, 7 October [online]
http://www.inmobi.com/press-releases/2009/10/07/blackberry-beating-iphone-in-indonesia-by-mobile-adrequests/
[Accessed 28 July 2011]
33
SalingSilang.com, 2011. Indonesia Social Media Landscape, 2nd report, [online] http://www.slideshare.net/saling
32
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Yet, despite demonstrating a keen ability for digital activism, Freedom House rates
Indonesia as partly free, including in terms of Internet and Press freedoms (Freedom House
2016). Additionally, treason and blasphemy laws are routinely used to limit freedom of
expression by minority groups and separatists (Indonesia, 2015).Media groups have found a way
to circumvent some of the barriers to access. For example, thousands of the radio and television
stations in Indonesia operate illegally because there are “stringent though unevenly enforced
licensing rules” (Indonesia, 2015). Restrictions on foreign journalists restrict the flow of
information from Papua and West Papua because they are not authorized to travel into these
areas without special permission. In August 2014, two French journalists were apprehended
and held “for violating their tourist visas while filming a documentary about human rights in
Papua” (Indonesia, 2015). These two journalists were convicted and sent to prison for 2.5
months.

Activism and History of Student Movement
Students and civil society first demonstrated their power during President Sukarno’s
regime (1959-1966). In 1966, it was a student-led coup which ousted Sukarno from power after
a failed army coup d’état on March 11, 1966(Bhakti, 2004). Likewise, as noted earlier, the
proliferation of Internet access and mobile phones led to the development of a ‘cyber-civic space’
in Indonesia (Lim, 2013, p. 639) that played a critical role beginning with the removal of
Suharto. One of the earliest efforts at using ICTs to create an alternative civic space, was the
development of an email discussion list by John MacDougall of the state of Maryland in the US
called “Indonesia-L” or “apakabar” (Harsono, 1996). This discussion forum became the first to
facilitate the communication of critics of Suharto’s New Order and played a key role in
distributing information to other activists. (Hill & Sen, 2002, p. 170). Additionally, one of the
political internet pioneers in Indonesia was PIJAR, an organization created by student activists
as a “mechanism for democratic struggle in September 1989” (Hill & Sen, 2002, p. 170).
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PIJAR’s mission of social and political justice was furthered by its program of public advocacy,
publications, education and training. PIJAR was best known for its print periodical, Kabar dari
PIJAR [News from PIJAR]. It was one of the illegal publications that circulated among
students, sharing the critical views on government policies. “In July 1995, its editor Tri Agus S.
Siswowihardjo was charged with insulting the president in an article in the magazine and
sentenced to two years in jail” (Hill & Sen, 2002, p. 171). The student activists were able to
bypass the “government-controlled television and radio stations” (Marcus, 1998, p. A01) as the
revolutionists spread their messages about their demonstrations by email, and they flooded
newsgroup websites “with stories of President Suharto’s corruption, and used chat groups to
exchange tips about resisting troops” (Marcus, 1998). Rather than spend excessively on
telephone calls between people located on thousands of islands, the Internet spread the
messages to activist organizers in each locale quickly and inexpensively. At the same time,
despite oppression of civil society, students continued to meet underground in “study groups”
providing a continuance of student organization leading up to the events of 1998 (Aaron, 2007).
Criticism of Suharto also began to emerge from influential NGOs, political leaders and parties,
Muslim organizations, etc. Student-led violent protests took place all around the country and
were increasingly supported by Indonesia’s middle class as well as political opposition groups,
academics, retired generals, and NGOs (Moreau & Lin, 1998). After rallying, the students could
occupy parliament before forcing Suharto to resign. Reports were sent directly from an activist
using a laptop inside the parliament building while surrounded by the military troops. “The
Internet in Indonesia functioned as a weapon against state censorship, until that censorship
crumbled in the final few weeks of the Suharto regime”(Hill & Sen, 2002, p. 173). Eventually,
students succeeded and Suharto was forced from power on May 21st.
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The shift from Suharto’s New Order to democracy was dramatic since the authoritarian
rule had been in power for more than 30 years. Additionally, moving from centralized rule to a
lively and functional democracy took a series of concerted reforms which faced many challenges
along the way. The free and fair electoral process was a part of a “general overhaul and
liberalization of the political system, including the establishment of a multiparty system,
freedom of the press and the first free and fair elections in the country since 1956” (Heiduk,
2014, p. 300). Unfortunately, focus on Indonesia’s conversion procedure rapidly deteriorated
“as concerns over the future stability and territorial integrity of the country” (Heiduk, 2014, p.
301) dominated. At the same time, Indonesia experienced conflicts in the provinces. With
Suharto out of power, the communal and religious tensions in the provinces began to appear.
Indonesia’s 87% Muslim population and the Christian and other minority faiths had been stifled
during the Suharto regime. Without the fear of repercussions, the discussion of prior taboo
topics, such as racial, ethnic, religious, or class divisions, became more visible in the mass
media, and this caused the tensions between the various groups to escalate. The religious wars
in Maluku contributed to the destruction and interruption of internet service to the region. As
the instability worsened and after humanitarian intervention, “East Timor seceded from
Indonesia in 1999” (Heiduk, 2014, p. 301). Additionally, “post-Suharto Indonesia was troubled
by the outbreak of communal violence between Christians and Muslims in the Moluccas and
parts of Sulawesi, as well as by the escalation of secessionist conflicts in Indonesia’s outermost
provinces of West-Papua and Aceh” (Heiduk, 2014, p. 301). The post-Suharto regime has also
included a group of holdovers who “also have sustained a corrupt, undemocratic political culture
in which patrimonial networks and money play central roles” (Nankyung, 2014, p. 366).
Indonesia’s anti-corruption body, Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi or Corruption Eradication
Commission (KPK), has taken a strong stance against corruption and since their founding in
2002 they have jailed high profile politicians and figures. However, vote buying and money
politics continues to be a problem in the fledgling democracy.
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Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was the first elected president after Suharto’s rule, and his
time in office was an extremely stable period for Indonesia. Yudhoyono’s term lasted from 2004
to 2014. Parameswaran (2014) gives credit to Yudhoyono “for giving Indonesia a decade of
political stability and economic growth in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and
the overthrow of Indonesian autocrat Suharto” (Parameswaran, 2014). Unfortunately, the
political stability was interrupted by a political rift. “Yudhoyono’s quiet rule was followed by the
most divisive elections since the end of Soeharto’s New Order regime in 1998” (Mietzner, 2015,
p. 119). According to Mietzner (2015), “The 2014 elections returned Indonesia to a more
‘normal’ state of politics — one in which the heterogeneity of views and interests played out in
the open instead of being absorbed into Yudhoyono’s quest for societal harmony” (p. 120).

Further Integration of ICTs into Political Landscape

Electoral reforms are critical for the sustainability of transitional democracies, like
Indonesia which experienced long periods of authoritarian rule (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2014;
Heiduk, 2014; Bhakti, 2004). Post-Suharto, the country underwent a series of institutional
reforms aimed at changing the electoral process and representative institutions in preparation
for the 2004 presidential elections (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2014; Bhakti, 2004; Fionna and
Njoto-Feillard, 2015; Heiduk, 2014; Mietzner, 2015). Therefore, these elections proved to be
critical for the country’s young democracy. It was also the first election which would lack many
of the rigid controls and manipulations that were seen in elections under Suharto’s New Order.
Therefore, perhaps for the first time in the country’s history, politicians would have to earn
people’s vote, rather than arranging for them (Bhakti, 2004; Fionna and Njoto-Feillard, 2015;
Heiduk, 2014; Mietzner, 2015; Wanandi, 2010).The Internet and digital activism also played a
pivotal role in the elections. It continued to be a unifying force for democracy in the days
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leading up to the election. For example, it was note that on the eve of the election, the
candidates called on the “community” to use the Internet to express their opinions rather than
go out on the streets and face the military”(Bhakti, 2004; Fionna and Njoto-Feillard, 2015;
Heiduk, 2014; Wanandi, 2010).Therefore, scholars argued that the Internet in Indonesia had
become the space from which educated middle-class liberal democrats could become guerilla
combatants in defense of democracy (Bhakti, 2004; Heiduk, 2014).

Yet despite digital activism and reforms, elite politics continued to dominate elections.
Although, the 2004 elections highlighted the growing power, independence, and political
awareness among citizens (Singh, 2003; Bhakti, 2004; Dagg, 2007), critics noted that reforms
and digital activism did not change much (Wanandi, 2010; Fionna and Njoto-Feillard, 2015;
Heiduk, 2014; Mietzner, 2015). For one, the incumbent President Megawati Sukarnoputri did
return to power that year. Second, studies noted that despite the proliferation of political
activity, the ability of newly-activated groups to grab power from traditional political elites
remained largely limited (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2014; Bhakti, 2004; Fionna and NjotoFeillard, 2015; Heiduk, 2014; Mietzner, 2015; Wanandi, 2010; Singh, 2003). For example,
during the electoral process, “the Democratic People’s Party (PRD), with its base in the radical
student movement, used the Internet more actively than any of the other political parties, but
did not even come close to winning a seat” (Nugroho, 2008; 59; Lim, 2013).Consequently,
although the Internet had played an integral role in the changeover from authoritarianism to
democracy, it did not have any direct impact on the ballot (Nugroho, 2008; Lim, 2013).
Meanwhile, political parties did not use the Internet to their advantage (Nugroho, 2008; Lim,
2013). Whereas the young urban professionals and the students viewed the internet as a
democratic tool, the political parties did not.
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It was not until the 2009 and 2014 Presidential elections, that Indonesia began to show
the signs greater democratic deepening. The 2009 elections largely seen by the public and the
international community as democratic, fair and peaceful (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2014; Fionna
and Njoto-Feillard, 2015; Heiduk, 2014; Mietzner, 2015). The 2014 Presidential elections put
Indonesia’s emerging civil society at the forefront once again. In October 2014, Joko Widodo,
better known as Jokowi, was inaugurated as the seventh president of Indonesia”(Connelly,
2015). Opposing Jokowi in the electoral race was retired Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto. After the
ballots cast during the 2014 election on 9 July 2014 were counted, Jokowi won by a 6.3 percent
margin in the presidential election. “Golkar, the party of former president Suharto, came in
second, but won fewer seats than in the past. The Democrat Party (PD) of outgoing president
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (also known as SBY) lost a significant number of seats” (Indonesia,
2015). Immediately after the elections, controversy surrounding the election led to violence in
Aceh. “A power struggle between two political parties whose members were once part of the Free
Aceh Movement led to shootings, grenade attacks, and destruction of property” (Indonesia,
2015). Voter list inflation and ballot stuffing caused a 99% turnout of voters in more than half of
the districts of Papua (Indonesia, 2015). The controversial ‘noken’ system of voting was also a
part of the political process even though the Election Commission ruled against the practice. The
noken system allows community leaders to “engage in bloc voting for their communities”
(Indonesia, 2015). The noken system was a part of customary law and was upheld by the
Constitutional Court in both 2009 and 2012 judicial reviews (Indonesia, 2015). Regional direct
elections were a customary practice, but the 2014 law brought that to a close, and the law was
detested by the public. “Direct elections for provincial and district leaders began in 2005, often
leading to tensions between the central government and local authorities” (Indonesia, 2015).
District elections had been corrupt, and “in June 2014, former Constitutional Court chief justice
Akil Mochtar received a life sentence for corruption and money laundering related to his role in
fixing rulings on contested district elections” (Connelly, 2015). However, direct elections did
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have a positive aspect. They also allowed “local leaders who are not part of existing national elite
to gain office, such as Jokowi” (Connelly, 2015).

An integral part of Jokowi’s winning campaign strategy was to rely “on a network of
volunteers, who were often mobilized through social media”(Fionna & Njoto-Feillard, 2015, p.
147). However, their opposition, Gerinda, had the necessary funds to deploy thousands of
salaried campaigners on the ground” (Fionna & Njoto-Feillard, 2015, p. 147). And Prabowo’s
campaign was even more organized than Gerinda and Jokowi’s campaigns. In addition, this
election was different than those of years past. The media was extensively involved in spreading
propaganda for the political campaigns. In fact, “in the history of Indonesia’s presidential
campaigns, this was the first time that the media would have such a critical role in polarizing the
electorate or the country” (Fionna & Njoto-Feillard, 2015, p. 147). After such hard-fought
campaigning, “Prabowo challenged the result – far closer than the winning margins in two
previous polls in 2004 and 2009 – before the General Elections Commission and the
Constitutional Court, but both institutions unanimously ruled that Jokowi had won” (Connelly,
2015). Although, Prabowo contested the ballot count, “The [inaugural] ceremony completed the
first peaceful transfer of power between two popularly elected leaders in the world’s thirdlargest democracy” (Connelly, 2015).

Political Parties and the Use of ICTs in Indonesia
Within a context of invigorated student population and emergence of new political actors
in the political stage, I explored how political parties are currently using ICTs. Currently,
Indonesia has 14 major parties.
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Table 21: Analysis of Indonesian Parties’ Social Media Sites

Political
Party

Global
Rank of
Party
Site
Medium:
1,457,125

Time
on the
Site

Facebook

Twitter

Other
accounts/techno
logies

Effectiveness

Medium:
2:27

Friends:
58,487.
High
activity

Since Feb 2011,
22.3k
followers; daily
activity

Blog

Party of the
Functional
Groups

Medium:
1,507,983

Medium1:49

Friends:
4,463: Low
daily
activity

Since Dec.
2009; 67.7k
followers; High
daily activity

Mobile app,
YouTube, Flickr

Indonesian
Democratic
PartyStruggle

Low:
7,368,241

Medium:
n/a

Friends:
1,281,880;
High daily
engagemen
t and
community

Since June
2010; 91.3k
followers.
Vibrant and
active daily
activity

Blog, YouTube

Great
Indonesia
Movement
Party

Medium:
655,998

Medium:
2:28

Friends:
3,497,502;
High daily
engagemen
t and
community

Since October
2011; 186k;
daily activity
and
interactions

2 mobile apps,
YouTube

People’s
Conscience
Party

High:
2,847,919

Low:
1:35

Since May
2012; 2,035
followers;
sporadic
participation

Blog, online videos

Indonesia
Justice and
Unity Party

Not
available

Not
available

Friends:
563,966;
Regular
high
engagemen
t, despite
postings
not being
regular
Not an
official
account

Since Dec.
2010; 243
followers; not
active

None

Nas Dem

Medium:
1,144,679

Medium:
2:37

Do not
have an
official
account

Blog, YouTube

Prosperous
Justice

High:
309,294

Medium:
2:18

Friends:
47,476:

Since Jan 2010;
129k followers;
Daily posting
and
engagement
with
community
Since March
2009; 129

Modern,
westernized use
but active
engagement and
participation on
all social media
platforms.
Although party
is active and
participating on
major social
media
platforms,
community
engagement is
low and
sporadic.
Modern,
westernized
use; very active
on all social
media. Vibrant
online
communities
Modern,
westernized
use; very active
on all social
media. Vibrant
online
communities
Party is not fully
invested in
social media
platforms. But
when they do
participate their
community’s
engagement is
high
Weak social
media strategy
and weak
community
engagement.
Inconsistent
strategy and
online
communities
with Twitter
being the most
active.
Active social
media

Democratic
Party
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Blog, YouTube,
Flickr

Party

National
Mandate
Party

Low:
2,572,894

Medium:
2:58

United
Developme
nt Party

Low:
1,572,568

Low:
1:48

National
Awakening
Party

Low:
5,549,436

Low:
0:55

Crescent
Star Party

Low:
3,641,485

N/A

The Great
Indonesian
Movement
Party
Partai
Golongan
Karya

Low:
1,484,317
Low:
1,367,804

Daily
postings
and
engagemen
t with high
community
involvemen
t
Friends:
16,831;
Daily
interaction
s and
vibrant
community
Friends:
1,406;
Irregular
postings
and
community
engagemen
t is low
None

followers; Daily
interactions
and community
involvement

engagement and
communities.

Since July
2010; 8,996
followers; daily
interactions
and vibrant
communities

Blog

Active social
media and
online
communities;
not especially
innovative

N/A

None

Limited to no
social media
activity or
online
community

Since August
2010; 1,400
followers;
Inconsistent
posting and not
very engaged
community

Blog: Limited
posting; YouTube:
Limited content

Since Sept.
2011; 836;No
engagement or
community

N/A

Medium:
2:34

Friends:
2,337;
Irregular
postings
and no
community
engagemen
t
No official
FB

Inconsistent
strategy; online
community
appears
fragmented, no
online
community or
engagement.
Have some
social media
accounts but
does not utilize
them and has
no online
community

N/A

N/A

Medium:
3:12

No official
FB

N/A

N/A

Very little to no
online
community or
engagement.
Very little to no
online
community or
engagement.

Several things stand out when looking at the online political uses of social media
platforms by political parties. First, there is great variability in the ways that parties utilize these
platforms and the successes they have in creating a vibrant online community. Second, Twitter
is the most utilized social media platform. This is not surprising considering Indonesia has been
dubbed the Twitter nation (Lim, 2013). Third, not surprisingly, the major political parties such
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as Democratic Party, Party of the Functional Groups, Indonesia Democratic-Party Struggle,
Great Indonesia Movement Party, also have the most sophisticated uses of ICTs in their online
politicking as well as the most vibrant online communities. Therefore, although the nontraditional candidate Joko Widodo successfully utilized social media to become President during
the 2014 elections, however, social media and other ICTs in Indonesia are not contributing to
any other break from traditional politics. Finally, Indonesian political parties have integrated
mobile technologies into their political outreach and communications to higher varying degrees
that seen in Chile and Taiwan. The uses of ICTs in Indonesia as well as the historical context
that has created a progressive voice, greatly differs from another emerging democracy, Peru.
Nevertheless, for a country that is plagued by poverty and low ICT development, the utilization
of ICTs in politics demonstrates how youth and a culture of civic mindedness in society can
contribute to transformative changes.

Peru
Despite having one of Latin America’s strongest economies, Peru is a weak democracy
due to a lack of strong parties and civil society (Vergara and Watanabe, 2016). In Peru,
corruption and nepotism have contributed to a loss of trust for democratic representative
institutions. Likewise, the country’s lack of coherent social policy has led to growing inequality
and persistent poverty (Cameron, 1994, 1997). Large segments of the population, such as
indigenous groups lack effective political representation and voice regarding decisions on land
use that directly affect them. Due to these factors, citizens in Peru tend to have an unfavorable
view of democracy and have among the lowest rates of satisfaction and public trust in their
democratic institutions and presidents (Thomas, 2016; Levitsky and Cameron, 2003).
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Human Development in Peru
Peru has historically been one of the most unequal countries in Latin America. Sustained
economic growth has reduced poverty by over half and extreme poverty by three fourths in the
last ten years (Peru, 2015). With a GNI per capita of $6,370 (Peru, 2015), Peru is considered an
upper middle income per the World Bank. However, its human development is low due to high
inequality, with a Gini coefficient of 44.73 as of 2013 (World Bank, 2015), widespread poverty
among indigenous communities, and very low social spending. During the 2000s, Peru only
spent 8% of its GDP on social spending, considerably lower than other countries with low social
spending such as Mexico (13%), Colombia (14%), and Chile (15%) (Economic Commission on
Latin America and the Caribbean, 2006). Peru’s public expenditure on conditional cash
transfers (CCTs) Junta constituted .14% of GDP in 2010, (UNESCO Institute for Statistics &
World Bank, 2015) and only reaches 21% of the Peruvian poor.

Likewise, Peru has one of the lowest rates of public spending on education. The average
in Latin America is 5.1% of a country’s GDP and Peru only spends 3.5% on education (UNESCO
Institute for Statistics & World Bank, 2015). Thus, there is a wide educational and vocational
gap in Peru and quality education is difficult to access. The chief educational problem is the
dropout rate. Due to family circumstances, “many poor children temporarily or permanently
drop out of school to help support their families” (The World Factbook: Peru, 2015).
Additionally, about a quarter to a third Peruvian children work to help support their families. In
fact, children ages 6 to 14 work at hazardous mining jobs or dangerous construction sites (The
World Factbook: Peru, 2015).So, only about half of Peru’s poor citizens finish primary school,
and just one in ten has access to higher education (university or technical Institute).

192

There are sharp economic divisions between Peruvians in the urban areas and rural
centers, as well as among Peruvians of European-descent rather than the indigenous population
(Graham, 1993, p. 46). The Afro-Peruvian, are among one of Peru’s poorest group of indigenous
people. They live in rural areas where the poverty rate is more than 55% (World Bank, 2013).
Overall, the city dwellers are more skilled and have access to more educational opportunities.
According to Losson (2013), the indigenous populations have not been well represented in the
national community. A group of intellectuals known as the indigenista elites “sought a greater
inclusion of indigenous (mainly, Andean) populations in the national community” (Losson,
2013). However, the indigenista endeavors failed “in proposing alternatives to social inclusion
for indigenous people other than the abandonment of cultural markers and the adoption of
more western-oriented standards of living” (Losson, 2013).

Media and Technology in Peru

By many standards, Fujimori’s media corruption persists today. Peru’s media is
considered Partly Free by the Freedom House (Freedom House, 2015). Although, freedom of
the press is permitted by the 1993 constitution, it is not often respected in practice. Journalists,
press media, and activists are often threatened, murdered, or charged and fined with criminal
defamation charges if they speak against the ruling government or try to uncover corruption of
individual politicians. Efforts to make the government more transparent through open data
initiatives have also resulted in criminal charges for anyone who attempts to undertake this. In
October 2013, President Ollanta Humala, signed a cybercrime law which restricts the use of
government data (Freedom House, 2015). Finally, activists have noted that journalists often
accept bribes from government officials in exchange for biased coverage (Freedom House,
2015). Therefore, for citizens it is often challenging to distinguish between real news and
information and government propaganda.
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A second concern regarding Peru’s media landscape is the concentration of media
ownership. According to the Peruvian media watchdog group, Ojo Público, political parties are
not behind the ownership of any private media at the national level. There are three media
companies which control 84% of the Peruvian market: Grupo El Comercio, ATV, and Latina. In
2013, the largest one of these conglomerates, Grupo El Comercio, also purchased a 54% state of
Empresa Periodistica, which owns popular newspapers, Ojo, Correo, El Bocón, and Ajá. The
purchase gave Grupo El Comercio a 78% share in Peru’s newspaper market. Consequently, there
are concerns that the concentration of media ownership will negatively affect the diversity of
opinions available in the media. Peru also has state media, although it has a relatively small
audience. The government owns one television network, two radio stations, and the print news
agency Andina.

The emergence of ICTs in Peru has been momentous but it has also faced challenges.
When the Internet was first introduced in Peru, its consumption was mostly among intellectuals
and wealthy individuals (Barreto, 2000). However, in the early 2000s usage began to expand
to the public and Internet in the capital of Lima alone increased 160 percent (FernandezMaldonado, 2005, p. 48). Commercial cybercafés, or cabinas, began emerging throughout Peru
and allowed middle and low-income groups access to the Internet. The continued expansion of
the Internet, has now made Peru the fifth-biggest internet user market in Latin America, with
18.0 million consumers of all ages (ITU, 2015). Internet usage currently penetrates 58.6. % of
the population (ITU, 2016), although most of the users are 24 years and younger (Gutierrez and
Gamboa, 2010). The government currently does not restrict the use of the Internet or social
media; therefore, Facebook is the top social media platform most used by most millennials
there34. Likewise, Peru has a flourishing blogging culture and community that has been helping
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¿Cuántas personas están en las redes sociales? El Comercio, June 30, 2017.
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to support online activism. According to the blog Peruanista, Peru has more than 10,000 active
blogs35.

Political Transformation and Dominance of Elite-Led Politics
Peru began its political transformation as a third wave democracy in the mid-1970s,
following the demise of the leftist military regime, Gobierno Revolucionario de la Fuerza
Armada (1960-1980).Attempts at democratic reform during this period created a political crisis
and instability in society as armed conflict erupted between the government of Peru and armed
resistance groups such as Ejército Guerrillero Popular (People’s Guerilla Army), communist
militant group Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), and Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac
Amaru (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) a radical socialist group took place from 19802ooo. This period of intense civil conflict resulted in the deaths of 69,000 lives at the ends of
armed rebel groups and government forces. In response to this social turmoil, Alberto
Fujimori’s led anautogolpe (self-coup) in 1992. He suspended the constitution and eliminated
the Parliament and judiciary shortly after taking power. Citizens tired of social conflict and
turmoil, initially supported Fujimori’s authoritarian stance at restoring peace and order (Vich,
2004; Cameron, 1994, 1997; Cotler, 1994). Likewise, his free market policies ushered in a
period of dramatic economic growth in Peru.

Fujimori placed economic growth above all else. In 1991, he adopted a series of
aggressive structural reforms aimed at ending Peru’s import-substituting industrialization
strategies as well as stopping the high inflation which had plagued the country. He
implemented several supplementary measures which deregulated the labor market and foreign
trade as well as privatized most state companies, established a central bank, and liberalized the
market for agricultural land (Cotler, 1994). Fujimori’s reforms ushered in an era of rapid
35
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economic recovery and macroeconomic stabilization which lasted largely until the Asian and
Brazilian crisis of 1998. To this day, Peru is categorized as an upper-middle income country.

During Fujimori’s dictatorship, democratic institutions were further weakened and no
coherent social policies were put in place. Fujimori also ushered in an era of wide-spread
corruption and nepotism which only served to further reinforce citizens’ lack of trust for
politicians. During his term, videotapes showing Fujimori spy chief and legal adviser, Vladimiro
Montesinos bribing a congressman-elect were leaked (McMillan & Zoido, 2004). The
‘Vladivideos,’ as they came to be known, revealed the identities of those on Montesino’s payroll,
thereby, destroying the political careers of the bribed group of politicians, congressmen, judges,
electoral authorities, mayors, and journalists (Calderon, 2001, p. 47). Following this release,
there was strong public outcry which followed Fujimori to his second inauguration day in 2001.
It was during this time, that the emergence of a strong progressive national voice arose. During
this period, the Civil Society Collective organized regular symbolic events which after time
aimed to build a broad citizen movement (Roberts, 1998). They organized protests such as “flag
washing” and “put the trash in the trash” protests in cities throughout the country (Vich, 2004;
Roberts, 1998). During this time, women’s and student groups also began taking to the streets,
organizing weekly protests in front of the Palace of Justice to denounce the absence of the rule of
law and the monopolization of power by Fujimori and his cronies (Burt, 2016; Roberts, 1998).
They set up banners called “Wall of Shame”, which displayed the names and images of regime
officials, including Fujimori, Montesinos, congress woman Martha Chavez, as well as Monsenor
Luis Ciprani, an Opus Dei bishop who were supporters of the regime. However, after Fujimori,
there was no central unifying issue for the various groups that had emerged out of the protests.

The administrations that followed Fujimori, Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006), and the
twice elected Alan Garcia (2006-2011) largely failed to address the culture of patronage and
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nepotism, weak governing institutions, and persistent poverty that continue to plague the
country. A 2006 report published by the Inter-American Development Bank, found Peru’s
“bureaucratic functional capacity” to rank near the bottom in Latin America, below Bolivia,
Guatemala and Nicaragua (Inter-American Development Bank, 2006). For example, it has been
noted that state functions such as law enforcement, courts, schools and health clinics were
missing staff and were largely inoperative (UNDP, 2015).

President of Peru from 2011 to 2016, Ollanta Humala made “social inclusion” the
centerpiece of his 2011 presidential campaign and launched several new anti-poverty initiatives.
These efforts help to reduce poverty from 50% to 26% in Peru (Guigale & Cibilis, 2007).
However, overall the social spending increases have been modest. As of 2013, 23.9% of the
people were at or below the national poverty line, according to the World Bank (Peru, 2015).
Within Latin America, Peru is the only country that has devoted very little towards instituting
public services and anti-poverty programs for its citizens. Like Alan Garcia, most of the other
post-Fujimori politicians tended to abandon established parties and become “independents” in
pursuit of short-term and individualistic electoral strategies (Levitsky and Cameron, 2001: 113:
Schmidt, 2000; Tanaka 1998: 96-97). Noted exceptions of this wave was Alejandro Toledo, who
created Perú Posible (PP) in preparation for a 1995 presidential bid and Frederico Salas, who
was elected mayor of Huancavelica as an independent, and co-founded (but ultimately
abandoned) Peru Now in preparation for a 2000 presidential bid. Nevertheless, after Fujimori,
all of the country’s successful parties— including both progovernment parties and opposition
parties such as Somos Perú and Perú Posible— were personalistic, candidate-centered and
lacked overall, programs, national agenda, and strong roots in society (Levitsky, 2003). At the
national level, We Are Peru, Possible Peru, Peru Now, Union for Peru, and Peru 2000 also
emerged between 1995 and 1999. At the local levels, smaller parties emerged some which
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proliferated such as We Are Huancayo, Forward Chiclayo, Ayacucho 95, Eternal Cuzco, Let’s
Save Huaraz, Chim Pun Callao, and Put Some Heart into Lince.

How ICTs are Being Integrated by Political Parties

Within the realm of politics, the use of ICTs by political parties aiming to increase
engagement has been limited. Although, there are some "political" websites, specialized on
political activism or discussion - citizens’ dislike of politics and preference for using ICTs for
social purposes has limited its scope. Thus, the online political sphere is just as fragmented as
the offline and the apathy that most citizens’ experience regarding politics in their country also
extends to online.

Activists working alongside technologists and international actors have sought to change
this trend by supporting the development of platforms to increase citizen engagement. One of
these platforms was 131 Voces (Voices) platform which was developed in 2012 by a Peruvian
civil society organization, software development companies CitiVox and Democratic Reflection,
in addition to the National Democratic Institute. The Peruvian Congress supported this
platform and integrated it into their website. 131 Voces made voting records and pending
legislation easily available to the public through the Peruvian Congress36. The platform then
encourages public scrutiny and feedback with the aim of making government more accountable
(131 Voces: Accountability and Transparency in the Peruvian Parliament, 2012). The website
creates transparency and stimulates dialog among issues ranging from consumer protection to
human rights (131 Voces, 2012)37. The platform was utilized by a handful of politicians to also
create individualized pages which included their bio, social media feeds, and actions on key
36
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This platform was taken down in 2004.
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pieces of legislation. The utility of this platform was limited as an evaluation study showed that
although it created political space for citizens to get engaged, this was not sufficient to overcome
citizens’ lack of interest in politics (Price, 2014). More recent technology platforms in Peru have
been centered around fact-checking elected officials, particularly during elections. In 2015, an
investigative media website, Ojo-Público was launched to provide real-time fact-checking for the
President’s public remarks.

ICTs have been embraced in varying degrees by political parties the past ten years. An
analysis of the online presence and strategies of the major political parties in Peru highlights the
limits on the utility of ICTs to transform political power and culture in Peru. The analysis shows
that three major parties in Peru: Left-wing-Partido NacionalistaPeruano,right-wing Fuerza
Popular, and center-left Solidaridad Nacional, have the most active online political communities
and utilize the most professional and sophisticated uses of ICTs for engaging citizens. Their use
of ICTs utilizes common Westernized ICT strategies such as creating groups and communities
on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram among other platforms. The remainder of
smaller parties in Peru employ ICTs in limited ways and so have smaller and inactive online
communities. Below is a table of how the major political parties are using the Internet and
social media in Peru.
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Table 22: Analysis of Peruvian Parties’ Social Media Sites
Political Party

Politic
al
Stance

Global
Rank of
Party
Site
N/A

Time
on
the
Site
N/A

Facebook

Twitter

Other
accounts/techn
ologies

Effectiveness

Partido
Nacionalista
Peruano/
Unión por el
Perú)

Leftwing

Friends:
21,524;
high daily
engagemen
t

Since
September
2009, 24.1k;
daily activity

Blog, YouTube

N/A

Friends:
49,065;Hig
h daily
engagemen
t

Since Sept.
2010; 3,832
followers;
Tweets daily,
engagement
is limited

Instagram

Very
Low:
9,822,84
0
Low:
1,716,400

N/A

Friends:
279; Not
active

N/A

A few YouTube
videos posted

Mediu
m:
2:29

1,420
followers;
daily activity
and
interactions

Blog, YouTube

RightWing

N/A

N/A

Friends:
96,948;
Posts daily
and has
very high
engagemen
t
N/A

Very active on
social media
sites.
Innovative
website with
opportunities
to elicit public
engagement,
engagement
and online
community
seems to be
high.
Very active on
social media
sites and
maintaining
an active
online
community.
No social
media activity
and no online
community.
Very active on
all social
media and
community is
vibrant.

Fuerza
Popular

Rightwing

Very
Low:
6,470,30
2

Partido
Popular
Cristiano

CenterRight

Solidaridad
Nacional

CenterRight

Renovación
Nacional

N/A

N/A

Alianza
Popular
Revolucionari
a Americana

Centerleft

Very
Low:
10,967,0
23

N/A

Alianza por el
Futuro

Rightwing

N/A

N/A

Acción
Popular

CenterRight

Very low:
6,284,40

N/A

Friends:
2,691;Daily
posts and
low
engagemen
t
N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Friends:
1,945;

1,144
followers;

N/A
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Has a website
but not using
any social
media or other
ICTs
Focuses solely
on Facebook
and elicits low
engagement
Only has a
party website
and uses no
other social
media and
ICTs
Low use of
social media

9

Irregular
postings
and
engagemen
t is low
Friends:
295; Daily
posts for
engagemen
t is low

Irregular
postings

189 followers;
Irregular
postings

YouTube

Since October
2010; 260;
Daily
postings,
limited
engagement
N/A

N/A

Somos Peru

Center

Very
Low:
7,028,92
8

N/A

Peru Posible

CenterRight

Very
Low:
3,181,741

Mediu
m:
2:19

Friends:
9,921; Daily
posts and
engagemen
t is low

Restoración
Nacional

Centerleft

N/A

N/A

Alianza Para
el Progreso

Centerleft

Low:
1,582,93
3

Mediu
m:
2:01

Friends: 75;
Irregular
postings
and no
online
community
Friends:
8,875;
Daily
postings
but no
engagemen
t or online
community

Justicia
Nacional

N/A

N/A

N/A

Partido
Socialista

LeftWing

N/A

Avanza País

N/A

N/A

and ICTS and
no online
community or
engagement

N/A

Since Jan.
2011; 8,442;
Irregular
postings and
limited
engagement

Blog

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Friends:
3,907; Low
engagemen
t

Since May
2010; 1,981
followers;
Irregular
postings and
low
engagement

Blog

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A
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Irregular and
limited use of
social media
and ICTS, no
online
community or
engagement
Lack of
coherent
strategy and
no online
community or
engagement
Limited use of
social media
and ICTs and
no online
community.
Inconsistent
strategy and
use; focuses
solely on
Facebook;
limited to no
online
community
and
engagement
Have a
website but
utilize no
other social
media or ICTs
and therefore
no online
community
Inconsistent
use of social
media and
ICTs. Have
little to no
online
community
and
engagement
from the
public.
Administer
one website
and not

Partido por la
Democracia
Social

CenterLeft

Low:
2,359,44
9

N/A

Friends:
283; Low
use and
engagemen
t

N/A

N/A

Partido
Movimiento
Humanista
Peruano

CenterLeft

N/A

N/A

Friends:
320; Low
engagemen
t

42 followers;
posts daily
and has some
engagement
from public

N/A

Renacimiento
Andino

Center

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

utilizing any
social media
or ICTs for
work. No
online
community
and
engagement.
Some limited
use of ICTs
and social
media, but no
online
engagement
or community
Very limited
strategy and
online
engagement
and
community
Have a
website and
use no other
social media
and ICTs

Therefore, unlike the case in Indonesia, the use of ICTs in the political context is less
transformative. In Peru, these technologies have become yet another communication and
organizing tool for the more established and well-resourced political parties; rather than
transforming traditional power bases and helping to overcome the political apathy that has
become endemic to Peru’s political culture. Additionally, the success of media-based candidates
such as Fernando Belaúnde Terry have shown politicians how ICTs can be used to for
supporting individual politicians rather than building party organization (Smith, 2009).
Likewise, scholars have noted how in Peru, ICTs are creating further fragmentation and
undermining the party system by further reducing the need for party building and constructing
a solid party organization (Hawkins, 2013).
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Conclusion
In Indonesia and Peru, we have two emerging democracies overcoming authoritarian
legacies and dealing with domestic challenges such as corruption, high poverty rate, and social
divisions. In Indonesia, the third largest democracy in the world, youth are driving political
change using technologies (McRae, 2013), despite low levels of ICT development, high poverty,
and low tertiary education. The election of a non-traditional and third-party candidate, Joko
Widowo, who capitalized on ICTs to engage with citizens, ushered in a new era of online political
engagement which has further spurred lots of online civic technology communities. In Peru,
where education attainment is low, and youth attribute ICTs with social rather than political
purposes, the utility has been more limited. ICTs have failed to reengage citizens at a national
level and to foster new cross-cutting networks and ties which can form the basis for a
progressive movement. In Peru, the use of ICTs in politics by politicians has been to use it as
another communication platform. Therefore, unlike the case in Chile and Taiwan, in Peru the
persistent lack of trust in the political system has resulted in youth remaining largely apathetic.
Although, Indonesia continues to struggle with weak political party system a campaign finance
laws (Transparency International, 2014), citizens of Indonesia appear committed to the idea of
democracy and are relying on digital activism to help push change along.

In summary, Indonesia presents a fascinating case study. Indonesia highlights the ways
that preexisting cultures of resistance and activism can overcome demographic and
socioeconomic factors. Although, Indonesia is the poorest and least developed economically
and ICT infrastructure-wise, it has some of the most vibrant ICT-enabled activism in the world.
A reason for this is that ICTs are amplifying a political culture of student activism which has a
historical legacy of being able to force oppressive leaders out of power. Additional, analysis of
political party websites showed how half of all political parties in Indonesia have high level of
engagement and online communities. Meanwhile, although Peru has a more educated and
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connected population, Peru has a weakened legacy of activism that has is characterized as
apathetic and disengaged from politics. This is seen in the limited usage that political parties
give to ICTs in their communications and outreach. Therefore, in this context ICTs are seen
more as social tools than political/activism tools. I can also argue that like in Chile, Indonesia is
another country where I would predict we may see political parties shifting and becoming more
fluid and participatory than in Peru and Taiwan.
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Chapter Six
Historical Legacies, ICTs, and Human Development:
Understanding ICTs Role in Politics in the 21 st Century

There is democratic uncertainty all over the world. The reported decline of political
parties and other institutional forms of engagement, loss of social cohesion, increasing economic
inequality, and emergence of populism, have raised concerns about the competency of
democratic societies. Likewise, the emergence of ICTs has led to new “empowered publics” and
“mediazation of politics” (Mazzoleni, 2008) which are contributing to greater dynamism and
unpredictability in politics today. How will political parties respond and adapt to these
challenges and opportunities and how much of what we are seeing today is new and not a
continuation of existing political and cultural practices? As complex as these questions are to
unravel, this study examines patterns and mechanisms which can help explain how ICT-enabled
activism is shaping political parties in emerging democracies. Specifically, it seeks to
understand how demographic, socio economic, and cultural factors interact with ICTs to shape
relations between social movements and political parties in the 21st century.

To answer these questions, this study sought to do two things. First, I argue that a
comparative approach to analyzing the relationship between ICTs and political parties has the
potential to offer renewed understanding of the development of the ICTs in social and political
life. There is increasing comparative literature that is starting to examine how the Internet
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shapes democratic politics in a variety of national contexts (Gibson et al. 2003; Chadwick, 2006;
Vaccari, 2008; Gibson & McAllister, 2011) and this study seeks to supplement that work.
Therefore, the study is centered around four case studies featuring two regions with the highest
rate of Internet usage, Latin America (Chile and Peru) and East Asia (Taiwan and Indonesia).
Second, I argue that political scientists can no longer ignore the role of ICTs and digital media.
Consequently, this study sought to incorporate four pieces of literature that rarely all interact
with each other in political science: literature on social movements, digital media, technology,
and democracy (Porta, 2011). There are studies which are increasingly integrating these bodies
of work, for example, by introducing new theories on how political communication works in the
digital age and how politics is increasingly defined by organizations, groups, and individuals
who are best able to blend older and newer ICT-media logics, in what has been coined hybrid
systems (Chadwick, 2016). Therefore, an area ongoing research will continue to explore how
ICTs and digital media challenge traditional established political parties in these new “hybrid”
contexts (Coleman, 2017; Chadwick and Strommer-Galley, 2016). Likewise, social movement
theory helps to bridge our understanding of digital media’s mediating effects on social and
political life, through its ability to foster new frames and opportunity structures for activists and
political parties to leverage. Finally, research on democracy tends to be centered on
representative institutions and often provides structural explanations of democratic
developments (Della Porta, 2010) which are often missing in discussion of ICTs in political and
social life.

By combining pieces of these literatures, I then examined the ways that ICTs interact
with contextual factors which pre-date their existence in Taiwan, Chile, Indonesia, and Peru.
What I find is that, history matters. Rather, I argue that the shifting nature between social
movements, ICTs, and political parties that can be shaped by a variety of demographic and
socio-economic factors as well as preexisting cultures of resistance, activism, and electoral
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campaigning. Specifically, factors such as successive student movements and a country’s human
development, particularly education may be fruitful patterns that are worthy of further
exploration. The case studies also show how different types of environments can catalyze or
diminish the development of ICTs for politics, although there were five political opportunities
structures that were found in varying degrees throughout the case studies. These were the: (1)
elevation of domestic issues to the international arena, (2) support the emergence of “third
party” non-establishment candidates, (3) facilitation of peer-to-peer communications which can
strengthen alternative and common/shared views and perspectives, (4) creation of new
government accountability and transparency advocate communities, and (5) diversification of
new and complementary forms of organizing, mobilizing, and movement building strategies.

Regarding the role of these political opportunities, in the Taiwan case study I discuss
how existing ethnonationalistic claims and complex cross strait relations have caused many to
argue that ICT-enabled activism especially post-Sunflower movement, disruptive to current
politics in Taiwan (Lee, 2014); therefore, lose its influence in the Taiwanese political landscape.
At the same time, Taiwan’s history of student movements demonstrates a preexisting culture of
resistance and activism often centered on media, of which the Sunflower movement could just
be a next phase, albeit with new ICT tools. In Chile, the dominance of elite politics and marketcentered reforms interacted with Chile’s preexisting culture of student activism to create new
and dynamic forms of ICT-enabled activism. However, despite the student movements’ ability
to garner domestic and international support, they were still unable to overcome the
embeddedness of Chile’s preexisting elite and market-driven political culture. Therefore,
despite the emergence of “empowered publics” creating new political opportunities in Taiwan
and Chile - political parties and the political landscape suggested that it would still be “politics
as usual”. Therefore, these preliminary findings suggest that the ICT-political partiesdemocracy relationship may not be absolute, but rather more dialectical - which means that not
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only can we expect great variability among regions and countries (Best & Wade, 2009), but that
it is possible that ICTs can reshape political parties, but political parties will mediate eventual
outcomes.

The same can be said for my supplemental case studies of Indonesia and Peru, although,
they present an additional layer of complexity. In these case studies, I discussed how social
movements and ICTs in Indonesia are creating more political opportunities than in Peru despite Indonesia being the least wealthy and having the lowest human development, rate of
education, and Internet usage of all the countries. As a result, in terms of ICTs and political
opportunities, Indonesia operated more like its wealthier, more educated, and higher Internet
usage counterparts of Taiwan and Chile. Therefore, what additional factors can help explain the
divergence in this case? Could Indonesia’s history of vibrant and successful student movements
help to explain this? I argue that Indonesia’s preexisting culture of activism and resistance
could help explain why Indonesia has a more active culture of activism and use of ICTs, despite
all odds. However, two additional factors may warrant a closer review. These are the role of
social capital and political efficacy. For example, in Indonesia, despite high level of corruption
and weak democratic institutions, student movements had earlier demonstrated how to use
ICTs to overthrow the Suharto dictatorship in 1998. While in Peru, the dominance of elite
politics in Peru and political apathy has weakened the sense of political efficacy which could
contribute to a lack of social capital among citizens and civil society38 (Loulis, 2003; Schmitter,
2003).

The sense of political efficacy for both student movement protestors and political parties
were themes explored in the surveys for Taiwan and Chile. In both countries, the surveys
showed that although students expressed a higher sense of political efficacy and interest in ICTs
38

This goes to Malcolm Gladwell’s argument that meaningful activism requires strong, offline ties to
mobilize engagement (2016).
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than did political parties, this didn’t suggest an interest in traditional politics. For example, in
Taiwan most students expressed a positive view towards the utility of social networking sites in
politics, the political activities students were most likely to use ICTs to engage with were: (1)
keep up with political news, (2) debate or discuss political issues with others, and (3) learn about
what issues and policies political parties are advocating for, (4) read the blog of a politicians, (5)
watch a video online of a politicians, and sign online petitions or comment on online news.
However, students were less likely to use social networking sites for more traditional politicking
tasks such as recruiting people to get involved in a political cause or finding other people who
share their political views. In Chile, students reported less political efficacy than Taiwanese
students, but they still reported using ICTs in similar ways. Finally, in Chile and Taiwan,
students appear to utilize ICTs to be connected to specific issues and not necessarily politicians.
Therefore, the trend in both countries highlight how students were not inclined to use social
media to feel closer to their political party, but rather for other personal purposes and interests.
Likewise, a further area for research in Taiwan is to survey and compare students from the
mainland with islander to determine if students’ interest in technology for political activism is
attributed to a generational gap or if also depends on the political opinions and sense of political
efficacy that students’ have.

In terms of political parties’ efficacy when thinking about ICTs, the surveys and analysis
of political party websites found that most parties were not even in the beginning stages of
evolving into more movement-as-party forms. In Chile, the political parties which actively
courted student-led movements, were more likely to express interest in exploring ways that ICTs
could promote innovative forms of direct and participatory democracy. Here the parties which
appeared especially innovative and effective in facilitating new participatory strategies were:
Party for Democracy (Partido Por la Democracia) and National Renewal (Renovación Nacional).
These parties’standout above the rest because they employ multiple technology platforms and

209

strategies and have active online communities with engagement from the public. Meanwhile, in
Taiwan party use of the Internet and technologies is more a function of current party culture
and desire to appeal to modern and young constituents, than an interest by parties to elevate
their interactions with citizens. Therefore, political parties in Taiwan are not necessarily
interested in exploring ways to be more responsive to citizens and improve their transparency
and internal party democracy, despite the existence of a highly educated and connected
citizenry. Consequently, it remains to be seen whether political parties will either be reformed or
entirely replaced under the weight of technological change (Anstead and Chadwick, 2009). The
table below summarizes differences in responses between political parties in Taiwan versus
Chile:
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Table 23: Summary of Chile and Taiwan Parties’ Surveys
Issues

Chile

Taiwan

Political leaders’ approval
of ICT use

Majority support

Majority support

ICTs are best for….

1.

Incorporate issues to the
political agenda
2. Motivate people to stay
politically active
3. Discussions with citizens
77% disagree

1.

Feel ICTs have facilitated
their communication of
messages and goals of their
party

82% agree

98% agree

ICTs help to increase
affiliations

53% agree

70% agree

ICTs help to diversify
affiliations

54%

95% agree

ICTs help to deepen
participation

76% agree

92% agree

ICTs help party work more
effectively and efficiently

76% agree

91% agree

Favorite online tools:

Website, Facebook, Twitter

Facebook, Website, SMS

ICT tool with greatest
impact

Twitter

Facebook

Use ICTs primarily to….

1.

1.

Feel ICTs make party lose
control of message ad
narrative

Distribute information over
political objectives and
other political messages
2. Build consensus around
political problems and
solutions
3. Mobilize members for
specific objective
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Distributing information on
policy proposals;
2. Search for information on
political or social issues
3. Discussion with citizens
73% agree

Communicate about policy
objectives
2. Increase concern and
interest in issues
3. Communicate with other
groups and supporters

In Indonesia, the major political parties such as Democratic Party, Party of the
Functional Groups, Indonesia Democratic-Party Struggle, Great Indonesia Movement Party,
also had the most sophisticated uses of ICTs in their online politicking as well as the most
vibrant online communities. However, unlike any of the other countries, Indonesia political
parties appear to have integrated mobile technologies into their political outreach and
communications. In Peru, there were only three major parties Left-wing-Partido Nacionalista
Peruano, right-wing Fuerza Popular, and center-left Solidaridad Nacional, who had the most
active online political communities and utilized the most professional and sophisticated uses of
ICTs for engaging citizens. The remainder of smaller parties in Peru employed ICTs in limited
ways and therefore had either small or inactive online communities. Therefore, in Peru these
technologies have become yet another communication and organizing tool for the more
established and well-resourced political parties; rather than transforming traditional power
bases and helping to overcome the political apathy that has become endemic to Peru’s political
culture.
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The table below summarizes the analysis of political parties use of ICTs in online spaces:
Table 24: Summary of Political Party Use of ICTs in Taiwan, Chile, Indonesia and Peru
Countries

Active Political
Parties

Facebook

Twitter

Activity Level

East Asia
Taiwan

5

60%: 3(5) using

40%: 2(5) using

Indonesia

12

67%: 8(12) using

83%: 10(12) using

Chile

12

92%: 11(12)

100%: 12(12)

Peru

30

43%: 13(30)

37%: 11(30) using

Major parties
active and savvy,
minor parties
investing less
energy
Most parties
trying to actively
use social media,
but only a few
standout parties
with successful
parties online.
Most parties were
active to varying
degrees of
success. Some
parties are
innovative and
maintaining
active
communities.
Most parties not
active or
struggling to
engage
constituents.
Two parties are
successful and
one is innovative.

Finally, the question as to whether political parties should resist or answer to populist
demands for a more fluid party-as-a-movement form is debatable. Studies have found that
political parties may be reformed due to the tension between control and interactivity, as ICTs
foster a culture of organizational experimentation and a party-as-movement mentality
(Chadwick and Strommer-Galley, 2016). But should they? For example, scholars such as
Zeynep Tufekci(2016) and Clay Shirky (2010) suggests that although ICTs drive thousands into
the streets, it doesn’t meaningfully threaten people in power (Tufekci, 2016). Instead, ICTs may
make it easier to build large but fragile movements, but they lack the hard work of compromise
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and coalition-building that is needed to organize and sustain efforts long enough to effect
political change (Tufekci, 2016). If this is the case for ICT-enabled movements, what if political
parties go the same way as these movements? What essential political party functions may be
lost or diminished? Thus, more research is needed to identify ways to help political parties use
ICTs to deepen existing traditional functions and foster “authentic participation” (Picazo, 2005),
rather than aspiring for newer party-as-movement forms that do not clearly define how, ICTs
could complement and not necessarily replace certain traditional functions that political parties
possess which are critical to democracies. Whether and how ICT-enabled citizens should
breathe new life into established political parties (Chadwick and Strommer-Galley, 2016) is still
a question which warrants more research.
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